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Chapter 1
Social Orientations and Others' Expected Orientations
Expectations in Social Interdependence Situations
Suppose you share your house with someone else and you are confronted with the
situation that it has to be cleaned. An appealing solution to this problem is that the other
cleans the house, while you do something more important and satisfying Unfortunately,
the other usually considers the same solution attractive, only with a reversal of roles
Confronted with this state of affairs one can firmly declare that one does not care for a
clean house and secretly hope that the other does care and cleans the house alone. But
generally the other is not that altruistic and in the end one either has to join forces and do
the task together or face a dirty house and perhaps buy some air spray. This is an example
of an interdependence situation: your outcomes are not only dependent on your own
behavior, but also on the behavior of another individual. Moreover, this situation has the
properties of a prisoner's dilemma game. Both individuals are better off when the other
does the cleaning alone, that is, when the other cooperates and they themselves do not
cooperate. However, when in the end nobody does the cleaning (both do not cooperate)
then they would both have been better off if they had divided the work and cleaned the
house together (both had cooperated)
As Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) pointed out in their goal/expectation theory,
cooperation in interdependence situations depends on the goal in the situation and on the
expectation of how the other individual will behave. Pruitt and Kimmel expect most
mutual cooperation to occur when both individuals have the goal of achieving cooperation
and also the expectation that the other will cooperate. Thus, Pruitt and Kimmel expect less
mutual cooperation if one of the individuals does not have a cooperative goal or does not
expect the other to cooperate. This implies for the above-mentioned example that it is less
likely that you will clean the house when you expect that the other will do nothing.
The Triangle Hypothesis
Interestingly, Kelley and Stahelski (1970b) suggested a priori differences to exist between
people in both their goals and their expectations concerning the cooperation of others
They stated that the goals that people set for themselves reflect the orientations they
generally adopt for a wide variety of their social interactions Two types of individuals
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were distinguished: cooperators and competitors. According to Kelley and Stahelski's
triangle hypothesis (197Ob) the differences in expectation boil down to competitors
expecting others to be primarily competitive, whereas cooperators expect more variation
among other people: others can be either cooperative or competitive The triangle
hypothesis received its name because of the relationship hypothesized to exist between
individuals' own orientation and their expectations about others' orientations (see Figure
11) The prediction of the triangle hypothesis was confirmed in Kelley and Stahelski's
own research (1970b)  Of the cooperators, only 39% expected that the typical other would
also have a cooperative orientation, whereas 76% of the competitors expected the typical
other to be oriented competitively. Thus, the consensus expectation of competitors was
clearly higher than that of cooperators.
Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) gave a plausible explanation for the competitors'
overestimation of their own behavior They observed that cooperators who interacted with
competitors  in a prisoner's dilemma  game  (PDG, see Figure 1.2) adjusted to increased
noncooperative behavior in order to prevent exploitation. Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob)
called this change from cooperation to noncooperation behavioral assimilation of
cooperators Cooperators assimilated to noncooperative behavior as otherwise they would
continuously receive the lowest possible outcome in the PDG and the competitive other
would receive the highest outcome. As a consequence, competitors misjudged the
orientations of cooperators taking them to be competitors Kelley and Stahelski concluded
with regard to competitors (1970, p. 67): 'Insofar as these people fail to discount their
causal role in their social relationships (  ), they develop a distorted view of their social
environment.'   It is important to notice the implicit causal mechanism that Kelley  and
Stahelski (197Ob) proposed here for competitors' overestimation of their orientation:
overestimation of one's own orientation is caused by a low accuracy in perceiving others'
orientations correctly.
The support for the triangle hypothesis came from research using PDGs Kelley
and Stahelski (197Ob) argued that this did not represent a serious limitation to the
generalizability of their hypothesis when three assumptions are made  As the claims of the
assumptions have been disputed and tested by other investigators they are presented here
in full (Kelley and Stahelski, 1970, p. 77):
Social Orien- Expectations as to Others'
tation Orientations
Cooperative Competitive
Cooperative         *             *             *             *
*                                        *                                        *
*Competitive
Figure  1.1   The Triangle Hypothesis
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Figure  1.2   The  Prisoner's  Dilemma  Game
Note. In a prisoner's dilemma game, two persons choose simultaneously between two alternatives. Each
alternative has an outcome (money or points) for oneself and for the other individual. The outcome one
receives is dependent on the choices of both oneself and the other. Two contradictory principles define the
PDG. According to the first principle the noncooperative alternative ID) always gives a higher outcome than
the cooperative alternative (C), irrespective of the other's choice. According to the second principle, when
-   -  _both r•re-n• rhim, rn.ppriti„Bly thAY rAM;VP highpr ni,trnmA thM whAn they both choose Ilan-
cooperatively.
1.  The PDG is an analogue of the type of real-life relationship in which people are
able to gain information about one another's basic social orientations. This does
not imply that the PDG type of relationship is a common one. Rather, the
assumption is that the PDG simulates the very important class of social interaction
settings in which the situational constraints on behavior are minimal and in which,
therefore, the participants can feel they learn something about each other rather
than merely about social roles and structure
2. The goals that subjects set for themselves when they enter the laboratory PDG
reflect the orientations they generally adopt for a wide variety of their social
relationships In other words, the cooperative subject tends generally to have a
cooperative orientation, and the competitive subject generally to have a competitive
orientation. It is important to note that this assumption does not imply that
cooperative and competitive persons always behave in accordance with their
orientations. The data which have already been summarized show that coopera-
tively oriented persons do not necessarily behave according to their orientations.
And, of course, even competitors are likely to behave cooperatively in settings
where there are strong social pressures to do so.
3.  Cooperative and competitive persons encounter and interact with one another  in
an unsystematic manner. That is, each type of person has experience in social
interaction with both his own and the other type of person There is no marked
degree of "selective mating"
Kelley and Stahelski (1970b) stated that with these three assumptions it was possible to
generalize the triangle hypothesis from the evidence obtained in PDG circumstances to a
general relationship between individuals' orientations and their expectations about others'
orientations.
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Overview of this Thesis
In this first chapter, research evaluating the triangle hypothesis and one of its implications
are described, and procedures to assess individuals' social value orientations accurately are
presented. The empirical overview suggests that support for the triangle hypothesis is
limited to studies employing the prisoner's dilemma game These studies, however, have
in common that more or less explicitly the possible range of expected orientations was
restricted Therefore, in the study described in the second chapter the expected orientations
of other people were assessed in a manner without this drawback, providing another
pattern of results. To increase our understanding of people's consensus expectations of
their social orientations, in the last part of the first chapter the attention is turned to a
more general field of research into individuals' consensus estimations, that of false
consensus. In this field, some intriguing explanations have been offered for the typical
overestimation of the occurrence of one's own behavior among other people. The most
promising explanations were applied in experiments reported in the chapters three to five.
In the final chapter, an overview of the empirical evidence gathered in the present research
leads to a falsification of the triangle hypothesis and to a new model to predict the
perceived consensus  of one' s social value orientation.
Research Evaluating the Triangle Hypothesis
Most of the research done into the triangle hypothesis employed a PDG. Commonly, in
these studies the procedure of Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) was followed. Subjects had to
indicate their own orientation and then the orientation they expected of a typical other
person The latter question was posed in two ways. Sometimes subjects had to indicate the
orientation of the typical other, either cooperative or competitive, in other cases subjects
were asked to estimate the percentages of typical others who would choose a cooperative
or competitive orientation. Kelley and Stahelski (1970a) used both questions and
considered them both adequate measures of the expected orientation.
Generally, the research results are clear: in eight of the nine studies, competitive
subjects showed a higher consensus expectation than cooperative subjects (see Table 1 1)
The only exception was found in a study by Mess6 and Sivacek (1979) in which the
consensus expectations of cooperators and competitors were about equal. In this study,
subjects did not have to predict the others' social orientation but their probable next
choice Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob, p 87) already noticed that with this question the
triangular pattern was less pronounced. They did not, however, provide a satisfactory
reason for this difference between competitors' expected choice and expected social
orientation A possible explanation for the result in the study by Mess6 and Sivacek (1979)
is that the phrase partner was used, which may have induced more expected cooperation
of the other  As can be seen in Table 1.1, when subjects had to generate expectations for
a nonpartner the result  was   more   in   line  with   the  triangle  hypothesis.   Nevertheless,   the
overall conclusion is clear: the triangle hypothesis is confirmed in PDGs Competitors'
consensus expectations are higher than those of cooperators.
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Table  1.1    Consensus  Expectations  in  Experiments  using  Prisoner's  Dilemma  Games
Experiments Coop- Competi-
erators tors
Stahelski & Kelley (in Kelley & Stahelski. 197Ob) 60% 80%
Kelley & Stahelski (197Ob) 39% 76%
Miller & Holmes (1975) 60% 90%
Kuhlman & Wimberley (1976) 53% 65 %1
Schlenker & Goldman (1978) 33% 85%
Mess6 & Sivacek (1979; partneA 76% 72%
Messd & Sivacek (1979, nonpartneA 56% 63%
-Misra-&-Kalro-(19791     - - -      ---     --  59% --86%        ----     -       -
Bixenstine, Lowenfeld & Englehart (1981. part 1) 50% 100%
Bixenstine. Lowenfeld & Englehart (1981, part 2) 58% 96%
1 The social orientations individualism and competition are grouped together.
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game Analogous to
Situations in Daily Life?
Miller and Holmes (1975) took issue with Kelley and Stahelski's (197Ob) first two
assumptions. With regard to the first assumption they quoted a problematic segment in
which Kelley and Stahelski assumed that the PDG simulates situations where situational
constraints on behavior are minimal Miller and Holmes reacted as follows (1975, p. 662)
It would appear, on the contrary, that the PDG represents an analog of a very
specific type of social situation where situational constraints are maximal, affording
participating individuals little person information, with the consequence that
interaction between participants generally evolves into spiraling competition.
Although Miller and Holmes point indeed at a weak fragment, it is perhaps not a fair
treatment of the first assumption as a whole. If this third sentence were omitted the
essence of the assumption would remain: the PDG is an analogue of the type of real-life
relationship in which people are able to gain information about one another's basic social
orientations. This assumption remains possible and it would take additional research to
evaluate this assumption more decisively.
Furthermore, Miller and Holmes (1975) took issue with the second assumption by
criticizing the way that Kelley and Stahelski (1970a, 197Ob) had assessed subjects' social
orientations. Subjects were first taught the PDG and the interaction procedure, and were
then asked what they wanted to achieve in the relationship. They could choose from two
orientations: cooperation    (' I   will    try to cooperate   with the other player   and    will    be
concerned with my own score and the other player's score') or competition ('I will work
for myself against the other player, and will be concerned only with my own score').
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Miller and Holmes (1975) pointed out that in this manner subjects' orientations may be
confounded with the structural properties of the PDG (the noncooperative alternative
always leads to a higher outcome than the cooperative alternative). Moreover, in Kelley
and Stahelski's procedure (1970a, 197Ob) the direction of causality may be from expecta-
tions in the PDG to choice of a social orientation, rather than vice versa, as implied by
Kelley and Stahelski (1970b). This is, indeed, a serious problem Miller and Holmes did
not have an adequate solution for it This problem will be dealt with in a later section.
Because Miller and Holmes (1975) considered the PDG an example of a very
specific type of social situation where situational constraints were maximal, they expanded
a PDG with a defensive alternative. In this so-called EPDG, cooperative subjects could
defend themselves against noncooperation of another without having to choose non-
cooperatively themselves. The results were in the direction predicted by Miller and
Holmes (1975)  In the PDG the competitors expected a high percentage of others to be
competitive (90%), whereas cooperators expected only 60% of others to be oriented
cooperatively  In the EPDG no difference in consensus expectation (expectation of their
own orientation) was found between cooperators (65%) and competitors (68%).
This result implies that support for the triangle hypothesis was restricted to the
PDG Contrary to this implication is the observation that Miller and Holmes' EPDG
essentially had the same drawbacks as a PDG. The EPDG is also a dilemma game with
specific strategic aspects that influence both one's own behavior and expectations about
other's behavior A better solution is to measure social orientations and expected
orientations of others without letting strategic considerations play a part.
Social Value Orientations and Their Assessment
Kelley and Stahelski (1970a, 1970b) assessed social value orientations by a goal that
subjects chose in a PDG. However, as pointed out by Miller and Holmes (1975), it is
possible that the direction of causality is from situational expectations to choice of a social
orientation, instead of vice versa. Another drawback of Kelley and Stahelski's procedure
is that in a PDG the interdependence of outcomes on the other individual is stressed,
leading to strategic considerations influencing both one's own behavior and the expected
behavior of others (McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman & Campos, 1973) Therefore, it is
preferable to employ decomposed games in which the interdependence of outcomes on the
other is less apparent (see Figur.e 1.3 for examples) for the measurement of social value
orientations
The decomposed games technique was developed by Pruitt (1967) and Messick and
McClintock (1968). A decomposed game consists of two or more alternatives, each
alternative comprising an outcome to oneself and an outcome to an other, unknown
individual. One is instructed to choose the most preferred alternative. The other individual
also makes a choice in the same decomposed game, but usually neither receives feedback
of the choices made by the other in order to minimize the influence of strategic
considerations
Individuals' choices in a series of decomposed games enable an accurate assess-
ment of the weights they assign to their own and to others' outcomes, and this, in turn,
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Alternatives
A               B
Self 25 24
Otherperson              16               25
IKG CAEM
A             B
Self                                     16                         14
-  -Otherperson - - - - -  19- --  -- --26
IKGEM CA
Figure   1.3    Examples  of  Decomposed  Games
Note. For illustrative purposes, under each decomposed game the alternative preferred by each of the social
orientations is indicated: 1: individualism; K: competition; G: aggression; C: cooperation; A: Altruism; E:
Equality; M: Maximin.
defines their social value orientations (Wyer, 1969; McClintock, 1972) McClintock (1972)
distinguished four social value orientations: cooperation (maximizing   one' s    own   and
other's outcomes), competition (maximizing the difference between one's own and other's
outcomes to one's own advantage), individualism (maximizing one's own outcomes,
regardless of the other's outcomes) and altruism (maximizing the other's outcomes,
regardless of one's own outcomes). McClintock et al. (1973) tried to distinguish another
orientation, aggression (minimizing   the  other's   outcomes,   regardless   of  one's   own
outcomes), but hardly found any subject with this social orientation. Altruistic subjects are
also found rarely.
Consider the following examples of choices made according to a social orientation
in the first decomposed  game in Figure 1.3. Cooperators, for instance, prefer the second
alternative because here the sum of their own and the other's outcomes (24+25=49) is
higher than for the first alternative (25+16=41). Competitors prefer the first alternative
because the difference between their own and the other's outcomes (25-16=9) is higher
than for the second alternative (24-25=-1)
Social orientations can be depicted in a geometric model developed by Griesinger
and Livingston (1973) In this geometric model - with one's own outcomes on the
horizontal axis and the other individual's outcomes on the vertical axis - individuals'
social orientations can be depicted as vectors, depending on the weights they assign to
their own  and the other's outcomes (see Figure  1.4a)
Although a utility function with two weights, one weight for one's own outcomes
and one weight for the other's outcomes, can adequately describe a large range of the
social orientations found in empirical research, some authors proposed a more complex
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(a)                                  (b)
Figure  1.4  A  Geometric  Model With  Two  Dimensions  (a)  and Three  Dimensions  (bJ
utility function that places even fewer restrictions on the range of social orientations that
can be distinguished (Radzicki, 1976; MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; Grzelak, Iwinski,
& Radzicki, 1977; Wieczorkowska, 1982; Knight & Dubro, 1984; Schulz & May, 1987,
1989). In this more complex utility function, one weight is added to the previous weights:
the absolute difference between one's own and other's outcomes (see Table  1.2).  For two
social orientations found in empirical research (Schulz & May, 1989) this third weight is
ernployed: equality (minimizing the difference between one's own and others' outcomes)
and marimin (maximizing the outcomes for the person who receives least). As shown by
Schulz and May (1989), Griesinger and Livingston's geometric model (1973) can be
extended to three dimensions with an axis of the third weight (from equal to unequal
outcomes for oneself and another). This three dimensional model is depicted in Figure
1.4b.
Some research has investigated the stability and external validity of social orienta-
tions. Research relevant to the stability of social orientations has been reported by
Kuhlman, Camac, and Cunha (1986). About four to six weeks after subjects' social
orientations had been assessed differences were found on other tasks that were consistent
with subjects' social orientations. For instance, competitors carrying out a typing task
started working more rapidly or making more errors in the presence of a fast coactor than
in the presence of a slower one. Cooperators and individualists were not influenced by
the working speed of the coactor. Research pertaining to the external validity of social
orientations has been reported by Knight (1981) and Bem and Lord (1979). Knight (1981)
studied how accurate children's social orientations were identified by their classmates. He
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found a high agreement (60%) between the children's social orientations (as assessed by
their choices in decomposed games) and the estimated orientations by their classmates.
Bem and Lord (1979) used a more indirect approach. They asked five judges to fill in a
personality questionnaire according to an individualistic, competitive and pro-social
orientation. Then the social orientations of a number of subjects were assessed in the
laboratory with decomposed games and their roommates were asked to rate them on the
same personality questionnaire. The roommates' ratings correlated significantly higher
with the judges' ratings of the subjects' actual orientation than with the ratings of other
orientations In conclusion, people's social orientation is identifiable by others who know
them and therefore is a manifestation of personality.
Difficulties in Applying the Triangle Hypothesis
Application of the triangle hypothesis to research in which more or other orientations are
differentiated than Kelley and Stahelski's cooperative and competitive categories (197Ob)
poses a problem because either the social orientations or the triangle hypothesis must be
accommodated There are at least three solutions to this problem. Firstly, the two
categories of social orientations that Kelley and Stahelski distinguished can be taken
literally as cooperators and competitors and other orientations can be disregarded
Secondly, all categories of social orientations can be grouped together into pro-social and
pro-self categories (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991 a) Pro-social subjects (cooperation,
altruism, equality, and maximin) show a concern for other's outcomes, whereas pro-self
subjects attach  no  or a negative weight to other' s outcomes (individualism, competition,
Table  1.2   Utility  Functions of  Social Value  Orientations  (Schulz  &  May.  1989)
Social Orientation Utility Function
U(S, 0) = WTS + W20
Altruism OXS + 1xo = 0
Cooperation 1 x s+l x o=s+0
Individualism 1xs  +   OXO  =   S
Competition 1xs+-lxo= s-0
Aggression O X S  +  -1  X O  =   -O
Ufs, W = W, S + W20  + W3  IS-01
Equality O x s  +O x o  + -1 x  l s-0 I    =   -ls-0  
Maximin 1 x s  +   1 x 0  + -1 x  I s-01    =   s  +  O-  I s-01
Note. s: outcome for oneself. o: outcome for the other individual. w,: weight for one's own outcome.
W2: weight for other's outcome. wi: weight for the absolute difference between one's own and other's
outcomes.
10           The Perceived Consensus of One's Social Orientation
and aggression). Thirdly, social orientations can be ordered along a continuum from
altruism to competition. This can be easily established for those orientations with only two
weights, one weight for own outcomes and one weight for other's outcomes, namely,
altruism, cooperation, individualism, and competition. Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976, p
80), for instance, suggested this ordering and even Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) stated that
(conclusion  1,  p.  66):
There are two stable types of individuals which may be described approximately
as cooperative and competitive personalities. (This could be put more accurately,
perhaps, by reference to stable individual differences along a dimension from
cooperation to competition, but the terminology of "types" greatly simplifies the
exposition of this argument.)
One problem with the continuum from altruism to competition is that it is not possible to
properly position the orientations equality and maximin Therefore, these orientations are
excluded in this solution The triangle hypothesis prediction in this third solution is that
individuals' consensus expectations should increase as their orientation is located nearer
to the competitive extreme of the continuum from altruism to competition This prediction
is implied by the figure of the triangle hypothesis and by the accompanying text by Kelley
and Stahelski (1970b, p 77): 'Translating the types into the underlying dimensions of
which   they are dichotomized simplifi cations, the hypothesis   can be represented   by   the
triangular plot shown in Figure ' (Figure  1.1  in this thesis).
None of the solutions is ideal, because in each case valuable information may be
lost.  Therefore,  it is seemingly impossible to choose a priori for one of them. The first and
second solution seem rather simplistic, but the third one is based on an interpretation of
remarks made by Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) and may, therefore, not reflect the
intention of these theorists  In the experiments in this dissertation the three solutions are
applied, though more or less implicit  In the final chapter, the relevant results are reviewed
and each of the solutions is evaluated explicitly. Some of the problems in applying the
triangle hypothesis can be noticed below in a few significant studies employing decom-
posed games.
Testing the Triangle Hypothesis
Employing Decomposed Games
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) saw the opportunity to test the triangle hypothesis
employing decomposed games Both individuals' social value orientations and their
expected orientations of others could be assessed without the above-mentioned drawbacks
of the PDG  In this manner, the expected orientations of others were determined less by
aspects of the situation and more by characteristics of the individual Kuhlman and
Wimberley (1976) used a series of decomposed games which made possible the distinction
between the orientations cooperation, individualism, and competition After subjects' social
orientations had been measured they were asked to indicate for each alternative in a
decomposed game how many university undergraduates out of a hundred would prefer it
This question was repeated for a number of other decomposed games.
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) found support for the triangle hypothesis in a
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Table  1.3   Subjects' Own  and Expected  Orientations  (Kuhlman  & Wimberley.  1976i
Social Orien- Expected Social Orientations
tation
Cooperation Individualism Competition
Cooperators 48% 31 % 21 %
Individualists 18% 42% 39%
Competitors 15% 25% 60%
PDG (see Table 1.1) and in a decomposed game resembling the PDG In this decomposed
game, one alternative was preferred by both individualists and competitors and another
alternative by cooperators. The consensus expectation of competitors and individualists
Was-a50Ut 70%;   comfaed -to  alry -50%  r -cooperators. These-two- results  suggested-
comparability with the approach and type of subjects described by Kelley and Stahelski
(197Ob) Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) also asked for the percentages of expected
others in a decomposed game with three alternatives, each satisfying one of the
orientations cooperation, individualism, and competition (triple dominance game). The
expected percentages are depicted in Table  1.3. Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) conclud-
ed that the pattern of results did not support the triangle hypothesis, but showed that
subjects of each orientation expected predominantly their own orientations of others
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) also suggested why the triangle hypothesis is supported
in a PDG. In a PDG an individualistic choice is confounded with a competitive choice,
that is, individualists and competitors both choose noncooperatively Kuhlman and
Wimberley (1976) suggested that when the expectations of individualists and competitors
with regard to individualism and competition in the triple dominance game are summed,
the results resemble those found in PDG. They emphasized that people of each social
orientation expect their own orientation to about the same extent In contrast with
Kuhlman and Wimberley's conclusion it seems that there was some support for the
triangle hypothesis in their study because the consensus expectations of competitors (60%)were higher than those of cooperators (48%). Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) did,
however, not test this difference in consensus expectations
Brown and Basil (1980; cited in Kuhlman, Camac and Cunha, 1986) replicated the
Table   1.4   Subjects'  Own  and  Expected  Orientations  (Brown  &  Basil,  1980J
Social Orien- Expected Social Orientations
tation
Cooperation Individualism Competition
Cooperators 52% 28% 20%
Individualists 28% 37% 35%
Competitors 23% 28% 49%
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study by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976). The only difference between the two studies
was that Brown and Basil (1980) asked subjects' expectations of others' orientations
approximately four weeks after subjects' own social orientation had been assessed The
main  pattern  of  the two studies is similar (see Table 1.4), which shows that social
orientations are relatively stable characteristics because the pattern would have been
different when, in the meantime, a large number of individuals had adopted another
orientation Nevertheless, some differences for individualists and competitors are apparent.
In the study by Brown and Basil (1980), compared to the study by Kuhlman and Wim-
beriey (1976), both individualists and competitors expected their own orientation to a
lesser extent and cooperation to a higher extent A possible explanation for these
differences will be provided in a later paragraph
Recently, Kuhlman, Brown, and Teta (1992) replicated the previous studies
(Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Brown & Basil, 1980) using the same decomposed games,
type of subjects, and a similar expectation question as in Kuhlman and Wimberley's study
(1976). Subjects' expectations of others' orientations were asked three to six weeks after
subjects' own social orientation had been assessed The expectations in the triple
dominance game were almost a copy of Brown and Basil's (1980) results (see Table  1.4).
New was the name that Kuhlman et al. (1992) coined for the pattern of results: the
Structured Assumed Similarity Bias (SASB) Curiously, they did not explain the name
Probably, the SASB means that subjects' consensus expectations are dependent on the
structure of the decomposed game. For example, in a type of decomposed game in which
individualists and competitors prefer the same alternative and cooperators prefer another,
cooperators show a lower consensus expectation (bias) than individualists and competitors
In another decomposed game in which cooperators and individualists prefer the same
alternative and competitors prefer another, competitors show a lower consensus
expectation than cooperators and individualists. In a decomposed game in which
cooperators, individualists, and competitors prefer different alternatives (the triple
dominance game), subjects' consensus expectations are similar.
No other experiments have been carried out to study the relation between indivi-
duals' orientation and their expected orientations of other people in decomposed games
It appears that most researchers agree with Kuhlman and Wimberley's conclusions.
Learning Others' Social Value Orientations
Kelley and Stahelski (1970b) studied the accuracy of identifying another's orientation in
PDG and found that competitors performed this task poorly. This low performance of
competitors might only be caused by cooperators' behavioral assimilation in PDG or by
a more general unawareness with regard to others' orientations This second possibility is
consistent with the theoretical basis of the triangle hypothesis Maki and McClintock
(1983) investigated the ability of subjects to learn others' social orientations in a series of
decomposed games Subjects observed a number of choices of another chooser, who
strictly choose according  to one social orientation.  Then  subj ects indicated preferences  as
they expected the other chooser would have done In this task, cooperators showed more
correct responses (82%) than competitors (64%), whereas individualists were intermediate
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(72%). Competitors' ability to perceive others' orientations correctly seems less developed.
This result is in accord with the theoretical basis of the triangle hypothesis. In the first
study of this thesis a further implication of the triangle hypothesis is studied  A low
performance in learning others' orientations should be related to a high expectation of
one's own orientation among other people.
False Consensus
-     -     - Theexpectationsof individualseencerning-theendersementoftheir behavior, preferencesr
attitudes, and opinions among other people have also been studied from a broader perspec-
tive than that of social interdependence. Ross, Greene and House (1977) coined the name
false consensus for the general   overestimation   of  people' s   own   behavior  and   attitudes.
Researchers have offered a number of explanations for the false consensus effect  Some
of these explanations are potentially valuable for providing more understanding of the
relation between individuals' social value orientation and the orientation expected of
others. The approach in this dissertation is to apply the most promising explanations for
the false consensus effect to individuals' perceived consensus for their social orientations
Explanations for the False Consensus Effect
Those who prefer climbing mountains over sunbathing on a beach will estimate a higher
percentage of people to prefer climbing mountains than people who themselves prefer to
sunbathe This is an example of the false consensus effect (Ross et al., 1977): the
overestimation   of the occurrence  of  one' s own preference, attitude, or behavior among
other people. This false consensus overestimation does not imply that those who prefer
climbing a mountain, expect a majority of others to follow their behavior Nor does it
imply that either mountaineers or sunbathers are more correct compared to the actual
percentages of people preferring each activity. The false consensus effect only suggests
that people who show a particular behavior themselves expect that behavior to be more
widespread than people who do not behave in this manner. False consensus effects are
apparent in Tables   1.3  and 1.4 (Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Brown & Basil,   1980)
Each social orientation is expected more frequently by subjects who have the orientation
themselves than by subjects with other orientations
The false consensus effect is widespread and occurs for behavior, attitudes,
opinions, and even facts (Marks & Miller, 1987). Ross et al. (1977), Zuckerman and Mann
(1979), Marks and Miller (1987), and Gilovich (1990) provided five explanations for the
false consensus effect: (I) selective exposure mid cognitive availability; (2) causal
attribution;  (3) motivation: (4) salie,ice and focus of attention: and (5) differential
14 The Perceived Consensus of One's Social Orientation
construal. The first three explanations are promising for providing greater understanding
of the expectations of social orientations.  This is less true of the construal explanation and
salience and focus of attention The essence  of the salience and focus  of attention
explanation is that individuals' consensus expectations are influenced by focussing only on
one's preferred alternative, in contrast to shifting between two or more positions in which
case estimates may be more or less evenly distributed among the alternatives The
di#erential construal explanation (Gilovich, 1990) states that people who make different
choices may interpret the two alternatives quite differently and in ways that reflect their
preference. Gilovich (1990, study 2) found that significant false consensus effects for
broadly defined choice problems (e.g. would you rather have an American or European
snack) disappeared when more specific versions of the choice problems were used (would
you rather have apple pie or chocolate mousse)
The salience and focus of attention, and the differential construal explanations do
not seem useful in explaining people' s differences in consensus expectations  due to their
social orientations. It is, for instance, hard to imagine that competitors, when generating
consensus expectations, pay less attention to unpreferred alternatives than cooperators.
Furthermore, even when such an effect would appear it would not add much to our
understanding. As for the differential construal explanation, it seems that there is not much
space left for construal in the alternatives of a decomposed game: usually an alternative
consist of two numbers referring to outcomes The first three explanations seem to have
more potential for the explanation of the perceived consensus of one's social orientation.
The same holds for a theory related to the motivation explanation - Gerard and Orive's
three-tiered theory of opinion fbrmation (1987) The explanations and theory will  be
clarified and considered in more detail with regard to the subject of the present thesis.
Selective Exposure
One of the explanations for the false consensus effect originated by Ross et al. (1977) is
the selective exposure explanation According to Ross et al (1977) we tend to associate
with people who share our background, experiences, and interests. After all, people
typically associate with others who are similar rather than dissimilar to themselves. This
selective exposure to similar others provides one with a biased and restricted sample of
information and, in all likelihood, increases the availability of instances of similarity or
agreement between self and others Marks and Miller (1987) regard availabilio' of
instances of similar others the primary variable generating the false consensus effect.
Cognitive availability might contribute to the selective exposure effect (Marks &
Miller, 1987). Cognitive availability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) is the estimation of
frequencies or chances by the ease with which examples or associations are retrieved from
memory. Through selective exposure, people possess primarily examples of similar others.
According to Marks and Miller (1987) selective exposure or cognitive availability
has never been manipulated experimentally. Therefore, no direct evidence of the influence
of selective exposure on consensus expectations has been demonstrated Close to the ideal
of an experimental manipulation is a field experiment by Bennett and Hibberd (1986) in
which the effect of a - probably - random manipulation was tested People who had
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recently been the victim of a crime expected more crimes in their neighborhood than
others. Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Corty and 01shavsky (1983) found indirect support for
the selective exposure explanation. Both smokers' and nonsmokers' expectation of
smoking peers correlated (median r = .22) with the number of their five best friends who
smoked. Thus, the expectation of the number of smokers among peers was influenced by
the smoking behavior of individuals to whom they had been exposed selectively.
According  to the selective exposure explanation the overestimation  of  one' s  own
orientation is less pronounced when people generate consensus estimates for populations
to which they have not been as frequently exposed. This effect has been found in a
number of studies. Wetzel and Walton (1985) found that boys in a summer camp
predicted a higher consensus expectation among peers than among older or younger boys.
Holtz and Miller (1985) asked the opinions of campus students and noncampus students.
The perceived differences in opinions were lower when people made estimates for their
own population than for the other population. Spears and Manstead (1990) found in two
studies that the consensus percentages were higher--for oile'S Uwil pupulatiuii lliali foi      -   -  -
another population Finally, adolescents overestimated the occurrence of their own
smoking behavior to a greater degree among adolescents than among adults (Sherman et
al., 1983).
In the second and fourth experiment of this thesis, the selective exposure prediction
is   tested   that the consensus estimates   of  one' s own social orientation are higher   for   a
population of which one knows a large number of individuals than for a population of
which one knows few or no people.
Causal Attribution
Heider (1958) discussed the idea that the nature of causal attribution can influence
assumptions about the commonness of a particular behavior. In this explanation, causal
attribution is used to clarify the false consensus effect. Individuals tend to attribute their
own behavior to the situation (external causes), while they attribute others' behavior
primarily to the person (internal causes; Jones & Nisbett, 1971). When one attributes the
cause of one's behavior to an external source, then one sees this behavior as normal and
appropriate and will perceive a large degree of consensus for it.  On the other hand, if one
attributes   one' s behavior to internal causes   then   one   will   be less inclined to assume
similarity of response between self and others. The internal attribution means that the
behavior is seen as typical for a specific individual and, thus, not generally expected in
others. The false consensus effect can be explained by causal attribution as the tendency
to perceive external causes for one's own behavior, leading to an overestimation of one's
behavior among others.
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the role of causal attribution comes from two
studies by Gilovich, Jennings, and Jennings (1983). In the first study, they used four
hypothetical situations with two behavioral alternatives (e.g preference for city or country
life). Subjects who were asked to write down external causes for their choice (external
condition) exhibited a false consensus effect. The false consensus effect was also observed
for subjects who were merely asked to explain what caused their choice (control
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condition). Finally, subjects who were asked to indicate internal causes for their choice
(internal condition) did not show a false consensus effect. As the false consensus effect is
quite common this is a remarkable finding. Moreover, in the control condition a
significant positive correlation was found between the extent of external attribution for
one's choice and estimates of consensus for that choice  The more subjects in the control
condition attributed the cause of their choice to the situation, the more the false consensus
effect increased. In the second study by Gilovich et al. (1983) subjects rated a number of
situations on the extent to which their decisions were determined by situational or personal
factors. On the basis of these ratings, Gilovich et al. (1983) selected ten of these
situations, ranging from strong external determination to strong internal determination. A
second group of subjects chose their preferred alternative in each of the ten situations and
provided a consensus estimate for it The degree of situational attribution rated by the first
group of subjects correlated .59 with the false consensus effects of the second group.
Zuckerman and Mann (1979, study 3) asked subjects in an internal attribution
condition to write down characteristics of their personality that had caused their prefer-
ence. In an external attribution condition the assignment was to write down situational
causes of their preference. As expected, subjects in the internal attribution condition
estimated the consensus for their behavior lower than subjects in the external attribution
condition
The causal attribution explanation was also tested by Sherman et al. (1983) in their
research into smoking behavior. Because 80% of the 5000 subjects found internal and
external causes of smoking behavior equally important, only subjects were used that rated
one of the causes more important. The consensus estimates of those who perceived an
internal cause as more important did not differ from those who perceived an external
cause as more important. However, because smoking was a behavior considered by 80%
of the subjects to be equally influenced by internal as external causes, smoking appears to
be a behavior that is not well suited for testing the causal attribution explanation, and
therefore, it is not surprising that no effect was found
The importance of the causal attribution explanation is underlined by another
finding  In the studies by Gilovich et al. (1983, study 1) and Zuckerman and Mann (1979,
study 3) the false consensus effects in the control and the external conditions did not differ
significantly This suggests that in normal circumstances similar processes play a role as
when explicit external causes are prompted That is, people show a tendency to attribute
their behavior to external causes, leading to a high degree of consensus for this behavior
In the third experiment of this thesis, the causal attribution explanation is investi-
gated. Subjects have to rate the behavior of individuals with different social orientations
in terms of internal and external causes. Moreover, subjects' ratings for the individual with
their own orientation are related to their consensus expectations
Motivation
The assumption of similarity in behavior between oneself and others provides social
support   for   one' s behavior, which is especially important   when   one' s behavior   is   less
socially desirable,    i f one fails,    or    if   one' s position is somehow threatened     The
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ego-defensive function of the overestimation of one's own behavior among other people
is  recognized by different authors  (Ross  et  al.,   1977;  Marks  &  Miller, 1987; Gerard  &
Orive, 1987). For example, it is less threatening for a student who cheats on an exam to
assume that other students are doing  the  same.  Katz and Allport  (193 1) found  that  the
admitted frequency of cheating by students was positively related to their estimates of the
number of other students who had cheated; a result which can, however, be otherwise
explained as well, e.g., by selective exposure. In addition, Wagner and Gerard (1983)
found a higher overestimation of subjects' preference for items about values than about
facts Apparently, more social support is needed when an individual is less secure about
his or her own position.
An elegant study by Sherman, Presson, and Chassin (1984) shows that a motiva-
tional explanation is relevant for justifying one's failure Subjects were given two suicide
notes and told that only one of them was genuine. Subjects were then placed in one of
four possible conditions in which either they or another person had to identify the real
-31otei-crossed-wittfeedback that the-corrector incorrectnote had beenpicked- Inboth -  --    -
success conditions, no difference in consensus estimates was found (both 70%). In the
failure conditions, the consensus estimates of subjects who had failed themselves (57%)
was substantially higher than when the other person had failed (42%) A second study
used the same procedure, except that three suicidal notes were used and again only one
was genuine. The main findings of the first study were replicated.
Furthermore, Marks and Miller (1982) found that subjects' own positions on a
number of opinions corresponded to a greater degree with the positions they attributed to
attractive women than to unattractive women. Apparently we like to see ourselves as more
similar to attractive others. Crano (1983) found a need to enhance one's social support for
a personally important issue. He informed college students that a proposed tuition
surcharge would be imposed either on their own class or on another class. Subjects'
expected consensus among college students was higher when the surcharge was for their
own class, than when it was for another class.
Marks and Miller (1987) concluded that, in particular, motivational factors
influence people's overestimation of their behavior: when they have failed; when they
want to gain or to sustain self-approval; when they want to show themselves in the best
possible light; when they want to boost their own position (social support); when they
exhibit deviant, socially disapproved behavior; and when they have a high interest in a
certain outcome Nearly all these circumstances are relevant for social orientations, more
specifically competition and individualism
Research has shown that individualistic and competitive orientations are evaluated
more negatively than cooperative and altruistic orientations (Maki, Thorngate &
McClintock, 1979; Liebrand et al., 1986) Accordingly, people with individualistic and
competitive orientations have more reason to heighten their consensus estimates. The
differences in consensus expectation between the studies by Kuhlman and Wimberley
(1976) and Brown and Basil (1980) seem relevant in this respect Only competitors and
individualists showed a decrease in consensus expectation when they generated their
expectations four weeks after their social orientations were assessed. From a motivational
perspective subjects in the delayed condition had less reason to show high consensus
expectations because only their expectations of others' orientations were asked and their
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own orientations were not made salient The motivational explanation for subjects'
consensus expectations will be tested in the second and third experiment of this thesis
The Three-tiered Theory of Opinion Formation
Gerard and Orive's three-tiered theory of opinion formation (1987) is essentially a
motivational theory that deals with the projection of one's own opinion on others Projec-
tion of one's opinion on others probably influences the false consensus effect, a possibility
suggested by Orive (1984, p 728):
The resulting enhancing effect    of   the proj ection process, which manifests    as
overestimation of actual consensus, has been interpreted elsewhere as perceptual
bias. I propose that this overestimation is the enhancement aspect of projection
In line with this view, Sherman, Chassin, Presson, and Agostinelli (1984) concluded that
the false consensus effect   is also applicable  to the attribution   of  one' s own opinion   to
separate individuals, and Marks and Miller (1987) maintained that the concepts false
consensus, assumed similarity and attributive projection are dosely related. These concepts
have in common that people attribute their properties or preferences to others. From this
perspective, Gerard and Orive's theory can be considered relevant for the topic of this
thesis.
The three-tiered theory of opinion formation deals with the search for or even
fabrication of consensus information   for   one' s opinion or behavior According   to   this
theory, the anticipation   of a discussion about   one' s own behavior leads to dissonance,
caused by the negative characteristics of one's own opinion or behavior and the positive
characteristics of alternative opinions or behavior. This dissonance is dependent on the
importance of the opinion or behavior for the individual, for instance, the immediacy of
a discussion about the opinion, and it can be reduced by the finding of supportive
information This information can be from external sources, such as an expert. When no
external source can be consulted, one has to resort to the fabrication of consensus
information This is done by projecting one's own behavior on others who have a similar
relevant background. The projected behavior appears to a person as emanating from the
other and leads to a higher perceived consensus and a reduction of dissonance. This
process continues until the dissonance is sufficiently reduced.
Miller and Marks (1982) found a result that can be interpreted as support for the
projection of one's opinion on another when a discussion is anticipated They had a
subject and a confederate examine a court case and then render a verdict of guilty or
innocent. Half of the subjects anticipated a discussion with the confederate, the other half
did not. Subjects who anticipated a discussion attributed their own verdict more frequently
to the confederate  than the other  subj ects
A study by Gerard and Wagner (1984, cited in Gerard & Orive, 1987) shows that
the polarization of one's opinion is a dynamic process (The polarization of one's opinion
is another dependent variable of the same projection process that leads to a heightened
perceived consensus ) When a group discussion about the opinion would take place
following the opinion measurement, the opinion was more extreme than when the
discussion would take place a week later, and the latter opinion was more extreme than
Social Orientations and Others' Expected Orientations           19
when probably no discussion would take place at all. Other evidence that the projection
process is a dynamic process was revealed in another part of the same study (Gerard &
Wagner, 1984). Subjects were told they had to defend their opinion later Opinions
measured after a delay of 90 seconds were more extreme than those measured
immediately.
Gerard and Orive's three-tiered theory of opinion formation (1987) will be
examined in the second study of this thesis. Specifically, subjects in a condition with
anticipation of a group discussion are expected to perceive a higher consensus for their
orientation than people in a condition without this prospect Moreover, because individu-
alism and competition are evaluated more negatively than cooperation and altruism (Maki
et al., 1979; Liebrand et al.,  1986), it is expected that the influence of the anticipation of
a discussion on the consensus expectations is stronger for individualistic and competitive
subjects than for cooperative and altruistic subjects.
Chapter 2
Effects of Social Value Orientation on Expecting
and Learning Others' Orientations:1 Experiment 1
introduction
In many situations in daily life our outcomes depend not only on our own behaviour, but
-    - on«that of-others-as well=In-such interdependence-situations it-isimportant that we_
understand others' orientations and motives in order to react appropriately Suppose, for
instance, that someone applies for a job at an enterprise. In the interview the manager
asserts smilingly that her employees are competitive and try to surpass each other When
the manager asks the applicant for his viewpoint, he is wise not to remark that he is very
cooperative and tries to help others to reach their goals, that is, if he is still interested in
the job. The manager advocates a competitive approach, and showing that one is
cooperative is not an adequate response in this case. The manager might interpret this as
an indication of a weak and submissive attitude and consider him inadequate for the job.
Another example is a teacher who offers her preparations for a particular lesson to one of
her colleagues as a cooperative gesture to facilitate his preparations. The colleague,
however, responds that he values his own preparations more and, therefore, does not need
hers. This is a competitive response to a cooperative initiative which might influence
future interactions between the two teachers negatively. The colleague could better have
accepted the preparations, even if he did not intend to use them. Perhaps he misinterpreted
her suggestion as doubt about his qualities as a teacher. These examples show that it is
important to interpret others' intentions accurately, because once we comprehend the
motives or orientations of others we can adapt our own behaviour, if necessary, to our
own advantage. In this study others' social value orientations have to be learned through
their choices in situations with outcomes to themselves and another Two variables are
considered of importance in learning others' social orientations: one's own orientation and
the orientation one expects from others
Social value orientations or social motives are defined as individuals' preferences
for certain combinations of outcomes to themselves and to others (McClintock,  1972). In
previous research (Messick & McClintock, 1968; McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman &
Campos, 1973; Grzelak, Iwinski & Radzicki, 1977; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken & Suhre,
1986; Schulz & May, 1989) the most important social orientations observed were:
individualism (maximizing one's own outcomes without considering the outcomes of
1
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another person), cooperation (maximizing outcomes for self and another person),
competition (maximizing the difference between one's own and another person's outcomes
to one's own advantage), altruism (maximizing outcomes for another person), equalio'
(minimizing the difference between own and another's outcomes) and marimin
(maximizing outcomes for the person who receives the lowest outcomes). In recent
research (Van Lange & Liebrand, 199la) social orientations are sometimes distinguished
into pro-self orientations (competition and individualism) and pro-social orientations
(altruism, equality, cooperation, and maximin), a distinction which is based on concern for
others.
Learning another' s orientation is probably based   on   one' s a priori expectations
about others' orientations. Feedback received about the other's actual behaviour will
gradually replace or refine  the a priori expectation    Thus,   it is presupposed that another' s
orientation is learned better or faster when it is expected beforehand Maki, Thorngate and
McClintock (1979) and Maki and McClintock (1983) made this assumption implicitly in
their research on learning others' social orientations. In the study by Maki et al. (1979)
subjects learned orientations that were not expected - because they were very rare - less
easily than more common orientations.
Two hypotheses are relevant for learning others' orientations because they predict
specific relations between the orientation expected from others and individuals' own
orientation. These hypotheses are the false consensus hypothesis and the triangle
hypothesis. According to the false consensus hypothesis (Ross, Greene & House, 1977;
Marks & Miller, 1987), people have an egocentric bias in processes such as social
perception and attribution: they overestimate the occurrence of their behaviour in a
population. It is important to stress at the outset the relative nature of the false consensus
hypothesis. Applied to social orientations, the false consensus hypothesis does not predict
that people expect a majority of others to have their orientation. Rather, it predicts that a
social orientation is expected more frequently by subjects who have this particular
orientation than by subjects with different orientations. The false consensus hypothesis also
has implications for learning others' orientations. When individuals have to learn their
own social orientation, their a priori expectations ofothers' orientations will often coincide
with the feedback Therefore, they can learn their own orientation fast. When they have
to learn a different orientation, the feedback is more inconsistent with their a priori
expectation of others' orientation  Thus, it will take more time to learn an orientation
when it does not correspond with their own orientation. This leads to the hypothesis that
an orientation is learned more swiftly by people who have that orientation than by people
with other orientations.
The triangle hypothesis was developed specifically for social value orientations
Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) stated that cooperators and competitors hold different views
of what other people are like. Cooperators meet both cooperators and competitors and are
aware of heterogeneity in outlook Competitors also meet both cooperators and
competitors, but through their own competitive behaviour they influence cooperators to
show more competitive behaviour Because competitors fail to discount their own
influence in their social relationships they do not notice that others can be different and
therefore expect others to be homogeneously competitive. Thus, the triangle hypothesis
predicts that competitors are more likely to expect the occurrence of their orientation than
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cooperators theirs  As is clear from the theoretical notions on which Kelley and Stahelski
(197Ob) based the triangle hypothesis, it has implications for learning others' orientations.
Because competitors are less aware of the existence of orientations other than their own,
they will have more difficulty in learning others' orientations. Therefore, it is expected
that competitors will learn others' orientations less well than cooperators.
Additionally, according to the logic underlying the triangle hypothesis a
relationship should exist between subjects' expected orientations and the learning of
others' orientations. Competitors' overestimation of their orientation is related to their
experiences in social relationships in which they fail to discount their causal role: in
interactions with cooperators they cause the other to behave in a non-cooperative fashion.
The inability of competitive individuals to perceive others' orientations correctly should
on the one hand lead to overestimation of their orientation and on the other hand to low
performance in learning others' orientations. Cooperators have no distorted view of their
social environment and therefore should show less overestimation of their orientation and
-perform Well-whmi leailtilig ullicis' uiicitldliuits-In-oonclusionraceerding-to-the reasoning-   --   --   -
underlying the triangle hypothesis a relation should exist between subjects' expectations
of others' orientations and their performance in learning others' orientations. Subjects who
are worse in correctly perceiving others' orientations should more frequently expect their
own orientation of other people.
Nearly all previous studies in which the relation between subjects' own social
orientations and the orientation expected of others was considered, employed the
traditional two-person two-alternatives prisoner's dilemma game (PDG). The triangle
hypothesis was supported in all studies (Kelley & Stahelski, 19708; Miller & Holmes,
1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Schlenker & Goldman, 1978; Misra & Kalro, 1979;
and Bixenstine, Lowenfeld & Englehart, 1981) with one exception (Mess6 & Sivacek,
1979). However, in a PDG the interdependence between the individuals making choices
is very apparent and leads to strategic influences (McClintock et al., 1973). This makes it
a less than optimal situation for examining the orientations expected of others. Only two
studies have employed different choice situations in addition to the PDG (Miller &
Holmes, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976). Miller and Holmes (1975) found no
support for the triangle hypothesis in an extended prisoner's dilemma game in which
subjects could defend themselves against exploitation when confronted with a pro-self
individual. Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) using decomposed games failed to find
support for a triangle effect. Decomposed games are situations with two or more
alternatives, each consisting of combinations of outcomes to oneself and to another
individual. In decomposed games the perceived interdependence is lower than in a PDG
(McClintock et al.,  1973). On the basis of subjects' expectations in decomposed games
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) concluded that once a situation discriminates between an
individualistic, a competitive   and a cooperative orientation,   subj ects expect their   own
orientation to approximately the same extent. Additionally, they reasoned that a
noncooperative choice in a PDG may flow from both an individualistic as a competitive
orientation, leading to support for the triangle hypothesis. Hence, support for the triangle
hypothesis seems to be limited to the traditional PDG. In all studies employing a PDG,
extended PDG, or decomposed games, the false consensus hypothesis was supported.
In experiments in which subjects had to learn others' orientations the prediction
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derived from the triangle hypothesis was supported. Maki et al. (1979) and Maki and
McClintock (1983) related both the triangle hypothesis and the false consensus hypothesis
to subjects' learning of social orientations. In these studies subjects first observed a
hypothetical person (the Chooser) allocating outcomes to himself and another person in a
series of decomposed games. The Chooser's behaviour was preprogrammed according to
a specific social orientation. Next, subjects had to make predictions about what choices the
Chooser would make. In both studies pro-self orientations were more easily learned than
pro-social orientations. In addition, Maki and McClintock (1983) found that on average
cooperators were the most accurate learners (82% correct responses), followed by
individualists (72%), altruists (65%) and competitors (64%) This result supported the
triangle hypothesis
As a social orientation in Maki and McClintock's (1983) experiment generally was
not learned significantly better by subjects who themselves had this particular orientation
than by subjects with other orientations, no support was found for the prediction derived
from the false consensus hypothesis. A possible explanation for this result is that the
decomposed games used in the classification procedure differed from those in the learning
task. In the classification task, Maki and McCIintock used the decomposed games
procedure of Kuhlman and Marshello (1975). This procedure does not discriminate
between subjects choosing according to the orientations altruism, equality and maximin.
This led Maki and McClintock (1983) to classify all subjects choosing according to these
orientations as altruistic However, the description of the learning task shows that choice
behaviour according to on the one hand altruism and on the other hand the orientations
equality and maximin was unconfounded. Therefore, it is possible that subjects oriented
toward maximin and equality but classified as altruistic in the first task were less apt at
learning the choices of the altruistic orientation in the learning task because it was not
their own orientation. This problem was avoided in the present study by using the same
decomposed games in both the classification and the learning task Thus, the false
consensus hypothesis receives a better test
Finally, although the false consensus hypothesis and the triangle hypothesis lead to
different predictions, they are not necessarily antithetical. In fact, both hypotheses can be
supported with the same empirical results. For instance, if each social orientation is
expected more by subjects with this particular orientation than by subjects with other
orientations, then the false consensus hypothesis is supported. When at the same time
competitors expect their orientation more frequently than cooperators expect theirs, the
triangle hypothesis is also supported Furthermore, on a theoretical level the psychological
mechanisms underlying the two hypotheses are comparable. Marks and Miller (1987)
regard availability of instances of similar others the primary variable generating the false
consensus effect People typically associate with others who are similar rather than
dissimilar to themselves. This selective exposure to similar others provides one with a
biased and restricted sample of information and likely increases the availability of
instances of similarity or agreement between self and others. Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob)
argue that the social environment of competitors is in part determined by their own
behaviour because they influence cooperators to adapt to noncooperative behavior.
Because competitors fail to discount their causal role in their social relationships, they
develop a distorted view of their social environment. Or, in the words of the availability
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explanation: because of their own behaviour, the sample of information of competitors is
more biased than that of cooperators. In the present study subjects' own orientation is
related     to    both the orientation expected from others     and the learning of others'
orientations. It is predicted that both for the expecting and the learning of others'




The subjects were 67 female and 83 male university students who had not taken a course
in social psychology. They received 10 Dutch guilders (about $ 5.50) for participation.
-    -Overviewand-Design-   -      ---    ---                     -               -     -    --     -    -       -
The experiment consisted of three tasks.   In the first  task the subjects' social orientations
were assessed. In the second task the social orientations subjects expected to predominate
among others were assessed. In the third task subjects had to learn the choices according
to five different social orientations. In analyses of variance  on the subjects' achievements
in the third task, the subjects' own social orientation was a between-subjects variable and
orientations to be learned a within-subjects variable. Likewise, the orientation subjects
expected to predominate among others was used as a between-subjects variable. Finally,
the interrelationships between subjects' social orientations, subjects' expected orientations,
and learning others' orientations were examined. A design with both social orientation
and expected orientation contained too many empty cells. This was not the case when the
design was restricted to only cooperation and individualism. Therefore, a 2 (cooperative
or individualistic subjects) x 2 (expecting others to be cooperative or individualistic) x
2 (learning cooperation or individualism) design was used. In addition, analyses of
covariance were carried out without limiting the number of social orientations.
Procedure
Subjects participated in the experiment individually and performed three tasks on a
personal computer. The instructions for the three tasks were given on the computer
screen. The same decomposed games were used in all tasks. Each decomposed game was
a pairwise presentation of two combinations of outcomes for the subjects themselves and
for another individual. Because eight outcome combinations were used (presented in
Table  2.1) a pairwise comparison  of the outcome combinations resulted  in    (i)   =  28
decomposed games. In the first and second task, the decomposed games were presented
in the same order to avoid that subjects would remember their previous response. In the
third task different random orders were used.
In each of the 28 decomposed games in the first task, subjects indicated which of
the two alternatives (outcome combinations) they preferred. They were told that their
outcomes depended on both their own choice and the choice of another individual. The
other individual was referred to as another subject who had participated in the experiment
but would remain unknown. Likewise, the outcomes for the other individual depended
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Table  2.1    The Own-Other Outcome Combinations and Their Ranks According to Social
Orientations
Outcome for Perfect Rankings
Self Other Indi Altr Equa Coop Comp Maxm
f 26A f 2 2        1        4       4       2        3        2
f 25 f 1 6       2       6       6       4       2       4h
f 24 f 2 5        3        2        1        1        4        1
f 22 /12    4    8    7    7    1     7M
f 19 /2 4       5        3       5        3        7        3
f 16 f 1 9           6            5           3            6            6            4 Y2
f 14 f 2 6 7        1        8        5        8        6
f 12 f 1 4       8       7       2       8       5        7 Y2
A f 1.00 (Dutch guilder) is about $ 0.55.
both on his or her own choice and on the choice of the subject. Two examples were given
to make sure that the payoff structure was well understood. Outcomes were hypothetical
amounts of money subjects did not actually receive. Subjects were classified on the basis
of their dominant social orientation as is clarified in the next section.
In the second task, subjects indicated in each decomposed game the choice they
expected to be made by the majority of Dutch students. In this way, the social orientation
the subjects expected to predominate among students was determined Subjects were also
classified on the basis of the social orientation they expected to predominate among other
students.
In the third task, subjects had to learn the social orientation of five other persons,
referred to as Choosers. Subjects were told that each Chooser had been selected from a
previous experiment in which the same decomposed games were used, and that the
Chooser's choices had been fed into the computer Actually, the Chooser's choices had
been preprogrammed such that they strictly followed an individualistic, altruistic,
egalitarian, cooperative or competitive orientation (a maximin Chooser was not feasible as
there was too much overlap with the choices of a cooperative or egalitarian Chooser). In
each trial, subjects indicated which of the two alternatives in each decomposed game the
Chooser would have selected After each response the subject received feedback. An arrow
on the screen indicated the correct alternative. If a subject gave a wrong answer, the
computer bell sounded. The 28 decomposed games were repeated once for each Chooser,
making the total number of trials per Chooser 56. Subjects had to learn the social
orientation of five Choosers successively To check for possible order effects, a subject
was assigned to one of ten orders of learning the five social orientations. The ten orders
formed two 5 x 5 latin squares.
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Assessment of Social Orientation
Ideal rankings of the eight own-other outcome combinations were formed according to the
social orientations individualism, altruism, equality, cooperation, competition, and
maximin (see Table  2.1).  In the first task, the eight own-other outcome combinations  for
each subject were ranked according to how often each had been preferred. Spearman's
rank order correlation coefficient (with correction for tied ranks) was computed as a
similarity measure between a subject's ranking of the eight own-other outcome
combinations and each ideal ranking based upon a specific social orientation The
coefficients were transformed into Fisher Z-scores, truncated between  -3  and  +3.  In  this
way, any given subject's ranking could be characterized by six Z-scores representing the
social orientations individualism, altruism, equality, cooperation, competition, and
maximin (Wieczorkowska, 1982; Grzelak, Poppe, Czwartosz & Nowak, 1988) Subjects
were classified on the basis of their dominant social orientation if their highest Z-score
reached a classification criterion of 0.55, corresponding to a correlation coefficient of  50.
Results
Social Orientation Classification
Of the 150 subjects, 148 could be classified. One subject misunderstood the instructions
and one subject did not meet the classification criterion Eight subjects were classified as
oriented towards equality, 19 as oriented toward maximin, 39 as cooperative, 73 as
individualistic and 9 as competitive. There was no effect of gender on the classification,
X2 (4)=1.60, p>.80.
Social Orientation Expected of Others
In the same manner that Z-scores were computed for subjects' own orientations, Z-scores
were computed for the orientations they expected to predominate among others. Subjects
were also classified on the basis of their dominant expected social orientation. Table 2.2
shows the social orientations generally expected of other students by subjects of each
social orientation. To make it possible to compare the present results with previous
research (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970a; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976), subjects were
categorized as pro-social or pro-self Of the pro-social subjects, 47.0% expected others to
be  pro-social  and 53.0% expected others  to be pro-self   Of the pro-self subjects   19.5%
expected others     to be pro-social     and 80.5% expected others    to be pro-self     The
expectations of pro-self and pro-social subjects differed significantly, X2 (1)=11.65,
p< 001. This result is consistent with the triangle hypothesis. However, a closer inspection
of Table 2 2 shows that it were the individualists and not the competitors who expected
their orientation in high frequencies. When the orientation expected of others was
combined into two categories - whether subjects expected other students to have their
own orientation or a different orientation - a significant interaction effect was found
between social orientation and expected orientation,  X' (4)=49.41, p<.001.  Clearly,
competitors did not expect their own orientation more frequently than cooperators, a result
that is inconsistent with the triangle hypothesis. Only individualists (80.8%) expected their
own orientation more frequently than subjects with other orientations (29 3%). Thus, only
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Table  2.2    Per  Social  Orientation  the  Percentage  Estimated  Orientations  of  Others
Social Orientations Expected of Others
Social Pro-social Pro-self Row%Orientation
Altr Equa Maxm Coop Indi Comp
Pro-Social
12.5 12.5 25.0 37.5 12.5 5.4
Equality
(1)      (1)      (2)       (3)      (1)       (8)
5.3 10.5 31.6 42.1 10.5 12.8Maximin (1)          (2)         (6)           (8)         (2)          (19)
2.6 2.6 41.0 53.8 26.4
Cooperation (1)   (1) (16) (21) (39)
Pro-Self
1.4 16.4 80.8 1.4 49.3Individualism
(1) (12) (59)     (1)     (73)
11.1 22.2 33.3 33.3 6.1
Competition
(1)                        (2)       (3)      (3)        (9)
Column % 1.4 1.4 3.4 25.7 63.5 4.7 100.0
(2) (2) (5) (38) (94) (7) (148)
/Vote. The row and column percentages are percentages of the total sample.
when subjects were grouped together in pro-social and pro-self categories was the triangle
hypothesis supported This underscores Kuhlman and Wimberley's (1976) interpretation
that grouping together subjects in pro-social and pro-self categories leads to results that
seem to be in line with the triangle hypothesis, although this is in fact not the case.
The false consensus hypothesis predicts that an orientation is expected more
frequently by subjects who have that orientation than by subjects with a different
orientation. For example, cooperators expected that 41.0% of the subjects would be
cooperative (see Table 2.2). The percentage of cooperators expected by other subjects was
20 2%.  Therefore, as compared to noncooperators, cooperators overestimated  the
percentage of cooperators by (41.0% - 20.2% =) 20.8%, X2 (1)-9.26, p<.01. For the two
other pro-social orientations, maximin and equality, these percentages were 82% and
118% (both Fisher exact tests n.s.), respectively These percentages were smaller than
those  for the pro-self orientations competition  (30 4%, Fisher exact  p< 01)  and
individualism (34.2%, x2 (1)=32.86, p<.001). Thus, the strongest false consensus effect
was found for individualists; the false consensus effects for cooperators and competitors
were less strong but still significant, whereas the false consensus effects for egalitarian and
maximin  subj ects  were not significant.
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Learning  Others'  Social  Orientations
Preliminary analyses showed that the order of presentation had no effect on the learning
of others' social orientations, F(9,138)=1.29, p> 20 Therefore, this variable was excluded
from further analyses The number of wrong (or correct) responses seems an obvious
choice as a measure of the accuracy of learning another person's orientation. However, if
subjects lacked any idea which orientation they were learning and used their own
orientation as a guideline, this would result in different numbers of correct responses
because choice patterns according to some orientations were more similar than according
to other orientations. The overlap in choices between individualism and competition was
75%, while the overlap between cooperation and competition was 50%. Thus, if a
cooperator and an individualist responded solely according to their own orientation when,
in fact, they were supposed to respond as a competitive Chooser, the performance of the
individualist would seem better than that of the cooperator although neither learned the
correct orientation and performed equally poorly. Therefore, another dependent variable
-     -  was uacd.  ilic iliumcitl-of master·ing the-orientation-,Airorientation irmatered-when-the -
chance that predictions according  to  one' s own orientation  lead to correct predictions  of
the orientation that has to be learned is sufficiently small. The highest proportion of
overlap in choices according to two different orientations is .75. Then the chance that a
response according to one's own orientation is a correct prediction is .75  With a criterion
of eight correct responses in a row, the chance of making correct predictions while
responding according to one's own orientation is sufficiently small: 0.75 -0.10. Therefore,
the criterion for mastering an orientation was responding eight times without a mistake. A
subject's score was the number of the eighth correct trial or, when a subject did not meet
the criterion, the number of the last trial (56)
An ANOVA was performed on the five scores (one for each Chooser orientation)
with subject's own orientation as between-subjects variable and the orientation that had to
be learned as within-subjects variable. A significant main effect for own orientation was
Table  2.3   Mean Number of Trials After Which Subjects had 8 Correct Responses in a
Row
Social Chooser's Orientation
Orientation Altr Equa Coop indi Comp Mean
Maximin 31.3A1 27.9A 27.18 18.18 36.7A 28.2AB
Equality 31.4AB 25.6A 25.9AB 27.3c 23.9A 26.8AB
Cooperation 28.6A 33.OAB 17.3A 15.58 33.4  25.6A
Individualism 29.8A 29.5A 26.28 12.3A 29.2A 25.4A
Competition 45.38 45.OB 35.68 14.OAB 32.OA 34.4 
Mean 30.7x2 30.9x 24.5y 14.8z 31.1x 26.4
1 Means in the same column and not in the bottom row that do not share the same subscripts differ
significantly (D<.051.
2 Means in the bottom row that do not share the same subscript differ significantly  (p<.05).
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found, F(4,143)=2 51, p< 05 (see Table 2.3 for the means). Post hoc analyses revealed that
the learning performance of competitors was significantly worse than that of cooperators
and individualists. The learning performance of egalitarian and maximin subjects was on
an intermediate level. These results were consistent with the prediction derived from the
triangle hypothesis, particularly the result that competitors were worse learners of others'
orientations than cooperators. The effect of Chooser orientation (the orientation that had
to be learned) was also significant, F(4,140)=26 54, p<.001. Individualism was the easiest
orientation to learn, cooperation was more difficult and altruism, equality and competition
were the most difficult orientations to learn. Furthermore, a significant interaction effect
for subject's own orientation by Chooser orientation was found, 17(16,572)=2.57, p< 01.
As the means in Table 2.3 indicate, cooperation was learned most swiftly by cooperators,
individualism by individualists, and equality by egalitarian subjects. Competition, however,
was not learned most swiftly by competitors. These results, except that for competitors,
were consistent with the prediction derived from the false consensus hypothesis. Finally,
an analysis using another criterion for the number of correct responses  (with  11  correct
responses, 0.7511-0.04) resulted in the same pattern of significant results.  Also when the
simple number of wrong (or correct) responses was used without any correction, the same
effects were significant
Additionally, the influence of the orientation subjects expected from others on
learning others' orientations was analyzed using again eight correct responses in a row as
a     criterion for mastering another' s orientation. The expected orientation     was     a
between-subjects variable in an ANOVA and the five Chooser orientations were a
within-subjects variable. The data of two subjects expecting equality and two subjects
expecting altruism were discarded Subjects' expected orientation did not have a
Significant main effect on learning, F(3,141)=1  18, n s This result shows that the expected
orientation from others has no influence on learning others' orientations in general. Only
the interaction effect between the expected orientation from others and Chooser orientation
was significant, F(12,420)=3.81, p<.001, indicating that learning a particular orientation
was better when it was expected from others Again the effect of Chooser orientation was
significant, F(4,138)=16.66, p<.001.
Interretationships Between Social Orientation, Expected Orientation, and Learning
Orientations
Finding no effect of the orientation expected from others on learning others' orientations
is already a first indication that the main effect of social orientation on learning is not
mediated by the expected orientation. In this section the possible mediating influence of
the expected orientation is studied more in depth using three approaches. The most direct
way is to use subjects' own orientation and the expected orientation as independent
variables in an analysis of the learning performances. In order to prevent empty cells, only
the data of cooperative and individualistic subjects who expected others to be cooperative
or individualistic were included in an ANOVA on learning cooperation and individualism
0,=108).  Because the choice pattern of cooperation overlaps that of individualism as much
as the reverse is true, the number of wrong responses was taken as a dependent variable
(means are shown in Table 2.4). A main effect of own orientation, 17(1,104)=9.92, p< 005,
indicated that cooperative subjects (M-1.82) learned the two orientations better than
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Table 2.4  Number of Incorrect Responses of Cooperative and Individualistic Subjects
Orientation to Learn Cooperators expecting Individualists expecting
Coop Indi Coop Indi
Cooperation 1.09A1 2.818 4.50C 4.97D
Individualism 1.63AB 1.52A 1.21A 1.22A
Mean 1.36x2 2.17xy 2.85z 3.09z
1 Means  not in the bottom  row that  do not share the same subscript differ significantly  (p <.05).
2 Means in the bottom row that do not share the same subscript differ significantly (p< .05).
individualists (M=3.05). No main effect for the orientation expected from others was
-      --     -fbundrF(li+04)=+85, p>=15.-The interaction betweensubjectstownsociatorientation_and
the orientation expected from others was not significant, F(1,104)<1   A main effect for the
orientation that had to be learned, 17(1,104)=33.31, p<.001, indicated that individualism
(M=1.34) was learned better than cooperation (M-3.92) Subjects' own orientation
interacted significantly with the orientation that had to be learned, 12(1,104)=21.66,
p<.001. Cooperative subjects learned cooperation (M-2.07) better than individualists
(A»4.89), 12(1,106)=25.37, p<.001, whereas individualistic subjects did not learn
individualism (9=1.22) significantly better than cooperators (A»1.57), F(1,106)<1. The
interaction effect of the orientation expected from others with the orientation that had to
be learned was not significant, 17(1,104)-2.83, n.s. Also, the interaction effect between
subjects' own orientation, the orientation expected from others and the orientation that had
to be learned was not significant, F(1,104)-1.02, n.s. This analysis shows that one's own
orientation is important in learning orientations, while the orientation expected of others
is hardly of importance.
In the second approach two analyses of covariance were performed in order to
compare the relative influence of subjects' own social orientation and the orientation
expected from others. In the first analysis the effect of subjects' own social orientation
was analyzed with the orientation expected from others as a covariate. For each orientation
to be learned, the corresponding Z-score of the orientation expected from others was used
as a covariate The number of wrong responses was used as a dependent variable, because
the covariate corrected for the overlap between choices according to different orientations.
The effect of own orientation was still (marginally) significant, F(4,142)=2.37, p<.06,
indicating that when the analysis was corrected for the influence of the orientation
expected from others, subjects' own social orientation remained influential. The effects of
the Chooser orientation, F(4,571)=6 99, p< 001,  and the interaction effect between
subjects' own social orientation and the Chooser orientation, F(16,571)=1.84, p<.05, also
remained significant  In the second analysis the effect of the orientation expected from
others was analyzed with subjects' own social orientation Z-scores as a covariate (the data
of four subjects had to be discarded: two expecting altruism and two expecting equality)
The effect of orientation expected from others was not significant, F(3,139)<1. The effects
on the Chooser orientation, F(4,559)=11.90, p<.001, and the interaction effect between
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orientation expected from others and the Chooser orientation, F(12,559)=3.04, p<.001,
were  significant. In conclusion, when subjects' own social orientation  and the orientation
expected from others were corrected for each others' influence, subjects' own social
orientation was important in learning others' orientations, but the orientation expected
from others was not.
Finally, the relationship between subjects' heterogeneity of expectation and their
general learning performance was examined more closely The heterogeneity of
expectation was operationalized as the difference between the Fisher Z-score for own
orientation and the corresponding Z-score for the orientation expected from others. This
difference score was correlated with the average learning performance over the five
Chooser orientations and found to be nil (r = -.01, n.s.) Hence, subjects' heterogeneity of
expectation was not a good predictor of their mastery of others' orientations.
In conclusion, the three approaches used in this section show that the effect of
social orientation on learning others' orientations is not mediated by the orientation
expected from others.
Discussion
With regard to expectations about others' orientations, the triangle hypothesis was not
supported. Only when subjects were grouped together into pro-social and pro-self
categories pro-self subjects did expect their own orientation more often from others than
pro-social subjects When subjects' social orientations were considered separately, it was
clear that only individualists and not competitors expected their own orientation to be
widespread The false consensus hypothesis received more support. Cooperation,
individualism, and competition were expected more frequently by subjects who had these
orientations themselves than by subjects with other orientations. No false consensus effect
was observed for subjects choosing according to maximin and equality. They correctly
perceived their orientation as not being very common.
On the basis of their results Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) concluded that
subjects expected most others to have their own orientation. The results of the present
study are inconsistent with this conclusion. As Table 2.2 shows, subjects of each
orientation expected most others to be oriented individualistically and, therefore, only
individualists expected most others to be oriented like themselves. These different results
may have been caused by differences between the two studies which lead to two
explanations. Firstly, Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) asked subjects how many university
undergraduates out of a hundred would choose according to cooperation, individualism or
competition, whereas in the present study subjects were asked to repeatedly estimate the
choice that the majority of Dutch students would make Presenting three orientations may
influence expectations by providing a base rate of the number of possible orientations.
This base rate may have led to more or less evenly distributing expectations among the
alternatives and may have prevented individualists and competitors from overestimating
their orientation. In the present study no indication of the number of possible orientations
was provided A second explanation is based on differences in populations for which
subjects had to create expectations Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) asked their subjects
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to estimate social orientations among a hundred university undergraduates. The subjects
may have based their expectations on the students that they knew In the present study,
subjects had to create expectations for the majority of Dutch students. This is a more
general perspective and subjects may have based their expectations more on widely
disseminated claims about humans' natural egoism and selfishness. This may have
influenced subjects to expect individualism in such high frequencies.
The results pertaining to the learning of others' orientations only in part correspond
with the results obtained by Maki and McClintock (1983). In the present study the
prediction derived from the false consensus hypothesis with regard to learning was
supported as cooperators, individualists and equality subjects learned their orientation
better than subjects with other orientations Maki and McClintock (1983), by contrast, did
not find that an orientation was learned better by subjects who had the particular
orientation themselves than by other subjects  As was stated in the introduction, a plausible
reason is the difference between the type of decomposed games used in the social
--  orientation-classificationtask andin the learning task. Maki an#McClintocle.(1983)-found
support for the triangle hypothesis Cooperators had the highest learning performance,
individualists were intermediate, while altruists and competitors had the lowest scores.
Approximately the same pattern of results was found in the present study Cooperators and
individualists were the best overall learners, followed by maximin and equality subjects,
and lastly competitors. As mentioned above, the altruists in the study by Maki and
McClintock (1983) in all likelihood consisted of individuals choosing according to
equality, maximin, and altruism. The learning performances of these altruists are
comparable with those of subjects choosing according to equality and maximin in the
present study. In Kelley and Stahelski's study (1970b), subjects with individualistic and
competitive orientations were both classified as competitors. Therefore, the group of
competitors in Kelley and Stahelski's study in alllikelihood consisted of individualists and
competitors. Both the results of Maki and McClintock (1983) and the present results show
that competitors and not individualists are poor learners of others' orientations.
Competitors have great difficulty in learning an orientation correctly when it is not
pro-self
One of the most interesting results of this study is that no evidence was found for
a relationship between subjects' expected orientations and learning others' orientations. As
reasoned in the introduction, such a relation was to be expected according to the logic
underlying the triangle hypothesis. Furthermore, the orientation expected from others also
did not mediate the effect of subjects' social orientation on learning others' orientation.
These results, taken together, clearly show that the logic underlying the triangle hypothesis
is not supported.    Subj ects   who are worse in learning others' orientations   do   not   more
frequently expect their own orientation of other people It can be concluded that an
individual's social orientation influences both the orientation expected from others and the
learning of others' orientations, but expectation and learning are not directly related. Thus,
creating expectations about others' orientations and perceiving others' orientations
correctly are more separate processes than is implied by the logic underlying the triangle
hypothesis.
Because the present results pertaining to the expectations about others' orientations
are inconsistent with both the prediction and the logic underlying the triangle hypothesis,
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another explanation has to be developed to understand how people create their
expectations about others In this respect, the aforementioned second explanation for the
difference in results between the present study and Kuhlman and Wimberley's study seems
promising For more specific populations people may predominantly expect their own
orientation, whereas for more general populations especially the expectation of
individualism may increase.
The study of the present anomalous finding for the reasoning underlying the
triangle hypothesis might be extended by further research in everyday circumstances. In
the present study subjects had to create a perception of others' orientations by the others'
preferences in decomposed games A more realistic approach might be to ask subjects to
identify the orientations of people they know from daily life According to the logic of the
triangle hypothesis, subjects' accuracy in identifying the orientations of people they know
well should be related to their expectations of others' orientations More specifically,
subjects who identify their acquaintances' orientations incorrectly should more frequently
expect others to have their own orientation. The present findings imply that such a relation
will not be found. Further research might also devote attention to the suggested relation
between expected orientations and the generality of the population for which expectations
are created.
Chapter 3
Perceived Consensus of One's Social Value Orientation
in Different Populations in Public and
Private Circumstances: 1 Experiment 2
Introduction
Those who cannot refuse to contribute to an individual making a house-to-house collection
for a good cause will estimate a higher percentage of people to contribute than people who
do not contribute themselves.  This is an example of the false consensus €#ect (Ross,
Greene & House,  1977): the overestimation of the occurrence of one's own preference or
behavior among other people. This false consensus overestimation does not imply that
contributors expect a majority of others to follow their behavior. The false consensus
effect only means that people who show a certain behavior themselves expect that
behavior to be more widespread than people who do not behave in this manner.
This example illustrates the central theme of this research: the perceived consensus
of  one' s social orientation. A social value orientation   is an individual preference   for
certain outcomes for oneself and another individual (McClintock,  1972). In addition to the
false consensus effect, other aspects will be examined to increase our understanding of the
perceived consensus of one's social orientation McClintock & Liebrand (1988) and Van
Lange (1991) advocate an integrative approach for understanding people's behavior in
situations in which their outcomes depend on their own behavior and on the behavior of
another.   It is assumed   here that people's consensus estimates of their own social value
orientation among other people are a function of characteristics of the person, characteris-
ties of the situation, and the interaction between these components. The first characteristic
of the situation that is addressed  here is whether people generate their consensus estimates
in private or public circumstances. The second characteristic of the situation that is
considered is whether the population for which subjects have to create a consensus
estimate consists primarily of people they know (specific population) or consists primarily
of people they do not know (general population) The characteristic of the person that is
regarded is people' s own social value orientations.
Six social value orientations of theoretical or empirical importance (Messick &
McClintock, 1968; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken & Suhre,
1986; Grzelak, Poppe, Czwartosz & Nowak, 1988; Schulz & May, 1989) are distinguished
in the present research: cooperation (maximizing   one's own outcomes and another' s
1 A Dutch version of this chapter is forthcoming: ledema, J. & Poppe, M. Gepercipieerde consensus van
de eigen sociale-waardenori*ntatie voor verschillende populaties in publieke en privd omstandigheden. In:
Fundamentele Sociate Psychologie. deel 7.
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outcomes); altruism (maximizing another's outcomes without considering one's own
outcomes), equalio' (minimizing the difference between    one' s     own and another' s
outcomes), maximin (maximizing the outcomes for the person who receives least),
individualism (maximizing one's own outcomes, without considering another's outcomes),
and competiUon (maximizing the difference between one's own and another's outcomes
to   one' s own advantage). Cooperation, altruism, equality and maximin are regarded   as
pro-sociW orientations, whereas individualism and competition are considered pro-se/f
orientations (Van Lange & Liebrand,   1991 a)
Two hypotheses are distinguished here regarding the direct influence of the
characteristic of the person - people's social value orientation - on the perceived
consensus for their own orientation. Firstly, the false consensus effect, mentioned above,
predicts that the estimates of the occurrence of a particular orientation will be higher for
people who themselves have this orientation than for people with a different orientation
(Hypothesis  1).  Secondly, the triangle hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970b) can be
viewed as a special case of the false consensus effect. According to the triangle hypothe-
sis, the overestimation of the occurrence of one's own orientation is higher for pro-self
people than for pro-social people The higher consensus expectation of pro-self people
results from their experience with other people (Kelley & Stahelski, 197Ob) Pro-self
people meet both pro-social and pro-self people, but by their own pro-self behavior they
force pro-social people to show defensive behavior that appears to be pro-self Therefore,
pro-self people develop the incorrect perception that their orientation is very prevalent
among other people and to a large extent overestimate their orientation. Pro-social people
do not influence others' behavior in this manner and develop a more correct view of the
occurrence of social orientations According to the triangle hypothesis, the consensus
estimates of pro-self people will be higher than the consensus estimates of pro-social
people (Hypothesis 2).
Now the direct influence of characteristics of the situation on the perceived
consensus of one's orientation will be considered and also their interaction with character-
istics of the person. The first characteristic of the situation is whether consensus estimates
are generated in private or public circumstances In public circumstances, in which one is
not    anonymous    and    can    be held responsible   for   one' s own orientation    in a group
discussion, the consensus estimates could be different from those generated in private
circumstances in which one is anonymous and does not anticipate a discussion. Gerard and
Orive' s  three-tiered theory ofopinionformation (1987) focusses on searching for and even
fabricating a larger consensus for one's own opinion or behavior According to this theory,
the anticipation of a discussion about one's own choices leads to dissonance, caused by the
negative characteristics  of one' s own choices  and the positive characteristics of alternative
choices. This dissonance can be reduced by finding supportive information of an external
source, such as an expert, or by perceiving a high consensus for one's own orientation
When no external source can be consulted, one has to resort to the fabrication of
consensus i,vbnnation. This is done by projecting one's own orientation on others who are
similar in relevant background The projected orientation appears to a person as emanating
from the other and leads to a higher perceived consensus and reduction of dissonance.
This process continues until the dissonance is sufficiently reduced Therefore, it is
expected that people in a public condition (with anticipation of a group discussion) will
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perceive a higher consensus for their orientation than people in a private condition
(Hypothesis 3).
In addition, it is expected that anticipating a group discussion will influence people
with pro-social and pro-self orientations differently People perceive pro-self behavior as
more egoistical, bad, and unfriendly than pro-social behavior (Maki, Thorngate en
McClintock, 1979) Moreover, results of Liebrand et al. (1986) show that both pro-self
and pro-social judges evaluate pro-self behavior as less moral than pro-social behavior.
Because of this negative evaluation of pro-self behavior pro-self people will experience
more dissonance than pro-social people. This leads to the prediction that the difference in
perceived consensus between pro-self and pro-social people will be higher in a public
condition (with anticipated group discussion) than in a private condition (Hypothesis 4).
The second characteristic of the situation that might influence people's perceived
consensus is the population for which an estimate is generated.  One of the explanations for
the false consensus effect originated by Ross et at. (1977) is the selective exposure
-          -explanation-Aecording-te-Ross et-alr(1977) we-tend  to-knew and-asseciate-with=people-  -         --
who share our background, experiences, and interests. This exposure to a biased sample
of people and behavior leads to a subjective view of the preferences and behavior of
others. The selective exposure explanation implies  that the overestimation  of one' s   own
orientation should be less pronounced when people generate consensus estimates for
populations to which they have not been as frequently exposed. This effect has been found
in a number of studies (e.g., Sherman, Presson, Chassin, Corty & Olshavsky 1983; Holtz
& Miller, 1985; Spears & Manstead, 1990) For instance, adolescents overestimated the
occurrence of their own smoking behavior to a greater degree among adolescents than
among adults (Sherman et al., 1983). In the present research, the selective exposure
explanation predicts that the consensus estimates of one's own social orientation will be
higher for a population of which one knows a large number of individuals, than for a
population of which one knows few or no people (Hypothesis 5).
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 89 female and 39 male first year psychology students who had not yet
taken a social psychology course. They participated in the experiment voluntarily.
Procedure
The subjects received forms with instructions and two tasks: a task in which the social
value orientations were assessed and a task in which subjects had to generate consensus
estimates. The subjects were seated in a lecturehall and rows of subjects were assigned
alternately to the private or public condition. Subjects in the public condition were asked
to fill in their names and it was announced that before long they would be invited for a
follow up study with a group discussion about their own orientation ('the way you made
choices in the first task'). Twelve subjects did not fill in their names. Their data were
discarded from the analyses. In the private condition, subjects remained anonymous and
did not anticipate a group discussion. In the task to assess the social orientation, subjects
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Table  3.1   The   Nine   Alternatives   With   Their   Ranking   According   to   Social   Value
Orientations
Alternatives Ideal rankings
Self Other Indi Altr Equa Coop Comp Maxm
person
fA90 f 9 0          2        2        2         1         5        1
f 90 f 70     2    5 5M 2 h 2 72          3
f 90 f  50                      2                 8                 8 M               5                    1                 7
f 70 f 90         5        2 5'h 2 h 7 %          3
f 70 f 7 0         5       5       2        5        5       3
f 70 f50     5    8 572 7 h 2%   7
f 50 f  90                      8                 2                 8%               5                    9                7
f 50 f  70                   8               5               5  2 7 h 772   7
f 50 f 5 0         8        8       2        9        5       7
A f 1.00 (Dutch guilder) is about $ 0.55.
made 36 choices between two alternatives. Every alternative consisted of an amount of
money for the subject and an amount of money for an unknown, other individual. The 36
choice-situations resulted from a pairwise presentation of the nine alternatives in Table
3.1.
In the second task, a choice situation was presented that consisted of six alterna-
tives representing each of the six social value orientations (see Table 3.2). For each of the
six alternatives, subjects had to estimate which percentage of'psychology students of your
own university' would choose that alternative The percentages had to add up to hundred.
This  task was repeated with another population: ' Students from other universities  (all
fields of study)' Next, these two questions were repeated with another choice situation in
which the amounts of money and the order of alternatives were changed. The data of two
subjects were discarded because of missing values in these percentage estimates.
Assessment of Social Value Orientation
Ideal rankings of the nine own-other outcome combinations were formed according to the
social value orientations individualism, altruism, equality, maximin, cooperation and
competition (see Table  3.1).  For each subject  the nine own-other outcome combinations
were ranked according to how often each had been preferred. Spearman's rank order
correlation coefficients (with correction for tied ranks) were computed as a similarity
measure between a subject's ranking of the nine own-other outcome combinations and
each ideal ranking based upon a specific social value orientation The coefficients were
transformed according to Fisher-Z. In this way, any given subject's ranking could be
characterized by six Z-scores representing the six social value orientations
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Table 3.2  One of the Two Choice Situations With Six Alternatives
Alternatives
A B C D E F
Self f 9 flo f 5 f 12 f 6 f 11
Other Person
f 8 fl flo f 4 f 6 f 7
Psychology
students                  %           %             %             %             %            %- -  -  -  - -
Note. The alternatives A to F are preferred by the orientations maximin, competition, altruism,
individualism, equality, and cooperation, respectively.
(Wieczorkowska, 1982; Grzelak et al., 1988)
Results
Social Value Orientation Classification
The subjects were classified on the basis of their dominant social value orientation if their
highest Z-score reached a classification criterion of 0.881 (r=.707; 50% explained
variance). Three subjects did not reach this criterion. Six different orientations were found:
altruism (n=1), equality (n=21), maximin (n=17), cooperation (n=5), individualism (n=79),
and competition (n=2). Because a main effect of the variable private vs. public on the
subjects' social orientations would influence the rest of the analyses, this effect was
analyzed first. The frequencies of subjects with a pro-self or pro-social orientation were
not different for the private and public condition, x' (1)<1. An alternative possibility for
assessing the effect of the private vs. public manipulation on subjects' social orientation
was to use the six Z-scores as dependent variables in a MANOVA This analysis did not
reveal an effect either, F(6,118)=1.85, n.s. Thus, it was concluded that subjects' own
social orientations were not influenced by the private or public nature of the situation.
As reported earlier, the expected percentages of the six distinguished social
orientations were asked in two different choice situations  In a preliminary analysis it was
found that the influence of choice situation showed no interactions with other variables but
was limited to a main effect, F(1,120)=5.45, p<.05, with a higher perceived consensus in
the first choice situation  (A,1-39%)  than  in the second situation (M=35%). Therefore,   in
further analyses the average of the percentages in the two choice situations was used.
False Consensus Hypothesis
The false consensus hypothesis predicts that persons with a specific social orientation
expect that orientation to be more frequent than subjects with other orientations. Accord-
ing to the operationalisation proposed by Ross et al. (1977) for each particular orientation
the expected percentages of two groups have to be compared: a group of people for whom
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Table 3.3  Expected Percentages of Each Social Orientation
Expected Social Orientation
Social Orien-
tation Altr Equa Maxi Coop Indi Comp
Equality                       5           31           23           17           14             9
Maximin                  7         11         25        23        27          7
Cooperation                 3             4 23 34     32       4
Individualism             3         11 14 22 43      7
Note. Subjects' consensus estimates are in bold type.
it is their own orientation and a group of people with different orientations (see Table
3.3). The difference in means of these groups can be tested with a t4est (because of
unequal      n' s and unequal variances between groups, the t-test with separate
variance-estimates is employed here). Using this approach significant false consensus
effects were found for egalitarian subjects, t(24)=6.84, p<.001, maximin subjects,
t(21)=2.09,  p<.05, and individualists, t(112)=4 25, p<.001. Cooperators showed  a
marginally significant false consensus effect, 1(5)=2.51, p<.06, which can be attributed to
the low number of cooperators (n=5)
Triangle Hypothesis
The triangle hypothesis predicts that pro-self people show higher consensus estimates than
pro-social people. Because of the low numbers of subjects found for some social
orientations, in further analyses the individualists and competitors were grouped as pro-self
oriented (n=81) and subjects with other orientations as pro-social oriented 01=44). An
ANOVA was performed on the consensus estimates with social orientation and private vs.
public circumstances as between-subjects variables and psychology vs other students as
within-subjects variable. A significant main effect was found for subjects' social
orientation, F(3,116)=3 09, p<.05 (see the means in bold type in Table 3.3). The planned
contrast between individualistic subjects (M=43%) and subjects with one of the three
pro-social orientations (A+=29%) was significant, F(1,121)=8.48, p<.005. This confirms the
triangle hypothesis because pro-self subjects showed a higher perceived consensus than
pro-social subjects.
Influence of Private vs. Public and Population on Consensus Estimates
The ANOVA also showed a main effect for private vs public circumstances,
F(1,119)=4.08, p<.05, with higher consensus estimates in public circumstances (A,»43%)
than in private circumstances (A,»33%). This effect confirms Gerard and Orive's theory
(1987; Hypothesis 3). The interaction effect between social orientation and private vs
public circumstances was not significant, F(1,119)<1 However, inspection of the means
(see  Figure 1) showed  that the difference in consensus estimates between pro-social  and
pro-self subjects was smaller in private than in public circumstances Separate ANOVAs
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Figure  3.1   Interaction    Between   own    Social   Orientation    and   Private   vs.    Public
Circumstances on the Consensus Estimates
for the private and public condition confirmed this interpretation. In the private condition,
the difference between pro-social and pro-self subjects was not significant, F(1,61) = 1.80,
n.s. But in the public condition, however, the difference between pro-social and pro-self
subjects was significant, F(1,58) =6.11, p <.05. These results confirmed the expectation
that the private or public circumstances in which consensus estimates were generated are
more  influential for pro-self than pro-social subjects (Hypothesis  4).
The within persons variable psychology vs. other students was significant,
F(1,119)=9.18, p<.01. However, contrary   to the expectation   that the consensus
estimates for the population psychology students would be higher than those for other
students, the consensus estimates for psychology students were lower (M=36%) than
those for other students (M=38%). The significant interaction effect between social
orientation and psychology vs. other students,  F(1,119) = 18.54, p <.001, indicates  why
(see Figure 2). As expected, pro-social subjects showed higher consensus estimates for
psychology students   than for other students,   F(1,42) =4.68,  p < .05. However,   for
pro-self subjects the effect was the opposite of that expected. For pro-self subjects the
consensus estimates were lower for psychology students than for other students,
F(1,80) =22.80, p< .001. The unexpected direction of the main effect for psychology vs.
other students is the result of the private vs. public effect of pro-self subjects being
stronger than that of the pro-social subjects. The two remaining interaction effects were
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Figure 3.2 Interaction Between own Social Orientation and Psychology vs. Other
Students on the Consensus Estimates
not significant, F(1,119) < 1.
Finally, for the triangle hypothesis it is interesting to examine the triangle effect
per condition and per population (see Table 3.4). It was only in the private condition,
with the consensus estimates for psychology students, that the triangle effect was clearly
not significant, 17(1,61) < 1.  In the public condition, the triangle effect on the consensus
estimates for psychology students was marginally significant, F(1,58)=3.77,p<.06. The
consensus estimates for other students were significant for both private circumstances,
F(1,61)=4.10, p<.05, and public circumstances, F(1,58)=8.57, p<.01.
Discussion
The false consensus effects (Hypothesis 1) found in the present research are no exception.
In all studies found in the literature in which subjects were asked to predict the expected
social orientations of other people, the false consensus hypothesis was confirmed (Miller
& Holmes, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Schlenker & Goldman, 1978; Mess6 &
Sivacek, 1979; Misra & Kalro, 1979; Bixenstine, Lowenfeld & Englehart, 1981).
However, the support for the triangle hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) found in the present
research is rather exceptional. The triangle hypothesis was only supported in the above
mentioned studies when the prisoner's dilemma game was used. In the studies by Miller
and Holmes (1975) and Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) different choice situations were
used in which the triangle hypothesis was not confirmed. The prisoner's dilemma game
has the drawback that the interdependence of outcomes with the other individual is
Perceived Consensus in Different Populations and Circumstances 43
Table 3.4 Percentages of Consensus Estimates for Psychology and Other Students
Separated for the Private and Public Condition
Private Public
Social orienta-
tion Psychology Other Psychology Other
students students students students
Pro-social 30 26          31          29
Pro-self 34 39 45          51
stressed, leading to strategic considerations influencing both one's own behavior and the
expected behavior of others (McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman & Campos, 1973). Therefore,
iris   erape  to-6filpldy  the-thoicE-sit atiomused-in  th€jiraent  reardli /62omposed   -        -     -
games), in which the interdependence of outcomes with the other is less apparent. Then,
the consensus estimates are determined less by the specific situation and more by aspects
of the individual.
Only a few investigations are known (Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Brown &
Basil, 1980, cited in Kuhlman, Camac & Cunha, 1986; Kuhlman, Brown & Teta, 1992)
in which decomposed games were used to assess the consensus estimates (the latter two
studies are replications of the first study). In these studies, cooperators, individualists,  and
competitors expected their orientation among other people to approximately the same
extent; results not in line with the triangle hypothesis. A possible explanation for these
results is based on a distinction between private and public circumstances.
In public circumstances, a stronger difference in consensus estimates between
pro-social and pro-self subjects was expected than in private circumstances (Hypothesis 4).
Indeed, over conditions a triangle effect was found, but the triangle effect was not
Significant in private conditions. In the research done by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976),
Brown and Basil  (1980), and Kuhlman et at.  (1992) the social orientation of subjects  and
their consensus estimates were assessed in private conditions (subjects were probably
anonymous and were denoted as subject one or two in Kuhlman & Wimberley's study).
According to the explanation based on Gerard and Orive's theory (1987), the difference
in dissonance that pro-social and pro-self subjects experience is minor in private circum-
stances, and this does not lead to a difference in consensus estimates. It is plausible that
private circumstances in an experiment reduce the chance of finding support for the
triangle hypothesis.
According to Gerard and Orive's theory (1987) the anticipation of a discussion
about one's own social orientation would lead to higher consensus estimates (Hypothesis
3). Consensus estimates were indeed higher in the public condition in which discussion
was anticipated than in the private condition in which it was not. This effect confirms
Gerard and Orive's theory (1987) in a new domain.
The population for which subjects had to generate consensus estimates was also
influential. According to the selective exposure explanation, consensus estimates were
expected to be lower for a population to which subjects had not been exposed than for a
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population to which they had been exposed (Hypothesis 5). This effect was found for
pro-social subjects, but the reverse effect was found for pro-self subjects. It is likely that
the manipulation of a specific and a general population was confounded by a stereotype
of psychology students. According to this stereotype, psychology students would be
relatively sensitive ('soft'), compared to the population 'other students'. This, in turn,
increased the expectation of pro-social behavior and decreased the expectation of pro-self
behavior. Pro-self subjects, in particular, seem to have been influenced by this stereotype,
because their estimates for the two populations differed much more than those of
pro-social subjects. Both the stereotype explanation and the selective exposure explanation
are of interest for understanding the findings of previous research, because the subjects
were often psychology students and subjects had to generate consensus estimates for
populations which were described differently. In the research of Kelley and Stahelski
(1970ab), for example, subjects had to generate consensus estimates for 'the typical
person', a category that referred to people in general. In the investigations by Kuhlman
and Wimberley (1976) and Brown and Basil (1980) the instruction was: 'how many
university undergraduates   out   of a hundred would choose each alternative'.   In   the
Kuhlman et al. (1992) study subjects had to indicate: 'how many of 100 classmates of
their own sex they thought would choose A, B, and C' (cooperatively, individualistically,
and competitively). By using these instructions, the researchers probably attempted to
simplify the task for subjects by increasing the specificity of the population. The result
may have been that subjects resorted to relying on their experiences with a group of one
hundred fellow students taking the introductory psychology class. At least, subjects were
not prohibited to use information about their fellow students, which according to the
selective exposure explanation may have influenced their consensus estimates. Because in
the present research no triangle effect was found for the population of psychology
students, the interpretation given above may explain why no support for the triangle
hypothesis was found in the studies done by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976), Brown and
Basil (1980), and Kuhlman et at. (1992)
The integrative approach employed in the present research seems to have been
fruitful. Both private vs. public circumstances and the type of population influenced
support for the triangle hypothesis. The triangle hypothesis was confirmed in public
circumstances but not in private circumstances. Furthermore, the triangle hypothesis was
supported more strongly for the general population than for the specific population. These
results indicate that support for the triangle hypothesis is influenced by the circumstances
in which people generate consensus estimates and, additionally, the type of population for
which they generate consensus estimates, in particular the specificity and possible
stereotypes of the population
Chapter 4
Causal Attribution and Self-Justification as
Explanations for the Consensus Expectation of
One's Social Value Orientation: Experiment 3
Introduction
People usually overestimate the commonness of their own behavior, which typically results
-         --      -   in-an overestimation of-theirbehavior amongothers-  According  tolhe triangle hypothesis
(Kelley & Stahelski, 197Ob) the consensus expectations  of one' s social value orientation
are a special case of this general phenomenon, because competitive people overestimate
the occurrence of their orientation more than cooperative people This study focusses on
a causal attribution explanation for the difference in consensus expectations between
individuals with different orientations A social value orientation is an individual
preference for certain outcome allocations to oneself and another individual (McClintock,
1972). The social value orientations that are considered here are individualism
(maximizing one's own gain), competition (maximizing relative gain), and cooperation
(maximizing joint gain; e.g. McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman & Campos, 1973; Kuhlman
& Wimberley, 1976; Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken & Suhre, 1986). These orientations are
often differentiated (Van Lange & Liebrand, 199 la) into pro-sef orientations
(individualism and competition) and pro-social orientations (cooperation and altruism -
maximizing other's gain)
Kelley and Stahelski' s (1970b) reasoning   for the triangle hypothesis   is   that   the
overestimation of competitors is caused by their influence on cooperative others they
encounter. Pro-social people try to defend themselves against exploitation of pro-self
oriented others by shifting to more pro-self behavior themselves (Kelley and Stahelski
called this behavioral assimilation) Because pro-self individuals do not notice that they are
partly the cause of the pro-self behavior of others in their environment, they overestimate
the occurrence of pro-self orientations. Although the reasoning behind the triangle
hypothesis is plausible, it is perhaps possible to explain the difference in perceived
consensus between pro-social and pro-self individuals in alternative ways. One alternative
way is by causal attribution of one's own social orientation to internal or external factors
and its influence on the perceived consensus.
Ross, Greene and House (1977) related causal attribution to people's tendency to
overestimate the occurrence of their own behavior among other people: the so-called false
consensus efect. An example of the false consensus effect is that people who  prefer brown
bread to white bread estimate a higher percentage of people to prefer brown bread than
people who prefer white bread. The causal attribution explanation is based on people's
causal analysis of their behavior. When people try to estimate the way others are most
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likely to behave, they may examine the causes underlying their own behavior When
people attribute their own behavior to the situation (external attribution) then situational
determinants should exert a powerful influence on others as well, leading to the
expectation that most others will behave similarly to themselves. Alternatively, when
people attribute their behavior to personal characteristics that do not pertain to others
(internal attribution) they have little reason to believe that their behavior is particularly
common and they are more likely to expect others to behave in a different way As
research on actor-observer differences has shown, people tend to view their own behavior
as the result of environmental influences (Jones & Nisbett,     1972). Thus, people' s
overestimation of their behavior can be explained by causal attribution as the tendency to
perceive external causes for their behavior and accordingly expect of other people
predominantly their own behavior
Zuckerman and Mann (1979) and Gilovich, Jennings and Jennings (1983)
empirically tested the effect of causal attribution on overestimation of people's own
behavior or preferences Zuckerman and Mann (1979, experiment 3) asked subjects in an
internal attribution condition to write down characteristics of their personality that had
caused their preference In an external attribution condition the question was to write
down situational causes of their preference. As expected, subjects in the internal attribution
condition estimated the consensus for their behavior lower than subjects in the external
attribution condition. Gilovich et al (1983) replicated this finding in their first study. In
a second study they found a correlation of 59 between, on the one hand, how externally
caused the preferences in a number of situations were rated by judges and, on the other
hand, the false consensus effects   of   subj ects in these situations In addition to these
findings, in both experiments hardly any significant false consensus effects were found in
the internal attribution conditions. This is striking because the false consensus effect is
very robust and it is exceptional when it is not found. This indicates that causal attribution
is an influential explanation for the overestimation of one's behavior.
According to the triangle hypothesis, pro-self oriented people expect others
predominantly to be pro-self oriented, whereas pro-social oriented people expect both
pro-social and pro-self oriented others Thus, pro-social orientations are expected
infrequently by pro-self people and are also expected relatively infrequently by pro-social
people If the causal attribution explanation is correct, then especially pro-social
orientations should be attributed to internal causes. Pro-self orientations are expected more
frequently and thus, according to the causal attribution explanation, should be attributed
less to internal and more to external causes This leads to the hypothesis that pro-social
orientations are attributed more to internal causes and less to external causes, whereas
pro-self orientations are attributed less to internal causes and more to external causes
(Hypothesis  1)
Moreover, it is expected that attributions will be different for an individual with the
same orientation as oneself or with a different orientation People consider their own
behavior as caused predominantly by external factors, while they consider others' behavior
as caused predominantly by internal factors (the actor-observer effect, Jones & Nisbett,
1972). For the present study this implies that behavior according to a certain orientation
is attributed less internally and more externally by people who have this orientation
themselves than by people with a different orientation (Hypothesis 2)
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In the present study also a second alternative explanation is studied for the
difference between pro-social and pro-self people in overestimating their own orientation.
The assumption of similarity in behavior between oneself and others provides social
support for one's behavior, which is especially important when one's behavior is less
socially desirable. This ego-defensive function of the overestimation of one's own
behavior among other people is recognized by different authors (Ross et al., 1977; Marks
& Miller, 1987; Gerard & Orive, 1987). For example, it is less threatening for a student
who cheats on an exam to assume that other students are doing the same. Indeed, Katz and
Allport (1931) found  that the admitted frequency of cheating by students was positively
related to their estimates of the number of other students who had cheated. In addition,
Wagner and Gerard (1983) found a higher overestimation of subjects' own preference for
items about values than about facts. Apparently one needs more support of others, when
one is less secure about one's own position. Marks and Miller (1987) mention a number
of situations in which motivational factors especially influence the overestimation of one's
- -behavior»when-one wants to-show oneself in-the-best-pessiblelight; -to-boost-one's own
position (social support); when one exhibits deviant, socially disapproved behavior; when
one has a high interest in a certain outcome; to gain or to sustain self-approval; and when
one has failed.
Thus, by projecting one's behavior onto others one can try to conceal negative
information about oneself or, in other words, try to justify oneself. Research into the
evaluation of social value orientations shows that individualistic and competitive
orientations are evaluated as more egoistic, bad and unfriendly than cooperative and
altruistic orientations (Maki, Thorngate & McClintock, 1979). Moreover, both pro-social
oriented people as pro-self oriented people evaluate pro-self orientations more negatively,
although the latter to a slightly lesser degree (Liebrand et al., 1986). Because pro-self
orientations are evaluated more negatively, people with a pro-self orientation could be
more motivated to justify their orientation than pro-social oriented people  One way of
justifying one's own behavior is by projecting it onto other people. So far, in experiments
on social value orientations and expectations, people' s  own  social value orientation  was
always assessed first and the orientation they expected of others afterwards.  In this order
it is conceivable that pro-self oriented people try to justify their social orientation by
increasing their consensus expectation   If this order is switched one does not have a reason
to justify one's own orientation because it has not yet been assessed Thus, according to
a self-justification explanation, support for the triangle hypothesis should be stronger when
one' s own social orientation is assessed first and subsequently the orientation expected  of
others, than vice versa (Hypothesis 3).
Method
Subjects
Seventy-one students (64 women and 7 men) of a School for Business, Administration and
Economics participated  in the experiment. Their ages ranged  from   18  to 24 years  with  a
median of 20 years They received f 7,50 (about $ 4) for participation.
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Procedure
The subjects were seated in a lectureroom and received five tasks. In the first task
subjects' social orientations were assessed using the decomposed games measure (see
Table 4.1 for an example of a decomposed game) developed by Liebrand (Liebrand et at.,
1986). In the second task the social orientations subjects expected predominantly of their
fellow students were also assessed with the decomposed games measure. For half of the
subjects the order of the first two tasks was reversed.
In the third task, eight choices of an individual were shown who was referred to
as the chooser. The chooser so-called had participated in an earlier study and chose strictly
according to cooperation, individualism or competition. To ascertain that the subjects
studied the chooser's choices carefully, they had to make choices themselves in the same
decomposed games in which the chooser had already indicated choices. Moreover, a
number of questions were asked to verify an accurate perception of the chooser's
orientation Next, subjects made a number of attributions to the causes of the chooser's
choices. In the fourth and fifth task, the third task was repeated with a chooser with one
of the remaining orientations. The six possible sequences in which subjects were
confronted with the three choosers were evenly distributed over the subjects. When
subj ects had finished the tasks they received their payment  and  left.
Social Orientation Measurement
To assess the social orientations of subjects they made sixteen choices in decomposed
games (DGs)  Each DG had two alternatives and each alternative consisted of an amount
of money for the subject and an amount of money for another, unknown individual.  In the
example in Table 4.1, cooperative subjects will choose alternative A, because in this
alternative the sum of the outcomes for themselves and the other is higher (f 32) than in
alternative B (f 29) Individualists will choose alternative B, because the outcome for
themselves (f   19) is higher than in alternative A (f 16). Competitors will prefer alternative
B, because the difference between their own and the other's outcome is higher (f 9) than
in alternative A (f 0). The sixteen outcomes for the subjects themselves and for the other
were summed These two total outcomes are the coordinates of a vector in a
two-dimensional space, in which the outcomes for a subject are depicted on the horizontal
axis, and the outcomes for the other on the vertical axis (Liebrand et al., 1986). Subjects
for which the vector angle was in between 67.5° and 22.5° were classified as cooperative;
subjects with a vector angle in between 22.5° and -22 5° were classified as individualistic,
and subjects with a vector angle in between -22.5° and -67.5° were classified as
competitive.
Table 4.1   An Example of a Choice Situation  (Decomposed Game)
Alternative A Alternative B
Self f 16 f 19
Other individual f 16 f 10
Note. f 1.00 is about $ 0.55.
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The orientations subjects expected of others were assessed in a similar way. In each
DG the subjects indicated the choice they expected predominantly of their fellow students.
Again for each subject a vector was computed with the total outcome expected of their
fellow students and the total outcome for the unknown other individual. In this way,
subjects were also classified according to expected orientation of fellow students.
Finally, subjects also made eight choices towards the cooperative, individualistic,
and competitive chooser. This time subjects knew the choices of the other beforehand,
because the choices of the chooser were already indicated  On the basis of their choices,
subjects' orientations could also be assessed towards each of the three choosers.
Construction of the Attribittion Scales
It was important that subjects clearly understood the choosers' orientations in order for
their attributions to make sense. Questions asked about the choosers' orientations showed
that some subjects regarded a chooser with a different orientation than their own as most
--       --similar to-themselves„ For-the  attribution_partof_the study, these subjects'-data  were
discarded (seven cooperators, eight individualists and one competitor)  The data of one
subject were not used because of some missing values.
The causal attribution items were based on the causal dimension scale of Russels
(1982). This scale was developed to measure in a reliable way the dimensions internal vs.
external causes, smbilio' and control of Weiner (1979), each with three items Although
no hypotheses about control and stability were formulated they were added for the sake of
completeness. The items for the internal vs. external dimension were replaced by separate
internal and external items. Because experiments by Liebrand et al. (1986) and Van
Lange, Liebrand and Kuhlman (1990) showed that attributions to norms are important in
evaluating individuals with different orientations, some items about norms were added. An
example of the way the questions were generally posed is: "The Chooser chose in this
manner because of his or her personality". The subjects could indicate their answers on
six-point rating scales ranging from totally disagree (1) to totally agree (6).
It was important that the attribution scales had the same meaning for choosers with
different orientations. Therefore, a principal-component analysis was performed in which
the attributions of each subject to each chooser were used as the unit of analysis. The
principal-component analysis resulted in three factors with an eigenvalue greater than one
The factors were rotated after varimax (see Table 4.2). The first factor, attribution to
stable and controUable causes, consisted of the stability and control items. The second
factor, internal causes, consisted of the attributions to internal causes and norms. The third
factor, external causes, consisted of the external attribution items. To check whether the
three factors had the same meaning for each chooser, Cronbach's a's of the attribution
scales were computed separately for each chooser (see Table 4 3) The Cronbach's a's did
not vary much between choosers, indicating that the meaning of the attribution scales was
measured reliably for each chooser. On the basis of the rotated principal components,
factor scores were computed for each of the three choosers.
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Table 4.2  The Loadings of the Items on the Three Factors
Factors
Items Stable Internal External
The Chooser
Will choose differently in a next -.71
experiment
Would choose in this way every moment .65
Did not control his/her way of choosing -.63
Chose in this way on purpose .63
Chose differently than he/she actually was -.59
Chose only like this because he/she -.49 .44
participated in an experiment
Could not be influenced .47
Chose in this way because of his/her .80
character
Chose in this way because of his/her .74
personality
Chose in this way because he/she had an .68
opinion of how to interact with another
Chose in this way because of principles .58
Chose in this way because of the situation .88
Chose in this way because of .87
circumstances
Explained variance 20.2% 17.0% 16.2%
Note. Only factor loadings higher than  1.40 I  are depicted.
Results
Social Orientations, Triangle Hypothesis and Self-justification
In Table 44, subjects' social value orientations are depicted and also the orientation they
expect of their fellow students. The orientation expected of others was combined into two
categories: whether subjects expected their fellow students to have their own orientation
or a different orientation (this will be called consensus expectation) On these data, a
loglinear analysis was performed with the variables social orientation, consensus
expectation and order (first subjects' own social orientation assessed or first the expected
orientation of others assessed) For the most simple model with an adequate fit,
X2 (6)=6.80, p>.33, the contributions of order and the interactions between order and the
other two variables    were not significant (partial association tests:    ps>.10).    The
relationships among the three variables was adequately described by the main effects of
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Cooperative .76 .71 .89
Individualistic .75 .72 .81
Competitive .77 .63 .75
social orientation, xi (2)=14.13,p<.001, consensus expectation, X2 (1)=4.11,p< 05, and the
interaction between social orientation and consensus expectation, XJ (2)=12.54, p<.005.
The main effect of consensus expectation means  that  subj ects more frequently expected
-lheir-ownsocial orientatiwi uf ullicis  tliati a diffeiwit uiictilaliuit Themaineffectof social    -          -
orientation shows that there were fewer competitors than individualists or cooperators  The
interaction between social orientation and consensus expectation indicates that
individualists more often expected others to have their own social orientation than
cooperators and competitors did Because the order variable had no main effect or
interaction effects, no support was found for the explanation based on self-justification
To enable a comparison of the present results with previous research (Kelley &
Stahelski, 1970b; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976), in a second analysis, both for their own
social orientation and for the orientation expected of others, individualism and competition
were combined to a pro-self category (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991 a). Pro-self subjects
more frequently expected others to be pro-self oriented, (84%) than that cooperators
expected others to be cooperative (46%), X2 (2)-6.20, p<.05.
Table 4.4  Social Orientation and Expected Orientation of Others
Expected Social Orientation
Social Orientation
Cooperative Individua- Competitive Total
listic
Cooperative                               1 3                        1 5                           0                    28
46% 54% 0% 39%
Individualistic                       5                  27                    1               33
15% 82% 3% 47%
Competitive                         2                   4                    4               10
20% 40% 40% 14%
Total 20 46          5        71
28% 65% 7% 100%
Note. The first entry is the number of cases, the second entry is the row-percentage.
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Causal Attributions
A preliminary analysis of variance on the three attribution factor scores with the
self-justification order (first subjects' own social orientation assessed or first expected
orientation of others assessed) and the order of choosers (the six different orders in which
subjects were confronted with the choosers) showed no significant main or interaction
effects (ps > .25). Therefore the two order variables were not included in further analyses.
On the factor scores of attributions to stable, internal and external causes, an
analysis of variance was performed with social orientation as between-subjects variable and
the orientation of the chooser as within-subjects variable. The multivariate main effect of
subjects' social orientation was not significant, 17(6,100)=1.16,  n.s.
The  multivariate main effect of chooser was significant,  17(6,46) =4.70,  p <.01.
Univariately   the main effect for chooser   was only significant for internal attributions,
F(2,102)=11.87,   p<.001. The means indicated   that the behavior   of the cooperative
chooser was attributed more to an internal cause (M=0.34) than the behavior of an
individualistic chooser (M=-0.27), 1(53)=4.68, p <.001, or competitive chooser (M=0.00),
t(53) =3.09,   p < .01. The difference in internal attribution   to the individualistic  and
competitive choosers was also significant, t(53)=2.50, p < .05.
The multivariate main effect of chooser was qualified by a significant multivariate
interaction effect between subjects' social orientation and choosers' orientation,













Figure  4.1   Interaction   Between   Social   Orientation   and   Choosers   With   Different
Orientations on Internal Attributions
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attributions, F(4, 102)-4.12,  p<.01. Especially individualists showed the pattern expected
in Hypothesis 2 (see Figure 41). They attributed the behavior of the chooser with their
own orientation significantly less to an internal cause than the behavior of the competitive
chooser, t(24)=4 05, p< 001, or the cooperative chooser, t(24)=5.21, p<.001. Individualists'
internal attributions to the cooperative and competitive choosers were also significantly
different, t(24)=2.35, p<.05. Likewise, competitors attributed the orientation with their
own orientation least to internal causes. But in this case only the cooperative chooser's
orientation was attributed significantly more internally than the competitive chooser,
t(8)=3.14, p<.05, or the individualistic chooser, 1(8)=1.88, p<.10. Finally, the cooperators
did not show any differences between the three choosers in attributions to internal causes
Causal Attribution and Expected Orientation
The most important question of the present research is whether the orientation one expects
of others is influenced  by the attribution  of one' s social orientation to internal causes.  For
-   -is-purpose- a loglinear-analysis was-perfermed-with-the variables-social_orientation
consensus expectation (expecting one's own orientation of others or a different orientation)
and attribution (attributing one's own orientation relatively strongly or relatively weakly
to internal causes; the boundary was a factor score of zero). In a model with a very high
fit,    X2 (4)-1.17,   p>.88, the contributions   of   the main effect of attribution   and   the
interaction effect between social orientation and attribution were not significant (partial
association tests: ps>.20). The model consisted of the - in the aforementioned loglinear
analysis reported - effects of social orientation,  X2 (2)=8.40, p<.05, consensus
expectation,  X1 (1)=5.34, p<.05,  and the interaction between social orientation  and
consensus expectation, xi (2)=11.53, p<.005. A new effect was the interaction between
consensus expectation and attribution,  X2 (1)=3.48, p<.06.  This interaction effect indicates
that subjects who attributed their social orientation relatively weakly to internal causes,
expected their social orientation more frequently of other people than subjects who
attributed their social orientation relatively strongly to internal causes (see Table  4.5).
Choices Towards Other Choosers
The subjects made eight choices with the cooperative, individualistic or competitive
chooser as the other individual Of the total amount of money subjects allocated to
themselves and the total amount of money allocated to the chooser the vector angle was
Table  4.5    Interaction  Between  Consensus  Expectation  and  Internal  Attribution
Consensus Expectation Internal Attribution
Strong Weak
Own Orientation                                        12                                      24
52.2% 75.0%
Different Orientation                               1 1                                     8
47.8% 25.0%
Note. The first entry is the number of cases, the second entry is the column-percentage.
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Table 4.6  Choices Towards Other Choosers
Chooser's Social Orientation
Social Orientation
Cooperative Individualistic Competitive Mean
Cooperators 38.0' 10.7 15.7 21.5
Individualists 3.2 1.7 2.5 2.5
Competitors 2.5 0.0 -5.6 -1.0
Mean 15.0 4.5 5.8 8.4
Note. Depicted are subjects' mean vector angles resulting from their choices.
1 Only this vector angle was in between 67.5° and 22.5° and thus indicative of cooperative choices.
All other vector angles were in between  22.5° and -22.5° and thus indicative of individualistic
choices.
computed This vector angle represents the social orientation as expressed by subjects'
choices. An analysis of variance was performed on the vector angle with social orientation
as between-subjects variable and choosers' orientation as within-subjects variable. The data
of fifteen subjects were not available because of missing data Subjects' social orientation
had a significant effect, F(2,50)=6.22, p< 005 Cooperators showed more cooperative
behavior than individualists and competitors (see Table 4.6). A significant effect of
choosers' orientation, F(4,100)=3.78, p<.05, showed that subjects chose     more
cooperatively when the other was cooperative than when the other was individualistic or
competitive. The significant interaction effect between social orientation and choosers'
orientation, 12(4,100)=2 82, p< 05, indicated that especially cooperators adjusted their
choices  to the orientation  of the chooser, F(2,34)=8.70,  p< 005. The choices  of
individualists and competitors were not influenced by choosers' orientations, Fs<1.
Cooperators chose significantly more according to cooperation toward the cooperative
chooser than toward the individualistic chooser, 1(18)-4.98, p<.001, or the competitive
chooser, t(18)=3 06, p<.01.
Discussion
The results with regard to expected orientations from others were not very consistent with
the triangle hypothesis. When subjects were divided into pro-social and pro-self categories,
the triangle hypothesis seemed to be supported just like in earlier studies (e g Kelley &
Stahelski, 197Ob) However, when the consensus expectations of competitors and
individualists were analyzed separately the results were quite different Competitors did
not  estimate the occurrence of their orientation higher than cooperators. Only individualists
showed significantly higher consensus expectations than other subjects Furthermore,
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) concluded on the basis of their results that when subjects
are differentiated into cooperators, individualists and competitors, their consensus
expectation will be approximately the same. This conclusion is not validated in the present
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research because the perceived consensus of individualists is clearly higher than that of
people with other orientations.
Subjects' choices when a chooser was the other individual showed that
individualists and competitors were not influenced by the others' choices, but cooperators
were. This confirms the behavioral assimilation of cooperators, observed by Kelley and
Stahelski (197Ob) in a prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), in a decomposed game setting.
Cooperators prefer to choose cooperatively but are not prepared to be exploited by a
non-cooperative other. Cooperators adjust their behavior when opposing pro-self others
and therefore their behavior can no longer be distinguished from that of individualists.
This  result is  in line with the assumption of the triangle hypothesis that pro-self people do
not recognize pro-social others because pro-social individuals adjust their behavior when
confronted with a pro-self other
The hypotheses about differences in attributions (Hypotheses 1 and 2) were only
supported for internal attributions. Cooperation was attributed most to internal causes,
-             -        individualism was attributed least    to-internal- causes- and-the internal-attribution    of-
competition was in between. According to the second hypothesis subjects were expected
to attribute their own orientation less to internal causes and more to external causes than
other orientations. This difference was only found for internal attributions. Especially
individualists and also competitors showed the expected pattern. That the hypotheses about
differences in attributions were only supported for internal attributions may be explained
by the »,damental attribution error (Ross,  1977). This is the tendency to attribute
behavior to internal causes rather than to external causes. The explanation for the present
results is that it is unlikely that people show differences in attributions to a cause that is
not very influential in explaining behavior. To check whether the fundamental attribution
error was at work, simple means were calculated of the items that loaded high on the
internal attribution or the external attribution factor. Subjects attributed choosers' behavior
indeed more internally (A/4.45) than externally (M=3.08), 17(3,51)=23.41, p<.001.
The central question of the present research is whether causal attributions influence
the orientations expected of other people. A direct, affirmative answer to this question was
the effect that subjects who attributed their own orientation relatively more to an internal
cause showed a lower consensus expectation than subjects who attributed their own
orientation relatively less to an internal cause. A more indirect answer is given by
comparing the internal attributions found in the present research to the results of previous
studies into the triangle hypothesis. For a number of reasons only studies employing
decomposed games are considered for this comparison and not studies using a prisoner's
dilemma game setting. Firstly, in PDG-studies usually only two orientations were
differentiated (pro-social and pro-self). Secondly, choices are more influenced by strategic
considerations in a PDG than in decomposed games (McClintock et al., 1973), probably
also influencing the expectations of others' orientations. Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976)
showed convincingly that in the same experiment the triangle hypothesis can be supported
in a PDG and not in decomposed games, which demonstrates that it is more accurate to
study the triangle hypothesis using decomposed games. Of the studies employing
decomposed games, Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) found that the consensus
expectations of cooperators, individualists and competitors were approximately the same.
Iedema and Poppe (1993a) found that the consensus expectations of individualists were
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higher than those of pro-social subjects and competitors. This result was also found in the
present research. In conclusion, especially the consensus expectations of individualists
seem to be higher than those of pro-social subjects and competitors Additionally,
individualism usually was the orientation expected most frequently when subjects' own
orientation was not considered.
The internal attributions found in the present study reflect the pattern of consensus
estimates found in the studies employing decomposed games. Individualism is attributed
least internally, whereas individualism is the orientation expected most of others.
Moreover, the internal attributions of individualism by individualists themselves is even
lower than the attributions of subjects with other orientations (see Figure 4.1), which
corresponds with their high consensus expectation. Cooperation was the orientation that
was attributed most internally. This matches the low expected frequency of cooperators by
cooperatively oriented people themselves and by people with other orientations. Finally,
the internal attribution of competition is intermediate between that to cooperation and to
individualism. This agrees with the relatively low expected frequency of competition by
competitors.  All  in  all, the causal attributions of the orientations individualism, cooperation
and competition correspond with the expected frequencies of these orientations, both as
they are expected by people who have the specific orientation themselves and by people
with a different orientation  It can be concluded that causal attribution of one's own
orientation to internal causes is an important predictor of whether one expects one's own
or a different orientation of others
The explanation for the triangle effect based on self-justification of one's own
orientation (Hypothesis 3) was clearly not supported. Pro-self oriented subjects whose own
social orientation was assessed before their orientation expected of others did not expect
their orientation more frequently of others than pro-self subjects whose own social
orientation was assessed afterwards. It should be noted that this research was carried out
in private circumstances. In these conditions a motivational explanation probably is less
likely to be supported than in more public circumstances. Another possibility which cannot
be controlled for in the present research is that subjects already anticipated that their social
orientation would be assessed when they were asked to indicate what they expected others
would choose. A final note regarding this point is a result that was not found Subjects'
social orientations could have been influenced when they first had to indicate the
orientation expected of others. For instance, a pro-self orientation expected of others might
have convinced subjects about the egoistic nature of other people, influencing them to
choose in a more pro-self way when their own orientation was assessed. However, such
an effect was not found This supports the view that social value orientations are rather
stable personality characteristics.
Finally, the overview of studies into the relation between subjects' own and
expected orientations show results inconsistent with the triangle hypothesis. Differences in
consensus expectations are a result of the higher consensus expectation of individualists
and not of competitors  A new model should focus on this higher consensus expectations
of individualists. The present study shows that individualism is attributed least to internal
causes and, thus, is seen as the most common type of behavior. Individualism might be
expected in such high frequencies because it is the social value orientation that agrees best
with widely disseminated claims about Western people's egoism and selfishness.
Chapter 5
Estimating Others' Social Value Orientations
in Daily Life Circumstancesi: Experiment 4
Introduction
In daily life, it is to people's advantage to perceive another's intentions correctly. When,
-    - for-example, a woman_considers asking a stranger ta_take a_picture_of her„she should_
ascertain that he does not make a thievish impression: he might run away and steal her
camera In this example the woman has to estimate whether the other individual will
prefer to do her a favor and make the photograph to doing himself a favor and running
away with her camera. In the present research the characteristic that people have to
estimate of others is their social value orientation A social orientation is defined as a
preference for different allocations of outcomes for oneself and another individual
(McClintock, 1972). The social value orientations that are distinguished here are
individualism (maximizing one's own outcomes, without concern for another's outcomes),
competition (maximizing the difference between one's own and another's outcomes to
one's own advantage), and pro-social orientation (maximizing joint outcomes or
minimizing the difference between one's own and another's outcomes) (e.g. McClintock,
1972; McClintock, Messick, Kuhlman, & Campos, 1973. Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976;
Liebrand, Jansen, Rijken, & Suhre, 1986; Grzelak, Poppe, Czwartosz, & Nowak, 1988).
Individualism and competition can be grouped together in one class known as pro-seif
orientation (Van Lange & Liebrand,   1991 a)
Two studies have focussed on the accuracy of estimating others' orientations in
real-life circumstances. Knight (1981) first assessed children's social orientations using a
series of decomposed games (DGs, see Table 5 1 for an example)  In the DGs children
chose among three alternatives. Each alternative allocated a nVmber of points to the
children themselves and to an unspecified peer. The three alternatives in a DG
corresponded to an individualistic, competitive or pro-social orientation. The children were
informed that their choice would provide a number of points for themselves and another
child in the classroom and that the more points they acquired, the more toys they would
receive. Subjects were classified according to their most preferred choice. Next, the
children estimated the social orientation of each of their classmates. Knight (1981)
compared the social orientations of children with the prevalent estimates of their
orientation by classmates. He found a high agreement (60%) between the children's social
1 We thank Paul A. M. van Lange for putting his decomposed games series at our disposal.
These decomposed games were used in the present experiment.
58           The Perceived Consensus of One's Social Orientation
orientations and the estimates of their classmates. Bem and Lord (1979) used a more
indirect approach. They asked five judges to fill in a personality questionnaire according
to an individualistic, competitive and pro-social orientation. Then, the social orientations
of a number of subjects were assessed in the laboratory with DGs and their roommates
were asked to rate them on the same personality questionnaire. Bem and Lord (1979)
correlated the roommates' ratings with the judges' ratings of each social orientation  The
roommates' ratings correlated significantly higher with the judges' ratings of the subjects'
orientations   than   with the ratings of other orientations. In conclusion, people' s social
orientation is identifiable by others who know them and therefore is a manifestation of
personality.
Although the accuracy of estimating others' orientations in daily life has received
some attention, the possible influence of the perceivers' own social orientation has not
been considered yet. Nevertheless, this question is highly relevant for the reasoning
underlying the most intriguing hypothesis in interdependence situations, the triangle
hypothesis (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). The triangle hypothesis predicts that competitors
expect that others are primarily competitively oriented, whereas cooperators expect more
variation of orientations among other people: others can be oriented cooperatively or
competitively This implies that competitors expect their own orientation to a higher extent
from others than cooperators Kelley and Stahelski (1970) explained the triangle
hypothesis as follows: competitors are not aware of different orientations among others,
because they cause cooperators in their social environment to act in a more competitive
way to prevent exploitation This statement was a generalization of their own laboratory
research with a prisoner's dilemma game (PDG; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970) in which
cooperators who interacted with competitors subjects adjusted to more noncooperative
choices to prevent exploitation (this is known as behavioral assimilation) Afterwards,
cooperators  were more  apt at predicting the other' s orientation correctly than competitors.
Therefore, Kelley and Stahelski (1970) concluded that competitors have developed a
distorted view of their social environment, mainly because they have neglected the
influence of their own behavior on that of others.
Some studies have examined the claim underlying the triangle hypothesis that
pro-self people are worse in perceiving others' orientations correctly than pro-social
people. However, this research  was not carried  out in real-life circumstances,  but  subj ects
had to predict and learn the choices of another individual in a series of DGs  In fact, the
other individual did not really exist, but subjects received feedback strictly according to
a specific social orientation Maki and McClintock (1983) found that pro-social subjects
Table 5.1   An  Example  of a  Choice  Situation  With  a  Competitive,  Individualistic  and
Pro-social Combination of Outcomes. Respectively
A            B            C
You receive 500 560 490
The other receives 100 300 490
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learned others' orientations best, and that individualists were intermediate, while
competitors had the lowest scores Iedema and Poppe (1993a), using a similar procedure,
found that pro-social and individualistic subjects performed equally well, while
competitors learned others' orientations more poorly  Thus, the results of these studies
show that especially competitors and not individualists are poor perceivers of others'
orientations.
The present research extends the research line of the external validity of social
orientations and the research line of the effect of subjects' social orientations on learning
others' orientations: people have to estimate the orientations of others they know from
daily life circumstances. The accuracy of subjects' estimates is determined by comparing
them to the actual orientations of the other people, whose orientations are assessed.
Possible differences in accuracy of the estimates are expected for subjects with different
social orientations. Using the theoretical notions underlying the triangle hypothesis,
competitors are expected to be less accurate in estimating the social orientations of people
--      -intheir  socialenvironment-than_pro-social-subjects_(Hypothesis l)_Because Kelley_and
Stahelski (197Ob) did not distinguish individualists from competitors, it is expected that
individualists' and competitors' performance will be comparable.
Now, we turn more specifically to another important theme of the present research:
the relation between one's own orientation and the orientation expected of others. In all
except one study (Mess6 & Sivacek, 1979) with Prisoner's Dilemma Games (PDGs) the
triangle hypothesis was confirmed (Kelley & Stahelski, 197Ob; Miller & Holmes, 1975;
Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976; Schlenker & Goldman, 1978; Misra & Kalro, 1979;
Bixenstine, Lowenfeld & Englehart, 1981). However, the PDG is not an ideal situation to
test the triangle hypothesis. In a PDG, the perceived interdependence between the choices
of oneself and another individual is high (McClintock et al., 1973). Therefore, strategic
considerations might influence one's own orientation and also the expectation of others'
orientations. Miller and Holmes (1975) objected especially to Kelley and Stahelski's
generalization from PDG research to real-life circumstances, because they think that a
PDG does not resemble situations in real life but provides an impoverished number of
behavioral alternatives: one can choose either in a pro-social or in a pro-self manner.
Therefore, they extended the standard PDG with a defensive alternative, enabling
pro-social subjects to defend themselves against exploitation by a pro-self other without
having to choose in a pro-self way  In a condition with a standard PDG, Miller and
Holmes (1975) confirmed the triangle hypothesis, but they found no support for the
triangle hypothesis in the extended PDG. Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) used not only
a PDG, but also DGs to measure the expected orientations of others.  In DGs the perceived
interdependence with the other person is lower than in a PDG (McClintock et al., 1973)
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) concluded that in DC;s individualists, competitors and
pro-social subjects expected about the same percentages of others to have the orientation
they had themselves. Only Iedema and Poppe (1993a) found differences in expectation of
one's orientation in a research using DGs: individualists expected their orientation more
strongly than pro-social subjects and competitors. Thus, the results of these three studies
are not conclusive with regard to the triangle hypothesis. The prediction of the triangle
hypothesis will be examined once more in the present research using DGs. The triangle
hypothesis predicts that competitors show a higher consensus expectation (expectation of
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their own orientation in a population) than pro-social subjects (Hypothesis 2) Again, no
difference is expected between individualists and competitors.
An alternative explanation why competitors overestimate the occurrence of their
orientation is that they interact primarily with other competitors rather than with
cooperators. Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) were aware of this possibility and formulated
the triangle hypothesis on the basis of the assumption that there is no selective mating
between people with the same orientation. That is, cooperators and competitors encounter
and interact with one another in an unsystematic manner. This assumption is studied in the
present research. Subjects were asked how closely they were acquainted with other group
members  It is evident that subjects interact most with group members that they are closely
acquainted with Vespo (1991) for instance, found that subjects engaged in interactions
more often with their friends than with others. Therefore, selective mating operates when
subjects of a particular orientation show a higher proportion of closely related
acquaintances with their orientation than subjects with other orientations (Hypothesis 3).
A more general hypothesis concerning the relationship between one's own
orientation and the orientation expected of others is the false consensus hypothesis (Ross,
Greene & House, 1977). According to the false consensus hypothesis, people tend to
perceive a false consensus with respect to the relative commonness of their own responses.
The false consensus hypothesis was always confirmed, both in studies using PDGs and
DGs (Kelley & Stahetski, 197Ob; Miller & Holmes, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley, 1976;
Schlenker & Goldman, 1978; Messt & Sivacek, 1979; Misra & Kalro, 1979; Bixenstine,
Lowenfeld & Englehart, 1981). The usual way to test for a false consensus effect is to
compare the estimates of the occurrence of a behavior between people who themselves
show this behavior and those who show different behavior Thus, with regard to social
orientations the false consensus prediction is that subjects' consensus expectation (the
expectation of their own orientation) is higher than the expectation of this orientation by
subjects with different orientations (Hypothesis 4).
Marks and Miller (1987), in an overview of explanations for the false consensus
effect, consider selective exposure combined with cognitive availability (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973) the most fundamental account of the bias. The selective exposure
explanation of the false consensus hypothesis (Ross et al., 1977) predicts that the
consensus estimates for populations are influenced by how specific the populations are
People tend to know and associate with others who share their background, experiences,
interests, values, and outlook (Ross et al., 1977). This selective exposure to similar others
provides one with a biased and restricted sample of information, which increases the
cognitive availability of instances of similarity or agreement between self and others.
Therefore, people's consensus estimates in a population should be higher for a population
whose members they have been exposed more often. The selective exposure mechanism
is comparable to that of selective mating, but the selective exposure mechanism is
conceived on the level of differences in perception between populations, whereas selective
mating should manifest itself in differences in composition of close acquaintances within
a population. In the present research, consensus estimates will be asked for populations
differing in generality Because subjects have more experience with the behavior of
individuals of specific populations than of more general populations, the selective exposure
explanation predicts that subjects' consensus estimates should decrease from more specific
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to less specific populations (Hypothesis 5a). In addition, the selective exposure explanation
predicts that false consensus €#ects (the difference in expectation by subjects who have a
particular orientation themselves and by other subjects) decrease from more specific to less
specific populations (Hypothesis 5b).
An interesting aspect of the selective exposure explanation is that it provides an
explanation for the fact that the triangle hypothesis was sometimes confirmed and
sometimes rejected. Less or more specific populations for which consensus estimates were
generated may have influenced support for the triangle hypothesis. Subjects often had to
generate an expectauon for the average population or for the typical individual. However,
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) asked their subjects to give population estimates for the
population university undergraduates. This difference in population may have influenced
the consensus estimates, because for the population university undergraduates one may be
focused more on one's friends and acquaintances among them than for the average
population. Furthermore, people with different social orientations may be influenced
-   - -differentlybythe generality-ofthe-population for»whieh consensus estimates are created-
Pro-self people are not aware of different orientations among other people and base their
expected orientations of others on a stereotype of how other people are with regard to
their social orientations (Kelley & Stahelski, 197Ob). In contrast, pro-social individuals are
assumed to be more aware of different orientations among other people. Their expectations
of other people's orientations are less stereotypical, and depend more on accurate
perception of others' behavior. However, if pro-social subjects do not know many people
of a population, then they cannot rely on accurate perceptions of others' behavior and
probably have to utilize stereotypical information as well. Therefore, the above selective
exposure principle is expected to apply especially to the estimates of pro-social people.
This leads to the hypothesis that the decrease in consensus estimates from more specific
to less specific populations is sharper for pro-social people than for competitors and
individualists (Hypothesis 6).
Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) reasoned that pro-self people's overestimation of their
orientation is caused by inaccurate perception of others' orientations. This implies that the
estimates for a population as a whole should be related to the estimates for separate
individuals of the population. This relation is studied extensively here. A subject's
consensus estimates for separate individuals of a population are combined into one
percentage (henceforth referred to as the combined individual consensus estimate)
Correlations between the combined individual consensus estimates and the population
estimates should be substantial according to Kelley and Stahelski' reasoning (1970b)
Furthermore, as was argued above, pro-self people' s estimates of others' orientations arise
from a stereotypical source of information, because they do not perceive others'
orientation correctly. This stereotypical source implies that not much variation should be
found in the consensus estimates for separate individuals and different populations.
Pro-social people perceive others' orientations more correctly and therefore more variation
should be found between the consensus estimates for separate individuals and different
populations To explore this possibility, the combined individual estimates and the
population consensus estimates will be factor analyzed. It is expected that the consensus
estimates of competitors and individualists can be explained with less factors than the
consensus estimates of pro-social subjects (Hypothesis 7)
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Method
Subjects
The  subjects  were 79 girls  and  66 boys  from two secondary schools (mean  age was  15)
The subjects were from six classes and, most of the time, attended the same lessons. The
groups ranged   from   19   to 29 students   with   a   mean   of 24 students Because   it   was
important that subjects knew each other, only subjects who were in their fourth year of
study were selected These subjects had been in the same class for a period of five months
to three years They were paid f 2 50 (about $ 1.50) afterwards for participation.
Procedure
A class of subjects was seated in a classroom and received forms with eight tasks. In the
first task, subjects' social orientations were assessed using nine DGs such as in Table 5.1
Subjects had to make choices among three alternatives, each consisting of combinations
of outcomes to self and another, unknown individual. The three alternatives in Table 5.1
represent from left to right the preferences of a competitor, an individualist and a
pro-social oriented individual The outcomes were different for each of the nine DGs,  and
so was the order of the pro-social, individualistic, and competitive combination of
outcomes. The subjects were classified according to a social orientation when six of their
nine choices were consistent with one social orientation.
In the  second task,  subjects had to indicate which percentage of their peers would
prefer each of the three alternatives in the DG of Table 5.1   In the third through fifth task
subjects also had to indicate percentages but now for their schoolmates, classmates, and
.#iends. The descriptions of the populations peers, schoolmates and classmates were such
that they did not overlap. The population peers was described as "peers who are not
students at your school" The population schoolmates were described as "schoolmates from
other classes of the same level" Possible overlap between the populations friends and
classmates was not prevented, because it was considered likely that some of the closest
friends were classmates. Because the order in which tasks were presented to the subjects
might influence subjects' estimates, two relevant orders were used. For half of the subjects
the order of target groups was from less to more specific (peers, schoolmates, classmates,
and friends), for the other half it was reversed.
In the sixth task, subjects had to estimate for each of their classmates separately
which of the three alternatives they would prefer in the DG of Table 5.1. Subjects were
told that the subject with the highest percentage of correct estimates would receive a prize
of f  1 5 00 (about  $ 8; prizes  were  paid  a few weeks after the experiment). In addition
they had to rate how certain they were of each estimate (on a six-point scale ranging from
very unco,dident to very co,ilident). In the seventh task, subjects had to estimate the
orientation for each of their six best friends and also how certain they were of their
estimate. For subjects who had performed the second through fifth task with target groups
in the order from more to less specific, the order of task six en seven was reversed
In the eighth task, subjects had to indicate which percentage of their classmates
would expect them to prefer each of the three alternatives in the DG of Table 5 1. In the
ninth task, subjects had to rate how closely they were acquainted with each of their
classmates (on a six-point scale ranging from ve,y distant to very close)
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Results
Social Orientation Classification
Of the 145 subjects 127 could be classified. The distribution of social orientations was
significantly different for boys and girls, X2 (2)-7.00, p<.05 (see Table 5.2). More boys
were classified as individualistic than girls, whereas more girls were classified as
pro-social than boys. The distribution of social orientations in each class was not different
for the six classes, x2 (6)=11.35, n.s.
Accuracy of Estimated Orientations
The accuracy of subjects' estimates of their classmates' orientations could be determined
by comparing them to the actual social orientations of their classmates as assessed in the
first task. Because the classes differed with regard to size, instead of the number of correct
estimates the percentage of correct estimates was used as a dependent variable. An
 en this-dependentvariablewithsubjects -hu,ial  uticillativii  dild
gender as between  subj ects variables. A highly significant effect for social orientation  was
found, F(2,121)=25.27, p<.001 Pro-social subjects had the highest percentage correct
(A.»48.2%), followed by individualists (Ad[=34.9%) and competitors (A,»28.8%). The
interaction effect between social orientation and gender was not significant, F(2,121)=2.94,
n.s. Neither was the main effect for gender significant, F(1,121)<1.
The percentage of correct estimates was not corrected for chance. Half of the
subjects were pro-socially oriented, about one third individualistically, and only about one
sixth competitively. Consequently, the higher percentage of correct estimates of pro-social
subjects is simply expected according to chance if subjects were primarily estimating
others to have their own orientation. Therefore, Cohen's kappa was used as a coefficient
of agreement corrected for chance (Cohen, 1968) For each subject Cohen's kappa was
computed on the basis of a cross tabulation of the orientations expected of classmates and
the real social orientations of classmates. An ANOVA with Cohen's kappa as a dependent
variable and subject's social orientation and gender as between-subjects variable, was
again significant for social orientation, F(2,121)=3.94, p<.05. Pro-social subjects had a
higher mean kappa  (M=.11) than individualists  B#.04) or competitors  (M=.02).  Also,
pro-social subjects' mean kappa was the only one that differed significantly from zero,
Table 5.2  Classification of Subjects According to Their Social Orientation
Pro-social Individualistic Competitive
Girls 42              19             10
59.2% 26.8% 14.1%
Boys 20              25              11
35.7% 44.6% 19.6%
Total 62 44               21
48.8% 34.6% 16.5%
Note. The first entry in each cell is the n of cases, the second entry is the row-percentage.
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17(1,60)=27.17, p<.001. A kappa  of zero means that observed agreement  can be exactly
accounted for by chance (Cohen, 1968). Thus, the observed agreement between pro-social
subjects' estimated orientations of classmates and the real orientations of classmates is
significantly better than chance No significant effect was found for gender, 17(1,121)<1
or the interaction between social orientation and gender, F(2,121)=1.43, n.s.
The three social orientations used in the present research can be ordered on a
dimension from pro-social orientation, to individualism, to competition (e.g. Kuhlman &
Wimberley, 1976). Therefore, it is preferable to use a measure that accounts for this
ordering and weights disagreements in assignments accordingly. For example, estimating
a competitive classmate to be pro-social is a more serious error than estimating him or her
to be individualistic A weighted Cohen's kappa (Cohen, 1968) weights disagreement more
strongly as the distance on the dimension from pro-social, to individualism, to competition
increases. Weighted Cohen's kappas were computed for each subject using the
disagreement weights 0 (correct estimations), 1 (estimating an individualist as a pro-social
individual or a competitor, estimating a pro-social individual as an individualist, or a
competitor as an individualist), and 4 (estimating a competitor as a pro-social individual
or vice versa) The ANOVA using weighted kappa as the dependent variable revealed an
even stronger effect for social orientation than the unweighted kappa, F(2,121)=8.30,
p<.001. Again pro-social subjects had a higher kappa (At=.14) than individualists (A'».05)
or competitors (Af=-.02) Again, no significant effect was found for gender, 17(1,121)<1  or
the interaction between social orientation and gender, 12(2,121)=1.79, n.s.
Expected Social Orientations: Triangle Hypothesis
Preliminary analyses of variance showed that the two different orders in which subjects
had to estimate the occurrence of social orientations in different populations (from less to
more specific population or the reverse order) did not have any significant main effect or
interaction effect with other variables (all ps> 20). Therefore the order variable was not
included in any of the reported analyses.
In this analysis, three hypotheses were examined: the triangle hypothesis
(Hypothesis 2), the selective exposure hypothesis (Hypothesis 5a), and the hypothesis
concerning a sharper decrease in consensus estimates from the populations friends,
classmates, schoolmates to peers for pro-social subjects than for pro-self subjects
(Hypothesis 6). The expected percentages of own social orientation for different
populations were used as a repeated measure in an ANOVA with social orientation and
gender as between-subjects variables  The main effect for social orientation was marginally
significant, 12(2,121)=2.73, p<.07. Consistent with the triangle hypothesis (Hypothesis 2)
the difference between pro-social and pro-self subjects was significant, F(1,123)=5.35,
p<.05. The consensus expectations of competitors (A#=56.4%) were, however, not
significantly higher than those of pro-social subjects (A#=52.0%). Individualists showed the
highest consensus expectations (M=59.70%). The main effect for gender was significant,
F(1,121)=4.56, p<.05. Girls (A,»57.4%) expected a higher percentage of others to have
their orientation than boys (M=52.8%) Interaction effects of gender with other variables
were not significant. The main effect for population was also significant, F(3,363)=10.04,
p<.001. Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, mean expected percentages for each population
showed a decrease of consensus estimates from more specific to less specific populations.
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Further, the interaction effect between social orientation and population was significant,
12(6,363)=4.28,  p< 001 (see Figure  5.1). The effect of social orientation was entirely
absent for friends, F(2,124)<1, marginally significant  for the classmates, F(2,124)=2.14,
p<.13, and schoolmates, F(2,124)=2.35, p<.10, and significant for the population peers,
17(2,124)=5.29, p<.01.
In order to examine Hypothesis 6 more closely, an ANOVA with polynomial
contrasts was performed using the same variables as in the previous one. The linear
contrast for population was highly significant, F(1,124)=22.33, p<.001, indicating that the
expected percentage of own orientation decreased linearly from more to less specific
populations. Further, there was a significant interaction effect between social orientation
and the linear trend, F(2,124)-5.40, p<.01 (see Figure 5.1). Analyses for subjects of each
social orientation separately showed that the linear contrast was significant for pro-social
subjects, 17(1,61)=22.34, p<.001, and competitors, F(1,20)=7.90, p<.05, but not for
individualists, F(1,43)<1. Only for competitors was the quadratic trend significant,
F(1,20)-5.17, p<.05. These results support Hypothesis 6 decreases in consensus      -
expectations from specific to general populations - with regard to individualists (no
trend) and pro-social subjects (a significant decrease). The significant decrease for
competitors is not consistent with Hypothesis 6.
Expected Social Orientations: False Consensus Hypothesis
In addition to the previous analysis, false consensus effects were computed for the
populations peers, schoolmates, classmates and friends. The false consensus prediction is
that the expected percentage of a social orientation in a population is higher for people
who have that orientation themselves than for people with a different orientation
(Hypothesis 4). For instance, the false consensus effect with regard to individualism in the
population peers is the percentage of individualistic peers expected by individualistic
subjects compared to the percentage expected by non-individualistic subjects (pro-social
and competitive subjects). In this way, for each orientation a false consensus effect was
computed. These three false consensus effects were computed for each of the four
populations. All these false consensus effects turned out to be highly significant (p<.0005,
see Table 53). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is confirmed Furthermore, as can be seen in
Table 5.3, the FCEs decrease from more to less specific populations. This confirms the
prediction of the selective exposure explanation (Hypothesis 5b). The means in Figure 5.1
show how the decreases in FCEs from more to less specific populations are caused by
Table 5.3  False Consensus Effects for Different Populations
Social Friends Classmates Schoolmates Peers
Orientation
Pro-social 103.72 75.93 83.65 68.42
Individualistic 58.00 51.56 35.44 34.31
Competitive 129.15 90.05 72.71 40.74
Note. All Fs have df's (1, 143) and p<.0005.
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slightly different processes for different social orientations. The percentage of pro-social
people expected by pro-social subjects decreases more rapid from more to less specific
populations than the corresponding decrease in expectations by other subjects
(individualists and competitors). With regard to the percentage of competitors expected in
the different populations, competitors' expectations decrease from more to less specific
populations, while the expectations of non-competitors increase. With regard to the
percentage individualists expected in the different populations, individualists' expectations
do not change over populations, while the expectations of non-individualists increase from
more to less specific populations. This last result is very interesting. Although
individualism is already by far the orientation most commonly expected from others, it is
expected even to a larger extent for less specific populations.
Correlations Between Consensus Estimates for Dillerent  Populations
Kelley and Stahelski's reasoning (197Ob) implies that people's consensus estimates for a
group as a whole are related to individual orientation estimates for people in their social
environment. Indeed, substantive correlations were found between the group and the
individual consensus estimates for friends (r = .48, p<.005) and classmates (r = .43,
p<.005). The height of these correlations also depended on the social orientation of the
people. For pro-social subjects the correlations between group and individual consensus
estimates for classmates (r = .42, p<.005) and friends (r = .48, p<.005) were moderate.
For individualists the correlation for classmates was low (r = .27, p<.05) and that for
friends moderate (r = .45, p<.005). For competitors the correlations for classmates (r =
83, p<.005) and friends (r = .59, p<.005) were high. In line with Kelley and Stahelski's
reasoning, individual and population consensus estimates show a relationship.
Now the patterns of relations will be examined between the population consensus
estimates for friends, classmates, schoolmates and peers and the combined individual
consensus estimates for friends and classmates. The correlations between these six
variables were factor analyzed separately for pro-social subjects, individualists and
competitors. Principal-component analysis was used to extract factors. The criterium for
the number of factors to extract was an eigenvalue of at least one. The factors were
varimax rotated to facilitate interpretation.
For competitors only one factor was found with high factor loadings of all six
consensus estimates (see Table   5.4). This result   can be interpreted straightforwardly:
competitors relied on the same information, whether estimating consensus on a general
level or on a specific level. For individualists two factors were found. The four population
estimates loaded high on the first factor, and the two combined individual estimates loaded
high on the second factor. Thus, the consensus estimates of individualists were divisible
into two clear factors, one for the general estimates and one for the specific estimates.
Also for pro-social subjects, two factors were found, but the division into a
population-estimates factor and a combined individual-estimates factor was not as clear-cut
as for individualists. The population consensus estimates for schoolmates and peers loaded
high on the first factor and low on the second factor. Likewise, the combined individual
consensus estimates loaded high on the second factor and low on the first factor. But the
population consensus estimates for classmates and friends loaded substantially on both
factors (see Table 5.4). Thus, the interrelationship between the consensus estimates of
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pro-social subjects is harder to disentangle than that of individualists and competitors. This
applies especially to the general consensus estimates for classmates and friends, which are
related to both the specific estimates for classmates and friends and to the general
consensus estimates for schoolmates and peers. Nevertheless, this complicated
interrelationship for pro-social subjects is highly consistent with the selective exposure
explanation. The estimates for specific friends and classmates are related to their
respective population consensus estimates for friends and classmates. On the other hand,
the population consensus estimates for schoolmates and peers - which according to the
instructions did not consist of friends and classmates - were not related to the combined
individual consensus estimates for friends and classmates but only to the population
consensus estimates for friends and classmates. In contrast to pro-self subjects, pro-social
subjects based their population consensus estimates on their individual estimates.
Correlations Between Correct Perceptions and Consensus Expectations
Kelley and Stahelski (1970b) reasoned that because competitors perceived others'
orientations inaccurately, they expected their own orientation to a high degree of other
people. In this line of reasoning a relationship is implied between individuals' accuracy in
perceiving others' orientations correctly and their consensus expectations. This relationship
can be studied in the present experiment by correlating subjects' accuracy in identifying
their classmates' orientations (as indicated by their individual kappas) with their consensus
expectations for different populations. The correlations  were all lower  than  .10  and  not
significant. In addition, the correlations were computed separately for each group of
subjects with a particular orientation. For pro-social and individualistic subjects the
Table 5.4 Factor Loadings After Varimax Rotation of the Consensus Estimates for
Different Populations.  Separately for Pro-social. Individualistic and Competitive  Subjects
Social Specific Population consensus estimates Explained
orientation consensus variance
estimates
Friends Class- Friends Class- School- Peers
mates nnates mates
Competitors
factor 1 .74 .86 .90 .95 .89 .86 75.6%
Individualists
factor 1 .80 .90 .90 .92 53.1 %
factor 2 .84 .87 27.6%
Pro-social
subjects
factor 1 .51 .76 .93 .92 42.6%
factor 2 .80 .69 .61 .45 28.7%
Note. Only factor loadings of at least  I .40 I  are shown.
Estimating Others' Orientations in Daily Life 69
correlations were still lower than  . 10  and not significant. For competitors the correlations
between their Cohen's kappas and their consensus expectations for friends (r = .32, p< 10)
and classmates (r =  37, p<.05) were somewhat higher. The correlations should, however,
have been negative to support the reasoning underlying the triangle hypothesis  Now the
competitors who were better in identifying their classmates' orientations perceived a
higher consensus for their own orientation. Clearly, these results do not support the
reasoning underlying the triangle hypothesis.
Selective Mating
In this section Kelley and Stahelski's (197Ob) assumption is analyzed that people with a
certain orientation are not primarily exposed or do not expose themselves to group
members with their own orientation (Hypothesis 3). Subjects were asked to report for each
of their classmates how closely they were acquainted with them. The classmates that they
were closely or very closely acquainted with were taken to be those that they would hang
around with most often. On average, subjects were closely acquainted with six of their   --
classmates, which was not influenced by their social orientation, F(2,117)<1 (the data of
seven subjects that were not closely acquainted with any classmate were not included in
the analyses of this section). Of subjects' closely acquainted classmates, the percentages
of competitive, individualistic, and pro-social people were computed. These three
percentages were subjected to separate ANOVAs, with subjects' social orientation and
gender as between-subjects variables. The ANOVAs showed no effects of gender, and one
significant effect of subjects' social orientation on the percentage of competitive
acquaintances, 12(2,114)=4.02, p<.05. This effect was, however, qualified by a significant
interaction effect between social orientation and gender on the percentage of competitive
acquaintances, F(2,114)=3.20, p<.05. Also a significant interaction effect between social
orientation and gender was found on the percentage of pro-social acquaintances,
F(2,114)=4.62, p<.05. Separate analyses for boys and girls showed that the effect of social
orientation was not significant for boys, but significant for girls on the percentages of
pro-social acquaintances, F(2,65)=7.34, p<.01, and competitive acquaintances,
F(2,65)=8.80, p<.001. Pro-social girls showed the highest percentage of pro-social
acquaintances  (A.f=58.2%),  individualistic  girls were intermediate  (9=45.7%),  and
competitive girls had the lowest percentage of pro-social acquaintances (AM=21.3%). For
competitive acquaintances, the pattern was mirrored: competitive girls showed the highest
percentage of competitive acquaintances (M-36.3%), individualistic girls again were
intermediate (M- 18.70%) and pro-social girls showed the lowest percentage of competitive
acquaintances (Af=9.0%) Compared to the percentages of subjects of each orientation in
the sample (see Table 5.2), it is clear that especially the percentages of closely acquainted
classmates of competitive girls were deviant. Competitive girls compared to other female
subjects showed less close acquaintances among pro-social classmates and more close
acquaintances among competitive classmates. Pro-social girls also showed a deviation,
because they showed a lower percentage of competitive acquaintances compared to the
percentage expected according to the sample. These results falsify Kelley and Stahelski's
(197Ob) assumption that there is no selective mating among people with regard to their
social orientation, at least for girls.
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Discussion
The results of the present research provide insight into the strength and limitations of the
triangle hypothesis and yield an interesting explanation for the mechanism underlying the
expected orientations of others. The finding that pro-self subjects showed significantly
higher consensus estimates than pro-social subjects is consistent with the triangle
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) However, the consensus expectations of competitors were not
significantly higher than those of pro-social subjects. Moreover, univariately the only
significant effect was found for the population peers with individualists showing higher
consensus expectations than competitors and pro-social subjects (see Figure 5.1)
According to the selective exposure explanation a decrease in consensus estimates was
expected from more to less specific populations (Hypothesis Sa). Although this predicted
pattern was found, it was qualified by one of the most important results of the present
research: depending on their social orientation, subjects were influenced differently by the
selective exposure to the population for which they had to generate consensus estimates
(Hypothesis 6). The consensus estimates of pro-social subjects decreased sharply when the
population became less specific. Individualists' consensus estimates were not influenced
by the type of population. Competitors' pattern of consensus estimates resembled that of
individualists, except for the most general population. These different patterns from more
to less specific populations are reflected in the size of the effect for social orientation (not
significant for the most specific population, significant for the least specific population,
and marginally significant for the intermediate populations). According to the reasoning
on which Hypothesis 6 was based pro-self subjects enhance stereotypical information for
their population consensus estimates. This stereotypical source of information is not
different for the different populations and therefore pro-self subjects should show little
variation in their population consensus estimates In contrast, pro-social individuals were
assumed to be more aware of heterogeneity in outlook For specific populations - when
they knew a high percentage of the people of the population - pro-social subjects were
expected to rely on more accurate perceptions of others' behavior. But for less specific
populations, pro-social subjects probably had to utilize stereotypical information as well
The remaining question is why pro-social subjects showed a decrease in consensus
estimates when they had to rely on stereotypical information This question can be
answered by the percentages of individualism expected by subjects who themselves have
a different social orientation. As Figure 5.1 shows, individualism   is   by   far   the   most
expected orientation and the expected percentage even increases for less specific
populations. This is interpreted as evidence that individualism is the most stereotypical
orientation  and  that a decrease  in the expectation  of one' s own orientation is reflected  in
an increase in the expectation of individualism. Moreover, this interpretation is bolstered
by the general characterization of people in Western society as egocentric and
individualistic (Hofstede, 1984).
That confirmation of the triangle hypothesis is dependent on how specific the
population is for which consensus estimates were generated, may explain the contradictory
results of previous studies in which DGs were used. Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) did
not find a triangle effect. In their research subjects had to generate consensus estimates for
the population "university undergraduates". Although this is potentially a large population,
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subjects were not prohibited from using information about specific individuals of the
population they knew well. This probably made the population comparable to one of the
more specific populations used in the present research. Because for these populations the
triangle effect was marginal or not significant, the results of the study by Kuhlman and
Wimberley may have been influenced by the type of population that they used. In Iedema
and Poppe's study (1993a), individualists showed higher consensus expectations than
subjects with other orientations Subjects in their study had to estimate the most prevalent
orientation of "Dutch students". This is comparable with the most general populations used
in the present research.
The other hypothesis concerning the relation between one's own social orientation
and the expected orientation of others, the false consensus hypothesis (Hypothesis 4), was
confirmed Each social orientation was expected more by subjects who had this orientation
than by subjects with a different orientation. Moreover, as predicted by the selective
exposure explanation (Hypothesis 5b), the false consensus effects decreased as the
- populationbecame less-specific, indicating-that subjects-ofeach orientationoverestimated -
the occurrence of their orientation more strongly for more specific populations.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that with regard to estimating consensus estimates
for certain populations, support for false consensus effects and triangle effects is somewhat
complementary. As the populations become less specific, support for the false consensus
effect decreases and support for the triangle effect increases. Yet, it is clear that overall
the false consensus effects are much stronger than the triangle effects.
Other important results of the present research are those pertaining to a derivation
and an assumption of the triangle hypothesis. The derivation of the triangle hypothesis was
that pro-social subjects would estimate the social orientations of their classmates more
accurately than pro-self subjects (Hypothesis 1). This hypothesis was confirmed. Both the
percentages of correct estimates as the individual Cohen's kappas lead to this conclusion.
The performances of individualists and competitors did not differ from those expected
according to chance. Pro-self people are unable to correctly perceive the social orientations
of people they encounter in daily life circumstances. That pro-socials are better at
estimating others' orientations    can    also be related    to a persistent finding in previous
research. In both DGs and in PDGs, pro-social subjects are found to shift to less pro-social
choices when they are confronted with an individualistic or competitive other (e.g.
Liebrand et al., 1986; Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975). Individualistic and, especially,
competitive  subj ects hardly showed this tendency to shift to another orientation. People
with competitive or individualistic orientations can simply persist in their orientation to
reach the goal as defined in their social orientation. Although the goal of pro-social people
is also reached when they persist under all circumstances in their orientation, it is at a high
cost to their own outcomes when the other individual chooses individualistically or
competitively. As the results of the cited studies show, pro-social people usually are not
prepared to pay this price and shift to less pro-social behavior in situations where they are
confronted with individualistic and competitive people. Because pro-social people have to
adapt to the behavior of others more often, they are likely to pay more attention to the
behavior of other people in interdependence situations and therefore are better trained in
discovering the underlying social orientation of behavior in real-life circumstances. Thus,
pro-socials' accuracy in estimating others' orientations is consistent with their ability to
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adapt their own behavior easily to others' behavior. Pro-social people are more eager to
engage in pro-social relations with others in interdependence situations, but when the
others are not prepared to show pro-social behavior, pro-social people soon discover this
and then adjust their behavior accordingly
Pro-social subjects' performances in estimating classmates' orientations correspond
with their good performances in learning others' orientations (Maki & McClintock, 1983;
Iedema & Poppe, 1992). Combining the results of these two studies and the present
research shows that competitors seem to lack the ability to understand social orientations
that are different from their own orientation. To a lesser extent this also holds true for
individualists. The pro-social subjects in these three studies always performed at a high
level. Pro-social people may have developed the ability to understand the social orientation
underlying others' behavior in real-life situations, because they are more eager to interpret
the behavior of others in order, as was reasoned above, to adapt their own behavior
accordingly. Additionally, pro-social people may have developed certain strategies to find
out whether another individual prefers a pro-social interaction or not. For instance, by
making a pro-social choice in a certain situation, a pro-social individual might send a
message (a probe) to another individual. The probe can work out in two ways, depending
on the reaction of the other. If it is ignored, the sender acquires information that directs
the interaction in a pro-self way. If it is responded to, the interaction may proceed in a
more pro-social direction Individualists and especially competitors do not seem to
comprehend pro-social probes very well, or perhaps misinterpreted probes, for instance,
as weak and submissive behavior (Liebrand et al., 1986) or as unintelligent (Van Lange
& Liebrand, 1991 b)
Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) stated that one of the three necessary assumptions to
generalize from their laboratory results is that people of each orientation encounter and
interact with one another in an unsystematic manner. The present results show that this
assumption (Hypothesis 3) is not warranted, at least for female subjects. Pro-social female
subjects showed less close acquaintances among competitive classmates, and female
competitors showed less close acquaintances among pro-social classmates and more close
acquaintances among competitive classmates. This implies that, in daily life circumstances,
pro-social and competitive girls prefer to interact with people of their own orientation   The
finding that especially females show selective mating is consistent with recent suggestions
of Maccoby (1990) about differences in the nature of friendship between boys and girls.
Boys seek friends who share their interests in activities, usually in groups of more than
two individuals Girls tend to form close, intimate friendships which are marked by the
sharing of confidences. Especially for the female type of friendship, similarity in social
orientation probably facilitates friendship.
The falsification of the assumption of no selective mating between people with the
same social orientations does, however, not seem to damage the triangle hypothesis, for
a number of reasons Firstly, Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) clarify the assumption as
follows: people  of each orientation have experience in social interaction  with both their
own and other orientations. In the present research, subjects had known each other for
some time already  It is possible and even likely that when classmates saw each other for
the first time, they interacted with each other in an unsystematic fashion These first
experiences with classmates' behavior may have developed into a close acquaintance with
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only a few of them. Secondly, it is not quite clear whether the assumption of no selective
mating is necessary for generalizing from Kelley and Stahelskis (197Ob) research results
to the triangle hypothesis. Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) do not themselves clarify the
necessity of the assumption. The present results, at least, are not in line with the
assumption and do not damage the triangle hypothesis Pro-social girls might understand
the orientation of competitive classmates and not prefer them as close acquaintances, for
instance, because they require them to act out of line with their orientation. The result is
that competitive girls interact less with pro-social people, which as a result makes
competitors' (incorrect) expectations about others even more persistent. Such a process is
in line with the research outcomes from which Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) extrapolated
the triangle hypothesis, and even increases its credibility
Finally, the principal-component analysis on the correlations between combined
individual estimates and population estimates for the different populations showed
interesting differences in patterns and, in combination with other results, lead to interesting
conclusions. Pro-social people are more accurate in estimating the orientations of people
that they know than individualists and competitors. In daily life circumstances, pro-social
people recognize relevant behavior with regard to others' social orientations and
apparently collect and recall this information. Moreover, they try to enhance this
information about specific individuals when they have to generate estimates of the
prevailing orientations in certain populations, at least as long as they know individuals
belonging to these populations. As the populations become more general they are more apt
to use general stereotypical information about people in Western society. In contrast,
competitors and individualists do not recognize relevant behavior with regard to others'
orientations or do not think it of importance and therefore do not store this information in
their memories Competitors rely on one stereotypical source of information for both
individual and population estimates of others' orientations Individualists try to enhance
specific information about individuals when they have to estimate their orientations, but
are not successful in doing so. In generating estimates of the social orientations of certain
populations, individualists hardly show any variation. They expect many people to share
their orientation, probably because the stereotype of the most prevailing orientation in
Western society coincides with their orientation.
In conclusion, although a few assumptions and derivations of the triangle
hypothesis were supported, some of the present findings cast doubt on the validity of the
triangle hypothesis. The triangle hypothesis could not explain the different ways in which
the consensus estimates of pro-social, individualistic and competitive people were
influenced by the type of population. The consensus estimates of pro-social people and to
some extent competitors decreased as the population became less specific, whereas those
of individualists remained at a high level. This result implies that differences in consensus
estimates will only be found when people have to generate consensus estimates for
general, unspecific populations. The most problematic result for the line of reasoning
underlying the triangle hypothesis was that no relation was found between the accuracy of
identifying others' orientations and the consensus expectations. This result shows that how
accurate people perceive others' orientations is not relevant for predicting their consensus
expectations. More promising in this respect is the above explanation that for general
populations people expect much individualism which influences their consensus
74 The Perceived Consensus of One's Social Orientation
expectations. As a result, individualists show high consensus expectations, whereas
competitors and pro-social people expect their own orientation to a smaller extent
Chapter 6
From Triangle Hypothesis to Cone Model
This chapter starts with an evaluation of research results that are not related to the
orientations expected of others. Then, after problematic findings for the triangle hypothesis
and the structured assumed similarity bias are reported, an alternative model is presented
- -              foi   individuals'   Cullatilbub  CAPC,ldliu„J uf their-social-value orientatiox               -     -     -  -              -         -
Learning and Identifying Others' Social Orientations
In addition to the expectations of others' orientations, three other topics were investigated
in the four experiments reported in this thesis. In the first study, accuracy in learning
others' orientations was investigated. Cooperators and individualists were more apt in
learning others' orientations than competitors. In the third study, behavioral assimilation
was studied. Evidence was found for behavioral assimilation in the context of decomposed
games, instead of PDG. Only cooperators changed their choices towards cooperative,
individualistic and competitive others. In the fourth study, subjects were asked to identify
the orientations of well-known others Pro-social subjects more frequently identified the
social orientations of people in their social environment correctly than individualists and
competitors.
These results show that cooperative or pro-social people do learn and identify
others' orientations more accurately than individualists and, especially, competitors. This
supports the findings that Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) used for the derivation of their
triangle hypothesis Of course, these results do not support the prediction of the triangle
hypothesis itself.
The Triangle Hypothesis and the Present Research
In the first chapter, a problem was noticed with regard to the application of the triangle
hypothesis to research in which more orientations are distinguished than cooperation and
competition: either the social orientations or the triangle hypothesis must be
accommodated. The suggested solutions were: (1) take the two categories of social
orientations that Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) distinguished literally as cooperation and
competition and disregard all the other orientations; (2) group all categories of social
orientations together into pro-social and pro-self categories; (3) order social orientations
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along a continuum from altruism to competition (disregarding equality and maximin).
Applying the first possibility to the results of the four experiments (see Figure
6.1), the triangle prediction  is not supported. The consensus expectations of competitors
are clearly not higher than those of cooperators. The second possibility is consistent with
the triangle prediction. This possibility was reported in each of the four experiments and
the combined consensus expectations of individualists and competitors were always
significantly higher than pro-social subjects' consensus estimates. Applying the third
possibility again poses a problem for the triangle hypothesis. When individualism is
distinguished from competition, it is clear that there is no linear increase in consensus
estimates from altruism to competition. The results of the four studies show that, on a
continuum from altruism to competition, the consensus expectations reach a maximum at
individualism  and then decrease.  Thus,  for the third possibility the prediction  of  the
triangle hypothesis is not supported.
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Figure 6.1   Consensus    Expectations    of    Subjects    with    Different    Social    Value
Orientations in Four Experiments
Note. Subjects were only classified as pro-social oriented in the fourth experiment. In the second and fourth experiment,
subjects' expectations for the most general population were used.
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Critique to Grouping Orientations into Two Categories
Although the triangle hypothesis is supported when only pro-social and pro-self
orientations are distinguished, it can still be considered a rather curious solution. First,
subjects' social orientations are assessed with sophisticated measurement techniques
(usually the orientations cooperation, individualism and competition are distinguished;
sometimes also equality and maximin). Second, these reliably distinguished orientations
are grouped together into two categories in order for a hypothesis to be applicable. This
approach is not only roundabout, but it can even be considered inadequate because there
are some strong arguments against it.
Combining individualism and competition to a pro-self category is questionable
because previous research findings show that individualists and competitors differ in both
behavior and expectations. Kuhlman and Marshello (1975), for instance, showed
differences in choice-behavior when individualists and competitors were confronted with
-5 100%-cooperative strategy,-3100% noncooperative-strategy-and a tit-for-tat strategy-   - -   -
(starting with a cooperative choice and further imitating the other's previous choice) in a
Prisoner's Dilemma Game. The competitors chose noncooperatively regardless of the
other's strategy. The individualists chose least cooperatively towards    the     100%
noncooperative strategy, more cooperatively towards the 100% cooperative strategy and
most cooperatively towards the tit-for-tat strategy. These differences in choice-behavior
were confirmed and extended to other types of dilemma games in research by McClintock
and Liebrand (1988). In addition, Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) found that
individualists' and competitors' expectations of others' orientations differed from one
another. The present four experiments also show differences in expectations of individuals
with different orientations. It is clear that the high consensus expectation of pro-self
oriented people is caused by individualists and not by competitors.
In conclusion, it does not seem justified to group together orientations that differ
with regard to choice-behavior and expectations of others. Moreover, it would be peculiar
to disregard differences in expectations. After all, these differences are the subject of this
dissertation
Problematic Findings for the Triangle Hypothesis
In addition to the application problems of the triangle hypothesis, the experiments in this
thesis revealed a number of problematic findings for the triangle hypothesis. The first
problematic finding was that subjects' consensus expectations for a population were
influenced by how specific or general the population was (in the second and fourth study)
and by stereotypes of a population (in the second study). These effects were not
anticipated by the triangle hypothesis and, therefore, constitute anomalies
The second problem was that the behavior of an individualistic oriented individual
was attributed less to an internal cause than competitive or cooperative behavior (in the
third study). This implies that individualistic behavior agrees most with the behavior
expected of people in interdependence situations, and not competitive behavior as is
predicted by the triangle hypothesis.
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The third and foremost problem concerns the transition from the empirical findings
on which the triangle hypothesis was based to the actual prediction of the triangle
hypothesis. Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob) reasoned that because competitors perceived
others' orientations inaccurate, they expected their own orientation to a high degree of
other people. In this line of reasoning a relationship is implied between individuals'
accuracy in perceiving others' orientations correctly and their consensus expectations
More specifically, the more inaccurate individuals' perceptions of others' orientations are,
the higher their consensus expectations should be. In the fourth study this relationship was
studied by correlating subjects' accuracy in identifying their classmates' orientations with
their consensus expectations. Clearly, no relationship was found between these two
variables, except one significant correlation for competitors which was even in the wrong
direction. Therefore, the reasoning underlying the triangle hypothesis could not be verified
empirically
Moreover, a fourth finding challenges the same point as the previous one. In the
first study, subjects' consensus expectations were not related to their accuracy in learning
others' orientations Thus, subjects who perceived and learned others' orientations more
poorly did not expect their own orientation more frequently
In conclusion, although the reasoning on which the triangle hypothesis was based
is intuitively appealing, the implied relationship between less accurate perceptions of
others' orientations and a more frequent expectation of one's own orientation among other
people could not be confirmed. In combination with the anomalous findings, this casts
serious doubt on the validity of the triangle hypothesis.
The Structured Assumed Similarity Bias and the Present Research
The structured assumed similarity bias (SASB; Kuhlman, Brown & Teta, 1992) predicts
that the consensus expectations of subjects with different orientations are similar. The
significant differences in consensus expectations found in each of the four experiments  in
this dissertation do not support this prediction. Only when consensus estimates were asked
for specific populations (in the second experiment for psychology students [in private
conditions]; in the fourth experiment for friends), subjects with different orientations
exhibited similar consensus estimates. What is needed, however, is a model that can
explain all the results found in this dissertation
A Closer Look at Expectations of Others' Orientations
in the Four Studies
The four experiments reported in this thesis show a highly consistent pattern of results
with regard to individuals' consensus expectations (see Figure  6.1).  The most noticeable
finding is that the consensus expectations of individualists are higher than the consensus
expectations of subjects with other orientations In addition, in Figure  6.1 another effect
can be discerned. The consensus expectations of competitors and cooperators are
reasonably high, whereas those of maximin and equality oriented individuals are somewhat
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smaller. It should be noted  that the ordering of orientations in Figure  6.1  corresponds  to
their distance from individualism. That is, cooperation and competition are most close,
and maximin and equality are more distant from individualism. Combining subjects'
consensus expectations, the conclusion seems warranted that the consensus expectations
for an orientation decrease as the distance from individualism increases.
The question arises whether this pattern is reflected only in the expectations with
regard to subjects' own orientations. Figure 6.2 shows that this is not the case. The
expectations for orientations by individuals who themselves have a different orientation
show a similar pattern. The expectations for orientations decrease as the distance from
individualism increases. The pattern found in Figure 6.2 provides an answer to the
question why individualists expect their own orientation so frequently: individualism is to
a large extent expected by everyone. From this point of view, individualists' frequent
expectation of individualism is not only a consequence of overestimation of their own
orientation, but also a manifestation of a more general bias that persons of each
-      -»orientation show.
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Figure 6.2  Expected Percentages of Social Value Orientations in Four Experiments by
Subjects who Themselves Had a Different Orientation
Note. Subjects were only classified as pro-social oriented in the fourth experiment. In the second and fourth experiment,
subjects' expectations for the most general population were used.
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An Alternative Model
The findings of the present research lead to an alternative model to explain individuals'
expectations with regard to the occurrence of social orientations among other people. The
model consists of three principles, and is mainly an integration of the (partly adapted)
ideas of Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob), Ross et al. (1977), and Kuhlman and Wimberley
(1976). Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976) suggested that an individual's expectations of
others' orientations can be depicted as a frequency distribution on an orientational
continuum Later evidence (Grzelak et al., 1977; Knight & Dubro, 1984; Schulz & May,
1989) has shown that this continuum of orientations can be extended to a plane or sphere
(see Figure  1.4b).
Three principles are expected to influence the shape of individuals' expectation
distributions on an orientational plane or sphere. The first principle is that individualism
is expected to a large extent by everyone, regardless of his or her own social orientation
The second principle is that individuals tend to overestimate the occurrence of their own
orientation among other people. This is the well-known false consensus bias: a particular
orientation is expected more by people who have that orientation themselves than by
people who do not have that orientation (which does not imply that people with a
particular orientation expect their orientation predominantly among others). The third
principle states the first two principles more precisely. A high expectation for a particular
orientation has implicationB for the expectation of neighboring orientations, that is,
orientations situated next to or near each other on a plane or sphere of orientations. The
implication is that orientations at a close distance to a frequent expected orientation are
expected more than orientations that are more remote. The latter two principles were
already implied by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976). The three principles are elaborated
below
The First Principle
According to the first principle, individualism is expected to a high degree by all people.
According to Kelley and Stahelski (1970b), competition was the orientation that was
expected most frequently of others, but the present research clearly shows that it is
individualism. The results of the present four experiments are clearly congruent with the
first principle. The consensus expectations of individualists were higher than those of
subjects with other orientations (see Figure  6.1). In addition, if subjects  did not expect
their own orientation of others, individualism was the orientation expected most frequently
(see Figure 6.2). Empirical support of the first principle from another source is provided
by two studies into learning others' social orientations (Maki et al., 1979, experiment 2;
Maki & McClintock, 1983) In some decomposed games, the other's orientation was
identified correctly by two alternatives instead of one alternative. In both studies, there
was a significant tendency to predict that the other would prefer the alternative favoring
individualism. Also, the finding in the third study that individualism was attributed less to
an internale cause than cooperation or competition shows that individualism is seen as
common, appropriate behavior.
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Of course, an important question is why individualism is expected so frequently in
our culture. Concerning this expectation, people enjoy the good company of theorists,
because the view that people are self-interested is the central assumption of economics and
of some psychological theories as well (Stroebe & Frey, 1982). In these theories people,
like good businessmen, pursue rational goals and one of the most important goals is their
self-interest. In addition, Triandis, McCusker and Hui (1990) point out that the prosperity
of one's country may influence the egocentric view of others. Prosperous countries have
or develop a culture which is associated with autonomy, achievement, and pleasure. The
egocentric view of individuals in such a culture probably influences the expectation of
individualism.
It is hypothesized that, at least in prosperous cultures, individualism serves as the
most general stereotype of other people. Although it is expected that this general
stereotype usually has an influence on individuals' expected orientations, its influence may
decrease when other, more specific information about a particular population is available.
-rhis-information cairalso be-in theform of(more-specific»tereotypes about a populatior          -      -
as is suggested by the research results in this thesis. The second and fourth experiment
showed that the difference in consensus expectation between individualists and subjects
with other orientations was much more pronounced for more general populations (other
students or peers not at one's own school) than for more specific populations (friends or
classmates). The fourth experiment indicated that the expectation of individualism also
increased for non-individualistic subjects as the population became more general. Thus, the
more general the population is, the higher the expectation of individualism.
Two other research results also indicate the mediating influence of stereotypes of
a population on the expectation of individualism. In the second experiment the general vs.
specific population manipulation was confounded by a manipulation of psychology vs
non-psychology students. The results showed that the stereotype of psychology students
(being sensitive or even soft) led to a reduction of the expectation of individualism. In the
third experiment, in which subjects had to generate expectations for their fellow students
at a school for Business, Administration and Economics still displayed a high expectation
of individualism, although the population was rather specific. This can be explained by a
stereotype of these students as being businesslike. This stereotype probably elevated the
expectation of individualism (Sawyer, 1966, for instance, found that business majors
actually were oriented more often according to individualism than other majors). Thus, in
conclusion, a stereotype of a population can influence the extent to which individualism
is expected in that population.
The Second Principle
The second principle states that an orientation is expected more frequently by subjects who
have that orientation themselves than by subjects with another orientation. Of course, this
second principle plainly is the false consensus effect applied to the expectation of others'
orientations. The false consensus effect is a very robust phenomenon which has been
demonstrated for attitudes, opinions, behavior and even facts. Thus, it is no surprise that
false consensus arises with regard to the expected orientations of others.
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The false consensus effects for social orientations have been explicitly tested in the
first, second and fourth experiment. In the second and fourth experiment significant false
consensus effects were found for each orientation. In the first experiment the majority of
false consensus effects was also significant; only those for equality or maximin oriented
subjects were not significant. Although in the third experiment no separate false consensus
effects were computed, the cross-tabulation of subjects' own orientation and the expected
orientation of others (see Table 4.4) indicated that each orientation was expected more
frequently by subjects who had that orientation themselves than by other subjects. In
conclusion, the second principle manifested itself in every study for nearly all social
orientations.
Because the second principle is similar to the false consensus effect, all factors
affecting false consensus effects in general can also influence this second principle. For
instance, another causal focus can influence the consensus expectations of individuals
(Zuckerman & Mann, 1979, study three). Thus, when subjects first have to write down
some personal causes for their own orientation, their consensus expectations will be lower
than when they first have to write down situational causes for their own orientation  Also,
the fourth experiment in this thesis showed that the false consensus effects decreased for
more specific populations, as expected by the selective exposure explanation.
The Third Principle
According to the third principle, a high expectation for a particular orientation has
implications for the expectation of neighboring orientations on an orientational plane or
sphere: orientations at a close distance to a frequently expected orientation are expected
more than orientations that are more remote. The third principle has consequences for the
first two principles.
The combination of the third and first principle (individualism is to a large extent
expected by everyone) implies that cooperation and competition are expected more
frequently than equality and maximin because the latter orientations are more distant from
individualism than the former orientations.
The combination of the third and the second principle (the false consensus effect)
is that, for instance, cooperators more frequently expect individualists than competitors
because of the greater distance to competition. Likewise, competitors more often expect
individualists than cooperators. Another example is that individualists expect more
cooperators than equality oriented individuals because cooperation is closer to
individualism than equality.
The concept of neighboring orientations originates from Kuhlman and Wimberley
(1976). They combined the (modified) second and third principle as follows (p. 80; they
used the term motivation instead of orientation):
It would appear that subjects expect most others to be in their motivational
neighborhood. As a given motive becomes further removed from the
subject's own orientation, the subject expects fewer and fewer people to
possess that motive.
Of course, the third neighboring principle was supported in the experiment done by
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Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976). The third principle was also apparent in the present
research, as can be seen in Table 2 of the second experiment and Table 4 of the third
experiment. Generally, orientations were expected more by subjects who had neighboring
orientations than by subjects with more distant orientations.
The third, neighboring principle is also apparent in research on the perception of
social distributions (Nisbett & Kunda, 1985). Subjects were asked to estimate the
distributions of fellow students' behaviors and attitudes. Subjects had to indicate
percentages for each point on a 10-point rating scale. Nisbett and Kunda (1985, study 2)
concluded that there was a decided relation between subjects' own positions on the rating
scales and the shape of their estimated distributions. Subjects skewed the distributions in
the direction of their own positions on the scale. Nisbett and Kunda (1985) speculated that
subjects used their own location as a reference point in estimating a distribution.
-        -       -       -      - -    The-Cone Mode-       -         --     --       -    -
The combination of the three principles leads to a specific pattern with regard to
individuals' consensus expectations. It is expected that individualists' consensus
expectations are highest, and the consensus expectations of people with other orientations
are expected to decrease as the orientational distance to individualism increases. Figure 6.3
gives a graphical impression of the pattern that arises for individuals' consensus
expectations. The graphical shape depicted should, however, not be seen as a coercive
mold. In the top of Figure 6.3, the social orientations are positioned on an orientational
sphere (see Schulz & May, 1989). The orientational sphere is rotated such that
individualism constitutes the north pole. Thus, the axis of the weight for own outcomes
points in a vertical direction (y-axis)  The axis of the weight for other's outcomes runs in
a horizontal direction Or-axis) from left (minimizing other's outcomes) to right
(maximizing other's outcomes). Orthogonal    to the other    two    axes    runs    the
equality-unequality axis (z-axis), through the center of the sphere to the negative extreme
where it coincides with the orientation equality (minimal difference between own and
other's outcomes). Primarily to facilitate interpretation, this orientational sphere is
projected onto an orientational plane, with individualism in the center When the
frequencies of people's expectations are presented as bars on this plane of orientations, a
cone-shaped pattern arises with the highest bar above individualism. Therefore, this pattern
will be called the cone patient.
Figure 6.3 shows that the closer a particular orientation is to individualism, or in
other words, the smaller the angle between the vector of the orientation and the vector of
individualism, the more frequently persons with that orientation will expect their own
orientation of others. Figure 6.3 reveals a pattern other than the triangular one originally
intended by Kelley and Stahelski (1970b). The most important difference is that the
consensus expectation of individualists is highest instead of that of competitors.
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Figure  6.3    The  Cone  Model
Note. The orientational sphere is projected on an orientation plane on which individuals'
expectations of others' orientations are depicted.
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The Cone Principles and a Post Hoc Analysis of the Results
To make sure that the results with regard to the relation between one's own orientation
and the orientation expected of others are consistent with the three principles of the cone
model and that no other patterns are discernible, a final loglinear analysis was carried out
on the expected orientations, combining the data of the four experiments. In the second
and fourth experiment, subjects were asked to indicate percentages for a number of
different orientations and in different populations. For the present analysis, subjects were
classified according to the orientation they expected most frequently in the most general
population. Because the orientations equality and maximin were distinguished in only the
first and second experiment, these orientations together with cooperation and altruism were
grouped together in a pro-social category (see Table 6.1).
A loglinear model that included the variables social orientation, expected
orientation, and experiment revealed that all main and interaction effects were significant
-           -except the-interaction-effect between all three variablesrx; (12)=13-91,  p>30- This- - -       -
indicates that the interaction effect between social orientation and expected orientation,
X2 (4)=108.79, p<.001, was not different in the four experiments. It is evident from Table
6.1,  that the interaction effect between social orientation and expected orientation  was
caused by two effects. First, more than half of the subjects (64.2%) expected their own
orientation instead of a different orientation from others, x2 (1)=38.24, p<.001. Second, the
tendency to expect one's own orientation of others was more pronounced for individualists
(76.4%) than for cooperators (54.5%) and competitors (42.9%), X2 (2)-32.58, p<.001.  The
data in Table 6.1 reveal each of the three principles of the cone model: (1) individualism
is expected more frequently than other orientations; (2) each orientation is expected most
frequently by subjects with this particular orientation; and (3) pro-social subjects expect
more individualistic than competitive others, and also competitors expect more
individualistic than pro-social oriented others.
In each of the four experiments, different methods were used to assess social
Table  6.1     Social Orientation and Expected  Orientation of Others
Expected Social Orientation
Social
Orientation Pro-social Individualistic Competitive Total
Pro-socials 108 83            7       198
54.5% 41.9% 3.5% 42.2%
Individualists 48 175            6       229
21.0% 76.4% 2.6% 48.8%
Competitors                  6                           1 8                              1 8                     42
14.3% 42.9% 42.9% 9.0%
Total 162 276            31        469
34.5% 58.8% 6.6% 100.0%
Note. The first entry is the number of cases; the second entry is the row-percentage.
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orientation and expected orientation. In addition, the expected orientations were assessed
in two ways. In study two and four, subjects had to indicate percentages for each option
of a few decomposed games. In study one and three, subjects had to indicate the choice
of the majority of a population in the same decomposed games used to assess subjects'
own orientation. Because the social orientation by expected orientation interaction effect
was not influenced by the third variable, viz experiment, the interaction is robust and
seems uninfluenced by different orientation assessments or different ways of assessing the
expected orientation.
Further Research
In the fourth study it was found that pro-social individuals were better than individualists
and competitors in identifying the social orientations of people whose behavior they knew
from daily-life circumstances. There are two explanations to account for the poor
performances of individualists and competitors. First, individualists and competitors may
have the tendency to ignore relevant information for identifying the pro-social behavior of
others. Second, pro-social individuals may simply show less pro-social behavior in
interactions with individualists and competitors, a possibility suggested by Kelley and
Stahelski (1970b). Of course, both processes might also operate simultaneously. More
information regarding this research question might be obtained by observing the behavior
of individuals in naturalistic settings whose social orientations have been assessed
beforehand
Another point of research is whether the first principle, the high expectation of
individualism among other people, is restricted to individualist cultures. Hofstede (1984)
could differentiate countries on a continuum from individualist to collectivist cultures
based on responses to values. The country where the present research was carried out, the
Netherlands, was located on the individualist extreme, among other individualist countries
such as the USA, Australia, Great Britain, and Canada. In many samples from Asia, Latin
America, and Africa, a contrasting cultural syndrome called collectivism has been
identified (Triandis et al., 1990). People in individualist and collectivist cultures show
several differences In individualist cultures people tend to think of individuals as the basic
unit of analysis, whereas in collectivist cultures people tend to think of groups as the units
of analysis (family, community, or nation). Certain values such as achievement, pleasure,
and autonomy are emphasized more in individualist cultures, whereas family integrity,
harmony, saving face, and sacrifice for the ingroup are valued more in collectivist cultures
(Triandis et al., 1990) These differences suggest that the expectancy of individualism may
be less widespread in more collective cultures.
However, this expectation may be too simplistic. People in collectivist cultures
show more differences in behavior toward members of an ingroup versus members of an
outgroup than people in individualistic cultures Triandis et al (1990) found that people
in collectivist cultures perceive more dissociative and superordinate behavior toward
members of their outgroups as likely than people of individualist cultures. Therefore, the
high expectation of individualism for more general populations might be demonstrable in
collectivist cultures as well. A suitable approach to study these questions would be the one
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used in the fourth experiment and to ask the expected orientations for more populations,
varying from very specific (e.g., friends) to very general (e.g., people from another part
of the world). It is likely that people in collectivist cultures expect less individualism in
specific populations than people from individualist cultures, but that this difference
between the two cultures diminishes for more general populations.
Summary
In this dissertation, research  into the perceived consensus  of one' s social value orientation
is described. Chapter 1 starts with Kelley and Stahelski's derivation of the triangle
hypothesis (1970b) based on research findings in the prisoner's dilemma game (PDG)
Cooperators showed in their interactions with competitors a clear shift to more
-        -noncooperative-choicesto-preventexploitation. -This- led-competitors,  not-unreasonablyrto
the incorrect idea that the other individual was oriented competitively, like themselves.
Additionally, competitors were found to estimate the occurrence of their orientation to a
greater degree than cooperators. Kelley and Stahelski combined these two findings and
argued that insofar competitors do not perceive their own competitive behavior as the
cause of the cooperative other's behavior, they develop a distorted view of their social
environment. This distorted view leads to the competitors' overestimation of their own
orientation among other people.
In  Chapter  1 the advantages are stressed of using decomposed games instead  of the
PDG to study the expected orientations of others. In decomposed games, strategic
considerations are influencing behavior and expectations less than in the PDG. The usage
of decomposed games also poses some practical problems because more social orientations
can be distinguished than cooperation and competition which leads to the question how the
triangle hypothesis should be applied. Three solutions are proposed although none of them
is considered ideal.
An overview of research using the PDG confirms the prediction of the triangle
hypothesis. Competitors showed a higher consensus expectation (expected their orientation
to a higher extent) than cooperators. However, research in which other choice situations
were used than the PDG showed generally that subjects with different orientations had
rather similar consensus expectations (Miller & Holmes, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley,
1976; Brown & Basil, 1980; Kuhlman, Brown & Teta, 1992). Kuhlman et al, (1992)
explained these results with the structured assumed similario' bias (SASB) These results
imply that the triangle hypothesis is only supported in PDG.
Chapter  1 is concluded with an overview of important explanations for individuals'
false consensus (Ross, Greene & House, 1977). The false consensus hypothesis predicts
that people who show a particular behavior themselves expect that behavior to be more
widespread than people who do not behave in this manner. The explanations considered
a priori as most relevant for the explanation of individuals' perceived consensus of their
social orientation are described and applied in the empirical studies reported in the
chapters three to five.
In Chapter 2 the expected orientation of others is studied in an alternative manner.
90 The Perceived Consensus of One's Social Orientation
In the studies by Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976), Brown and Basil (1980), and Kuhlman
et al, (1992) specific circumstances might have influenced subjects' expectations. For
instance, the range of possible expected orientations was rather restricted, because only the
orientations cooperation, individualism, and competition were considered. Moreover, with
the procedure followed in these studies, subjects received already a hint of the orientations
that they should consider. In the study of Chapter 2, subjects had to indicate which choice
the majority of other students would prefer in the same series of decomposed games that
were used to assess their social orientation. With these responses, the expected orientation
of others was assessed in the same way as subjects' own orientation was assessed.
Cooperators, individualists, and competitors showed significant false consensus effects
That is, they expected their orientation more frequently than subjects with other
orientations expected it. The false consensus effect was not significant for egalitarian and
maximin oriented subjects. With regard to the triangle hypothesis, the consensus
expectation that individualists showed was much higher than that of other subjects
Competitors did not show a higher consensus expectation than cooperators. This pattern
of results is not very consistent with the triangle hypothesis.
Additionally, subjects' performances were studied when they tried to predict and
learn the choices of so-called choosers. Each chooser chose consistently according to
altruism, equality, cooperation, individualism, or competition. Cooperators and
individualists were the best overall learners, competitors performed most poorly, and
egalitarian and maximin oriented subjects performed at an intermediate level. In addition,
nearly every orientation was learned better by subjects who had that orientation themselves
than by subjects with a different orientation. Bothersome for the reasoning underlying the
triangle hypothesis was the observation that subjects' consensus expectations were not
related to their accuracy in learning others' orientations. That is, subjects who perceived
and learned others' orientations more poorly did not expect their own orientation more
frequently as argued by Kelley and Stahelski (1970b)
In Chapter 3 the selective exposure explanation and uie three-tiered theory of
opinion fbrmation are investigated. Consistent with the selective exposure explanation,
subjects' consensus expectations were higher for a more specific population (psychology
students of their own university) than for a more general population (students from other
universities; all fields of study). Furthermore, two predictions based on the three-tiered
theory of opinion formation were confirmed In public circumstances in which a group
discussion about one's own social value orientation was anticipated subjects showed higher
consensus expectations than in private circumstances without anticipated discussion. The
differences in consensus expectations between the public and the private circumstances
were more pronounced for pro-self subjects than for pro-social subjects. This shows that
individualistic and competitive subjects have more reason to heighten their consensus
expectations in public circumstances than pro-social subjects.
In Chapter 4 the causal attribution explanation is applied to subjects' perceived
consensus of their social orientation. According to a causal attribution explanation, it was
expected that subjects' causal attributions for their own orientation to internal and external
causes influenced their consensus expectations. Behavior attributed to an external cause is
seen as common, whereas behavior attributed to an internal cause is seen as typical for the
individual displaying it. Subjects studied the choices of a cooperative, individualistic, and
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competitive individual and attributed these behaviors to internal and external causes. Only
attributions to internal causes differed significantly between subjects with different
orientations. Individualism was attributed least internally, cooperation most internally and
competition in between. These attributions corresponded with subjects' consensus
estimates. Additionally, direct support for the effect of internal attributions on consensus
expectations was found. Compared to subjects who attributed their own orientation more
internally, subjects who attributed it less internally were more likely to expect their own
orientation among other people. According to a self-justification explanation, it was
hypothesized that the consensus expectations of individualists and competitors would be
higher when first their own social orientation was assessed and then the orientation they
expected to predominate among others than in the reversed order. This hypothesis was
falsified.
In Chapter 5 the selective exposure explanation is studied more extensively than
in Chapter 3. Subjects gave estimations of the occurrence of pro-social, individualistic and
- -competitive peoplein fourpopulations-varying-from speeific togeneral=Only for the most         -    -
general population (peers; not schoolmates) a significant difference was found, because
individualists expected their orientation to a higher degree than pro-social and competitive
subjects. From the perspective of the selective exposure explanation, only individualists
did not show the expected decrease in consensus expectations from specific to general
populations. This was explained with the reasoning that as a population is more general,
the expected consensus in that population will be based more and more on stereotypical
information. Probably, individualism is the orientation that resembles most the widespread
idea that Western people are egoistical and selfish. This explains why individualists did
not show a decrease in consensus expectations for more general populations. The increase
in expected individualism for more general populations by competitive and pro-social
subjects validates the assumption of an individualistic stereotype of people from general
populations.
Additionally, subjects tried to identify the social orientations of people they knew
from daily life circumstances. Pro-social subjects were better than chance in identifying
others' orientations, in contrast to individualists and competitors. It is reasoned that this
result is consistent with a basic difference between social orientations. Pro-social
individuals usually shift to less pro-social behavior in situations where they are confronted
with individualistic and competitive people. Individualists and competitors do not show
such shifts in behavior. Because pro-social people have to adapt to the behavior of others
more often, they are likely to pay more attention to the behavior of other people in
interdependence situations and therefore are better trained in discovering the underlying
social orientation of behavior in real-life circumstances. Finally, a damaging result for the
reasoning underlying the triangle hypothesis was that no relationship was found between
accurate perceptions of others' orientations and consensus expectations.
In Chapter 6 the accumulated evidence contradicting the triangle hypothesis is
reviewed, leading to a falsification of the triangle hypothesis. The structured assumed
similarity bias model (Kuhlman et al., 1992) was also falsified by the research results in
this dissertation. An alternative model is proposed instead, integrating adapted ideas of
Kuhlman and Wimberley (1976), Ross et al  (1977), and Kelley and Stahelski (197Ob). It
is called the cone model, because of the shape that arises when the frequencies of people's
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consensus expectations are presented as bars on a plane of social orientations, with the
highest bar above individualism. The cone model consists of three principles. The first
principle is that individualism is expected to a large extent by everyone, regardless of his
or her own social orientation. The second principle is that individuals tend to overestimate
the occurrence of their own orientation among other people, compared to the expectation
by individuals with other orientations, which is the false consensus effect. The third
principle states the first two principles more precisely. A high expectation for a particular
orientation has implications for the expectation of neighboring orientations, that is,
orientations situated next to or near each other on a plane or sphere of orientations. A post
hoc analysis on the combined data of the four experiments revealed each of the three
principles and showed no other effects. The chapter ends with some suggestions for further
research
Samenvatting
Het onderwerp van deze dissertatie is de mate waarin mensen hun eigen sociale-
waardenorientatie verwachten van anderen. In HooRimik 1 wordt uiteengezet hoe Kelley
en Stahelski (197Ob) de driehoekshypothese baseerden op onderzoek met het prisoner's
dilemma game (PDG). Cooperatieven vertoonden tegenover een competitieve persoon een
-verschuiving  naar -meer-non-coeperatieve-keuzes, Dit leidde-bilcompetitieven tot-de-
foutieve indruk dat de ander een competitieve orientatie had, net zoals zijzelf. Een ander
resultaat van Kelley en Stahelski (1970b) was dat competitieven op voorhand hun eigen
orientatie al meer van anderen verwachtten dan cooperatieven. Kelley en Stahelski
combineerden deze twee bevindingen en redeneerden dat naarmate competitieven sterker
hun eigen gedrag als oorzaak van het non-cooperatieve gedrag van cooperatieven negeren,
ze een meer foutief beeld krijgen van hun sociale omgeving. Volgens Kelley en Stahelski
veroorzaakt dit foutieve beeld de sterke overschatting door competitieven van het
voorkomen van hun eigen sociale orientatie.
In Hoofdstuk 1 worden de voordelen besproken van het gebruik van decomposed
games om de verwachte orientaties van anderen te onderzoeken, vergeleken met het
toepassen van het PDG. In decomposed games beinvloeden strategische overwegingen het
eigen gedrag en verwachtingen over het gedrag van anderen minder dan in het PDG. Het
toepassen van decomposed games leidt echter ook tot enige praktische problemen omdat
met deze methode meer sociale orientaties onderscheiden worden dan alleen cooperatie en
competitie. Dit leidt tot de vraag hoe de driehoekshypothese moet worden toegepast. Drie
oplossingen worden geboden, maar ze zijn geen van allen ideaal.
Een overzicht van onderzoekingen waarin het PDG werd toegepast leidt tot een
duidelijke confirmatie van de driehoekshypothese Competitieven vertonen een hogere
consensusverwachting (verwachten hun eigen orientatie sterker van anderen) dan
cooperatieven. Onderzoekingen waarin andere keuzesituaties werden toegepast dan het
PDG vertonen echter een ander beeld (Miller & Holmes, 1975; Kuhlman & Wimberley,
1976; Brown & Basil, 1980; Kuhlman, Brown & Teta, 1992). In deze onderzoekingen
hadden proefpersonen met verschillende orientaties ongeveer even sterke
consensusverwachtingen. Kuhlman et al. (1992) verklaarden deze resultaten met de
structured assumed similarity bias (SASB). Deze resultaten impliceren dat de
driehoekshypothese alleen gesteund wordt in onderzoek met het PDG.
Aan het slot van Hoofdstuk 1 volgt een overzicht van de belangrijkste verklaringen
voor hetfWse consensus e,#ect: het overschatten van het v66rkomen van het eigen gedrag
of de eigen voorkeur bij anderen (Ross, Greene & House 1977). De false consensus
hypothese voorspelt dat mensen die zelf een bepaalde gedraging vertonen het v66rkomen
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van dit gedrag hoger inschatten dan mensen die altematief gedragingen prefereren. Een
aantal van deze verklaringen leken op voorhand veelbelovend om verschillen in
consensusverwachting van de eigen orientatie te verklaren. Deze verklaringen zijn
toegepast in de empirische onderzoekingen vermeld in de hoofdstukken drie tot vijf.
In het onderzoek van Hoofistuk 2 werd de verwachte orientatie van anderen op een
andere wijze bestudeerd. In de onderzoekingen van Kuhlman en Wimberley (1976), Brown
en Basil (1980) en Kuhlman et al. (1992) kunnen specifieke omstandigheden de
verwachtingen van proefpersonen hebben beinvloed. Zo was bijvoorbeeld het scala van
orientaties waarover verwachtingen werden gevraagd nogal beperkt, aangezien alleen
cooperatie, individualisme en competitie in aanmerking werden genomen. Bovendien
kregen de proefpersonen door de manier waarop hun verwachting gevraagd werd al een
indicatie over welke orientaties in ogenschouw moesten worden genomen. In het
onderzoek van Hoofdstuk 2 moesten proefpersonen aangeven welke keuzes de meerderheid
van andere studenten zouden maken in dezelfde serie decomposed games die ook gebruikt
was om de orientaties van de proefpersonen te bepalen. Op deze manier werd de
verwachte orientatie van anderen op dezelfde wijze bepaald als hun eigen orientatie.
Cooperatieven, individualisten en competitieven vertoonden significante false consensus
effecten. Elk van deze orientaties werd dus vaker verwacht door mensen die de betreffende
orientatie zelf hadden dan door mensen met een andere orientatie. Voor de orientaties
gelijkheid en maximin werden geen false consensus effecten gevonden. Verder bleek dat
de consensusverwachting van individualisten veel hoger was dan die van de overige
proefpersonen. Competitieven hadden geen hogere consensusverwachting dan
cooperatieven. Een dergelijk patroon van resultaten wordt niet voorspeld door de
driehoekshypothese.
Daarnaast werd bestudeerd hoe goed proefpersonen de orientaties van zogenaamde
kiezers leerden te voorspellen. Elke kiezer koos consistent volgens een van de orientaties,
altruisme, gelijkheid, cooperatie, individualisme of competitie Cooperatieven en
individualisten leverden de beste leerprestaties, competitieven waren het slechtst, telwijl
proefpersonen met de orientaties gelijkheid en maximin een tussenpositie innamen.
Bovendien werd vrijwel iedere orientatie beter geleerd door proefpersonen met die
orientatie dan door proefpersonen met een andere orientatie. Zorgwekkend voor de
redenering waarop de driehoekshypothese gebaseerd is, was dat de
consensusverwachtingen van proefpersonen geen relatie vertoonden met de leerprestaties.
Proefpersonen die andermans orientaties slecht leerden verwachtten hun eigen orientatie
niet vaker dan goede leerders, zoals verondersteld werd door Kelley en Stahelski (1970b)
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd de selectieve blootstellingsverktaring en de three-tiered theory
of opinion formation onderzocht. In overeenstemming met de selectieve
blootstellingsverklaring waren de consensusverwachtingen van proefpersonen hoger voor
een meer specifieke populatie (psychologiestudenten van de eigen universiteit) dan voor
een meer algemene populatie (studenten van andere universiteiten; alle studierichtingen).
Daarnaast werden twee voorspellingen geconfirmeerd die afgeleid waren van de three-
tiered theory of opinion formation In publieke omstandigheden waarin een groepsdiscussie
werd geanticipeerd over de eigen sociale orientatie vertoonden proefpersonen hogere
consensusverwachtingen dan in priva omstandigheden waarin geen discussie werd
geanticipeerd. De verschillen in consensusverwachting tussen de publieke en privt
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omstandigheden waren meer uitgesproken voor pro-zelf dan voor pro-sociale
proefpersonen. Dit laat zien dat individualistische en competitieve proefpersonen meer
reden hebben om hun consensusverwachtingen te verhogen dan pro-sociale personen.
In Hoofistuk 4 werd onderzocht of de gepercipieerde consensus van de eigen
orientatie van proefpersonen kon worden verklaard op basis van causale attributie
Volgens deze causale attributie verklaring zou het toeschrijven van de eigen sociale
orientatie aan interne of externe oorzaken de consensusverwachting beinvloeden. Gedrag
dat men namelijk aan een externe oorzaak toeschrijft wordt als veelvoorkomend gezien,
terwij 1 gedrag dat aan een interne oorzaak wordt toegeschreven als kenmerkend voor de
persoon wordt beschouwd. De proefpersonen bestudeerden de keuzes van een
cooperatieve, individualistische en competitieve persoon en moesten interne en externe
oorzaken aangeven voor hun gedrag. Alleen op de interne attributies werden significante
verschillen gevonden. Individualisme werd het minst sterk aan interne oorzaken
toegeschreven, cooperatie het sterkst en competitie nam een tussenpositie in. De mate van
-nterne_attributie    bleek_direct effect te hebben _op    de_consensusverwachtingen_  -
Proefpersonen die hun eigen orientatie minder sterk aan interne oorzaken toeschreven,
bleken hun eigen orientatie vaker van anderen te verwachten dan proefpersonen die hun
eigen orientatie sterker aan interne oorzaken toeschreven. Verder werd een verklaring
getoetst die de consensusverwachting in verband brengt met zelfrechtvaardiging. Volgens
deze verklaring zouden de consensusverwachting van individualisten en competitieven
hoger moeten zijn wanneer eerst hun eigen orientatie werd bepaald en daarna de orientatie
die ze verwachten van anderen dan in de omgekeerde volgorde. Deze hypothese werd
gefalsifieerd.
In Hoofbtuk 5 werd de selectieve blootstellingsverklaring meer uitgebreid
bestudeerd  dan in Hoofdstuk 3. Proefpersonen gaven schattingen  van de prevalentie  van
pro-sociale, individualistische en competitieve mensen in vier populaties, varierend van
specifiek tot algemeen. Alleen voor de meest algemene populatie (leeftijdgenoten; niet van
de eigen school) werd een significant effect gevonden van de eigen sociale orientatie van
proefpersonen op de consensusschattingen. De consensusschatting van individualisten was
hoger dan die van pro-sociale en competitieve proefpersonen. Verder werd volgens de
selectieve blootstellingsverklaring een verlaging in consensusschatting verwacht van
specifieke naar algemene populaties. Competitieven en pro-sociale proefpersonen
vertoonden deze dating in consensusschatting, maar individualisten niet. Als verklaring
hiervoor werd aangedragen dat naarmate een populatie meer algemeen is, de verwachte
consensus meer op stereotypische informatie wordt gebaseerd. Waarschijnlijk is
individualisme de orientatie die het meest overeenkomt met heersende ideeen dat mensen
in de Westerse samenleving egastisch en individualistisch zijn. Dit verklaart waarom
individualisten geen verlaging in consensusverwachting lieten zien voor meer algemene
populaties. De toename in het verwachten van individualisme voor meer algemene
populaties door competitieve en pro-sociale proefpersonen steunt deze assumptie van een
individualistisch stereotype van algemene populaties.
In een ander onderdeel van dit onderzoek werd proefpersonen gevraagd om de
sociale orientaties te schatten van mensen die ze kenden uit het dagelijks leven. Pro-sociale
proefpersonen waren beter dan verwacht mocht worden op basis van kans in het accuraat
schatten van de orientaties van anderen, in tegenstelling tot individualisten en
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competitieven. Dit resultaat stemt overeen met een essentieel verschil in ervaringen tussen
mensen met verschillende orientaties. Pro-sociale personen verschuiven meestal naar
minder pro-sociaal gedrag wanneer ze geconfronteerd worden met individualistisch of
competitief gedrag. Individualisten en competitieven vertonen een dergelijke verschuiving
niet. Omdat pro-sociale personen hun eigen gedrag vaker aan dat van anderen moeten
aanpassen, letten ze waarschijnlijk beter op het gedrag van anderen en zijn daarom beter
getraind in het ontdekken van onderliggende sociale orientaties van alledaags gedrag.
Tenslotte werd nog een resultaat gevonden dat inconsistent is met de redenering achter de
driehoekshypothese. Er werd namelijk geen relatie gevonden tussen de accuraatheid van
percepties van andermans orientaties en consensusverwachtingen.
In Hoofistuk 6 wordt een overzicht gegeven van relevante onderzoeksresultaten in
deze dissertatie met betrekking tot de driehoekshypothese, hetgeen leidt tot het falsifieren
van de driehoekshypothese. Ook de voorspelling van de structured assumed similarity bias
(Kuhlman et al., (1992) wordt op basis van deze resultaten gefalsifieerd. Een alternatief
model wordt voorgesteld, waarin aangepaste ideeen van Kuhlman en Wimberley (1976),
Ross et al. (1977) en Kelley en Stahelski (1970b) zon geintegreerd. Het wordt het
kegelmodel genoemd, vanwege de vorm die ontstaat als de frequenties van
consensusverwachtingen als staven op een vlak van sociale orientaties worden
geprojecteerd, en de staven hoger worden in de nabijheid van individualisme. Het
kegelmodel bestaat uit drie principes. Het eerste principe is dat individualisme in hoge
mate wordt verwacht, ongeacht de eigen orientatie. Het tweede principe is dat personen
geneigd zijn het voorkomen van hun eigen orientatie te overschatten, vergeleken met de
verwachting van die orientatie door personen met andere orientaties; dit is het false
consensus effect. Het derde principe preciseert de eerste twee principes nader. Een hoge
verwachting van een bepaalde orientatie heeft implicaties voor de verwachting van
nabijgelegen orientaties op een vlak van sociale orientaties. Een post hoc analyse op de
gecombineerde gegevens van de vier onderzoekingen onthulde ieder van de drie principes
en vertoonde geen andere effecten. Het hoofdstuk wordt besloten met suggesties voor
verder onderzoek.
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STELLINGEN
I
De bewering van Kuhlman, Brown en Teta dat de vraag naar de verdeling van sociale
orientaties onder klasgenoten (p. 118) weerspiegelt hoe de sociale orientaties in de
algemene populatie ('generalpopulation 9 zijn verdeeld (p. 128), wordt in dit proefschrift
genuanceerd.
Kuhlman, D. M., Brown, C., & Teta, P. 1992. Judgments of cooperation
and  defection in social dilemmas: The moderating  role of judge's social
orientation. In: W. Liebrand, D. Messick, & H. Wilke (Eds.), A social
psychological approach to social dilemmas.  Oxford: Pergamon Press.
II
Kelley en Stahelski stellen dat verwachtingen over verdelingen van orientaties in een
populatie gebaseerd zijn op ervaringen met het gedrag van mensen uit die populatie Dit
mechanisme blijkt alleen op te gaan voor pro-sociaal georienteerde personen.
Kelley, H. H. & Stahelski, A. J. 1970. Social interaction basis of
cooperators' and competitors' beliefs about others. Journal Of Personalio'
and Social Psychology, 16, 66-91.
III
Hoewel Popper waarschijnlijk hoofdpijn zou krijgen van het gezegde dat de uitzondering
de regel bevestigt, onderstreept de zeldzame vondst van een fWse uniqueness efect de
robuustheid  van  het fWse consensus e#ect.
W
Dat de consensusschatting van de eigen sociale waardenorientatie verschilt voor populaties
van bekenden en onbekenden, geeft aan dat mensen hun schattingen proberen te
compenseren voor selectieve blootsteUing aan bekenden.
V
Benamingen als fWse consensus en onrealistisch optimisme getuigen van weinig respect
voor de soms indrukwekkende accuraatheid waarmee mensen schattingen maken.
Nisbett R. E. & Kunda, Z. 1985. Perception of social distributions. Journal
of Personality  and  Social  Psychology,   48,  291-311.
VI
De door onderzoekers veel gemaakte fout dat de orientatievector van individualisten tussen
22 5 en 337 5 graden ligt, duidt erop dat onderzoekers het voorkomen van individualisme
zwaar overschatten.
VII
Het onderbouwen van ordinaire bezuiningsmaatregelen met het argument dat we niet in de
pas lopen met omringende landen heeft een interessante keerzijde: zo is in Duitsland
bijvoorbeeld de accijns op auto's en benzine veel lager dan in Nederland, en heeft men in
Groot Brittannie gratis gezondheidszorg.
VIII
Het is vreemd dat het middel AZT werd toegediend ter bestrijding van aids terwijl de
werkzaamheid niet ondubbelzinnig was aangetoond; het wekt nog meer bevreemding dat
de toediening van AZT niet wordt gestaakt nu de onwerkzaamheid is aangetoond.
IX
Het werken aan een proefschrift verschaft dubbel plezier: ten eerste als men er mee bezig
is, en ten tweede als men er mee kan ophouden.
X
Deze stelling is niet erg substantieel, maar wordt hier toch vermeld vanwege de
volledigheid.
XI
Vond u Loesje ook leuker toen u nog niet wist dat ze commercieel was?
XII
Het tekstverwerkerspakket WordPe ct is het inderdaad nog lang niet.
Stellingen bij het proefschrift, getiteld 'The perceived consensus of one's social value
orientation' van J. Iedema
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